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ABSTRACT	
	
ENACTING	THE	SEMANTIC	WEB:	ONTOLOGIAL	ORDERINGS,	NEGOTIATED	STANDARDS,	AND	
HUMAN-MACHINE	TRANSLATIONS	
	
by	
Matthew	T.	McCarthy	
	
The	University	of	Wisconsin-Milwaukee.	2017	
Under	the	Supervision	of	Professor	Aneesh	Aneesh	
	
	
Artificial	intelligence	(AI)	that	is	based	upon	semantic	search	has	become	one	of	the	dominant	
means	for	accessing	information	in	recent	years.	This	is	particularly	the	case	in	mobile	contexts,	
as	search	based	AI	are	embedded	in	each	of	the	major	mobile	operating	systems.	The	
implications	are	such	that	information	is	becoming	less	a	matter	of	choosing	between	different	
sets	of	results,	and	more	of	a	presentation	of	a	single	answer,	limiting	both	the	availability	of	
and	exposure	to,	alternate	sources	of	information.	Thus,	it	is	essential	to	understand	how	that	
information	comes	to	be	structured	and	how	deterministic	systems	like	search	based	AI	come	
to	understand	the	indeterminate	worlds	they	are	tasked	with	interrogating.	The	semantic	web,	
one	of	the	technologies	underpinning	these	systems,	creates	machine-readable	data	from	the	
existing	web	of	text	and	formalizes	those	machine-readable	understandings	in	ontologies.	This	
study	investigates	the	ways	that	those	semantic	assemblages	structure,	and	thus	define,	the	
world.	In	accordance	with	assemblage	theory,	it	is	necessary	to	study	the	interactions	between	
the	components	that	make	up	such	data	assemblages.	As	yet,	the	social	sciences	have	been	
slow	to	systematically	investigate	data	assemblages,	the	semantic	web,	and	the	components	of	
these	important	socio-technical	systems.	This	study	investigates	one	major	ontology,	
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Schema.org.	It	uses	netnographic	methods	to	study	the	construction	and	use	of	Schema.org	to	
determine	how	ontological	states	are	declared	and	how	human-machine	translations	occur	in	
those	development	and	use	processes.	This	study	has	two	main	findings	that	bear	on	the	
relevant	literature.	First,	I	find	that	development	and	use	of	the	ontology	is	a	product	of	
negotiations	with	technical	standards	such	that	ontologists	and	users	must	work	around,	with,	
and	through	the	affordances	and	constraints	of	standards.	Second,	these	groups	adopt	a	
pragmatic	and	generalizable	approach	to	data	modeling	and	semantic	markup	that	determines	
ontological	context	in	local	and	global	ways.	This	first	finding	is	significant	in	that	past	work	has	
largely	focused	on	how	people	work	around	standards’	limitations,	whereas	this	shows	that	
practitioners	also	strategically	engage	with	standards	to	achieve	their	aims.	Second,	the	
particular	approach	that	these	groups	use	in	translating	human	knowledge	to	machines,	differs	
from	the	formalized	and	positivistic	approaches	described	in	past	work.	At	a	larger	level,	this	
study	fills	a	lacuna	in	the	collective	understanding	of	how	data	assemblages	are	constructed	
and	operate.			
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	“The	computer	takes	our	own	superlative	power	over	worlds	as	the	condition	of	possibility	for	
the	creation	of	worlds.	Our	intense	investment	in	worlds	—	our	acute	fact	finding,	our	scanning	
and	data	mining,	our	spidering	and	extracting	—	is	the	precondition	for	how	worlds	are	
revealed.	The	promise	is	not	one	of	revealing	something	as	it	is,	but	in	simulating	a	thing	so	
effectively	that	“what	it	is”	becomes	less	and	less	necessary	to	speak	about,	not	because	it	is	
gone	for	good,	but	because	we	have	perfected	a	language	for	it.”	
-	Alexander	R.	Galloway:	The	Interface	Effect	
	1	
1.	Introduction	
	
More	than	once	over	the	past	year,	the	webmaster	for	Schema.org	was	approached	
about	using	the	project	to	help	automate	political	and	journalistic	fact	checking	and	reducing	
the	impact	of	fake	news.	The	main	concern	being	that	fake	news,	and/or	misleading	claims,	
might	be	damaging	to	one’s	ability	to	inform	oneself	and	to	carry	on	as	an	engaged	citizen,	as	
incorrect,	improper,	or	incomplete	information	can	lead	to	incorrect	attributions	and	false	
conclusions	in	the	populous.	Working	though	this	conceptual	morass	is	complicated.	
Recognizing	something	as	false,	requires	interpretation	on	the	part	of	the	reader,	however,	this	
interpretation	is	seemingly	not	happening,	or	is	not	happening	enough	for	this	issue	to	gain	
such	prominence.	Popular	expressions	of	anxiety	have	contributed	to	a	collective	blame	
shifting,	placing	the	onus	for	filtering	out	fake	news	onto	the	owners	of	the	platforms	that	
deliver	it.	In	the	United	States,	companies	like	Google	and	Facebook	have	begun	applying	a	host	
of	technological	fixes	to	the	problem,	allowing	machines	to	algorithmically	filter	results.	One	
solution,	employed	by	Google,	implicates	Schema.org	and	relies	on	an	infrastructural	shift	in	
the	way	that	Web	information	is	structured,	represented,	and	recalled.	This	shift	involves	
converting	news	articles	and	their	claims	into	machine-readable	data	to	indicate	to	an	artificial	
intelligence	(AI)	or	other	computational	agent,	that	a	piece	of	content	is	analysis,	background,	
opinion,	reportage,	or	review.	Furthermore,	this	conversion	can	take	up	individual,	or	sets	of	
claims	made	to	determine	their	truthfulness	and	to	reference	fact-checking	entities	whose	job	
it	is	to	review	such	claims.					
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How	does	a	machine	know	what	fake	is,	though?	How	does	an	AI	know	the	difference	
between	a	true	claim	and	one	that	has	been	debunked?	How	does	a	computer	know	if	content	
is	a	sponsored	advertisement,	or	content	that	is	newsworthy,	but	sponsored?	How	can	it	
understand	how	a	fact	checked	claim	relates	to	the	contexts	in	which	the	claim	was	originally	
used	or	was	reproduced?	In	sum,	on	what	basis	is	a	computer’s	understanding	of	the	world	
built?	Heather	Ford	and	Mark	Graham	(2016)	note	a	different,	but	similar,	problem.	They	ask	
what	effects	the	mediation	of	Web	information	has	on	the	representation	of	different	places.	
Specifically,	they	inquire	about	this	just	noted	infrastructural	shift	in	information	recall	and	
presentation.	They	investigate	the	ways	that	the	city	of	Jerusalem	is	represented	by	Wikipedia,	
Wikidata,	and	Google,	as	well	as	the	consequences	of	the	way	translations	between	those	sites	
occur.	In	this	process	of	translating	information	between	Wikipedia,	Wikidata,	and	Google,	
much	definitional	nuance	is	lost,	as	both	Wikidata	and	Google	obscure	Jerusalem’s	complex	
historically	grounded	claims	of	ownership	and	importance	and	over-determine	its	political	
status	(Ford	and	Graham	2016).		
In	this	work,	they	also	show	that	the	provenance	of	important	statistical	data	describing	
Jerusalem	is	obscured	in	different	ways	across	these	three	domains.	They	argue	that	the	
population	statistics,	particularly	of	Jerusalem,	reflects	a	certain	political	position	that	obscures	
the	precise	nature	of	the	people	who	are	doing	the	counting,	and	those	who	are	counted.	They	
show	that	these	important	details	of	provenance	are	lost	in	the	translations	from	Wikipedia.	
Lastly,	they	also	note	that	a	user’s	agency	to	make	changes	and	their	ability	to	interrogate	
alternate	information	is	limited	as	these	translations	occur.	Where	users	have	the	ability	to	
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actively	engage	with	information	on	Wikipedia,	no	such	agency	exists	in	Wikidata	and	Google1.	
What	causes	this	loss	of	nuance,	obscured	provenance,	and	reduction	in	a	user’s	ability	to	
change	and	interrogate	information?	How	are	these	two	problems	of	automated	fake	news	
filtration	and	the	problems	of	information	retrieval	and	representation	linked?		
	 These	stories	orient	us	to	one	of	three	major	changes	in	the	way	that	information	
currently	exists	on	the	Web.	The	change	at	the	center	them	is	one	of	infrastructure	and	its	
relation	to	data.	This	first	change	reflects	a	new	implementation	of	the	means	for	representing,	
interpreting,	connecting,	and	retrieving	data	on	the	Web.	It	is	an	implementation	where	human	
interpretation	is	one	more	additional	level	removed	from	the	underlying	data,	with	an	
additional	insertion	point	for	computational	agents	to	mediate	information,	one	where	
information	is	actually	premediated.	This	change	is	one	that	affects	the	thing	actually	being	
parsed	in	any	search.		Before	I	examine	the	new	structural	change	introduced	above,	I	will	point	
to	the	second	major	change,	the	way	that	information	on	the	Web	is	accessed	and	retrieved.		
While	search	is	still	the	dominant	means	through	which	information	is	accessed	on	the	
Internet,	the	nature	of	search	has	changed,	and	promises	to	change	further.	There	is	no	novelty	
in	claiming	that	search	based	information	retrieval	is	changing,	as	work	has	extensively	covered	
the	effects	of	Web	search,	particularly	as	it	pertains	to	Google	and	its	marked	shift	from	past	
search	forms	(Halavais	2009;	Introna	and	Nissenbaum	2000;	Viadhyanathan	2012).	However,	
																																																						
1	On	this	last	point,	I	disagree.	This	study	examines	exactly	the	ways	in	which	information	
seekers	engage	with	the	technologies	underpinning	Ford	and	Graham’s	work.	Such	
development	communities	are	open	and	participation	driven.	However,	their	analysis	should	
give	cause	to	consider	an	important	related	issue	about	both	the	expertise	required	to	
participate	in	a	meaningful	way,	as	well	as	the	practical	transparency	the	processes	and	
technologies	involved	in	semantic	search.		
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there	is	value	is	stating	the	nature	of	those	changes,	insofar	as	those	changes	coincide	with	a	
change	in	interface.	Just	as	the	shift	from	the	page	to	the	screen	prompted	a	movement	to	
rethink	information	access,	the	shift	from	the	desktop	to	the	mobile	device	should	prompt	
another	(Galloway	2012).		
	 Consider	the	following,	the	interface	through	which	search	takes	place	is	now	primarily	
mobile.	Between	52%	-	71%	of	all	Web	traffic	is	mobile	depending	on	source	and	country.	Over	
50%	of	Google	search	is	now	mobile,	though	Google	offers	no	geo-demographic	detail	beyond	
that	(Chaffey	2016;	Meller	and	Cohen	2015).	One	estimate	by	Hitwise	reports	that	roughly	58%	
of	all	Web	search	is	mobile,	though	they	too	do	not	offer	more	detailed	distinctions	(Fetto	
2016).	Moreover,	these	rates	have	increased	year	over	year.	Perhaps	most	telling	in	these	
regards,	is	that	Google	is	switching	its	primary	search	index	from	desktop	to	mobile	sites.	This	
last	fact	has	major	consequences	for	what	information	appears	and	what	does	not,	as	content	
now	faces	increased	competition	for	a	newly	constrained	display	space.	All	of	this	is	to	say	that	
mobile	search	is	more	prominent	than	desktop	search	and	its	interface	is	newly	limiting.		
	 The	third	major	change	is	in	the	method	of	access.	It	is	not	just	that	search	and	Web	
access	shifted	to	a	mobile	interface,	but	mobile	interfaces	themselves	are	seeing	a	concurrent	
shift.	While	search	sites	still	draw	traffic,	search	is	now	integrated	as	a	fundamental	feature	of	
mobile	operating	systems.	Since	2011,	these	mobiles	operating	systems	–	Android,	iOS,	and	
Windows	Mobile	–	have	had	search	based	artificial	intelligence	systems	embedded	into	their	
platforms	as	an	increasingly	dominant	means	through	which	users	interact	with	their	devices.	
This	has	the	practical	consequence	of	allowing	mobile	search	to	occur	outside	of	a	Web	
browser,	and	instead	promotes	search	through	the	mediating	effects	of	predictive	AI.	While	
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researches	do	not	know	the	precise	nature	of	the	many	algorithms	that	each	major	search	
engine	deploys,	we	do	know	that	those	search	companies	now	rely	on	semantic	data,	rather	
than	“raw”	text,	for	their	search	results.	Search	is	now	mobile,	AI	driven,	and	semantic.		
	 As	a	preliminary	concern,	why	does	this	matter?	Indexical	search	already	filters	
information,	and	has	done	so	algorithmically	for	decades.	Adding	to	the	issues	covered	in	past	
work,	I	point	to	at	least	three	main	reasons	(Halavais	2009;	Introna	and	Nissenbaum	2000;	
Viadhyanathan	2012).	First,	as	display	space	decreases,	decisions	about	what	to	display	and	
what	to	omit	take	on	a	new	heightened	significance.	Second,	the	presentation	of	results	
matters.	Rank	order	of	results	enrolls	users	and	search	companies	in	a	trust	relationship	where	
users	trust	that	the	search	engine	is	displaying	the	correct	and	most	relevant	information	to	
their	query.	This	has	the	effect	of	drawing	users’	attention	to	the	first	few	results,	making	highly	
unlikely	that	they	view	lower	ranked	results,	with	results	on	later	pages	even	less	likely	to	
generate	traffic	(Jansen	and	Spink	2003;	Jansen	et	al.	2000;	Spink	and	Jansen	2004).	This	is	
particularly	salient	when	search	results	are	viewed	on	a	mobile	page,	as	the	first	few	options	
are	the	only	options	immediately	visible.	Lastly,	we	do	not	know	precisely	how	search	
algorithms	sort	and	present	results	or	how	recent	AI	systems	augment	search.	Some	general	
knowledge	exists	about	the	processes,	but	exact	details	elude	us,	as	they	rest	on	a	hidden	
combination	of	technologies	and	algorithms	whose	implementation	are	often	trade	secrets	and	
differ	depending	on	the	company	at	hand.	That	is,	they	are	notoriously	black	boxed.	However,	
one	such	technology	has	not	yet	shifted	completely	into	the	background:	the	semantic	web.	
	 Recently,	search	engines	have	been	drawing	on	linked	data	technologies,	creating	and	
enabling	what	is	more	conventionally	referred	to	as	the	semantic	web.	The	semantic	web	is	an	
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additional	layer	to	the	World	Wide	Web	(WWW)	where	content	is	given	machine-readable	
context	and	meaning.	Just	as	Hypertext	Markup	Language	(HTML)	provides	standards	for	a	
describing	a	logical	section	of	a	Web	document,	the	semantic	web	provides	a	series	of	
standards	for	creating	meaningful	data	and	content	from	that	Web	content	(Berners-Lee	et	al.	
2001;	Giri	2011;	Halford	et	al.	2012;	Legg	2013).	This	web	of	linked	data	converts	an	
unstructured	web	of	textual	information	to	a	structured	web	of	semantic	data	by	providing	the	
definition	of	terms,	properties,	and	the	formal	statements	of	relationships,	all	of	which	become	
marked	and	interlinked	by	Web	developers	through	recourse	to	semantic	ontologies.	For	
example,	a	computational	agent,	such	as	a	search	based	AI,	would	understand	that	Dune	is	a	
creative	work	authored	by	Frank	Herbert	in	1965	and	has	the	fictional	characters,	Paul	Atreides,	
Vladimir	Harkonen,	and	Feyd-Rautha,	among	others.	If	the	Web	data	was	encoded	correctly,	an	
agent	could	start	at	any	point	in	that	chain	of	relationships	and	divine	the	entire	set	of	them,	all	
by	dereferencing	the	parsed	content	through	the	ontology.		
	 As	search	is	now	semantic	and	AI	driven,	it	becomes	increasingly	important	to	
understand	how	machines	arrive	at	their	understandings	of	the	world	and	the	consequence	of	
those	processes,	even	with	the	benign	example	above.	Despite	this	importance,	we	as	a	public	
and	as	scholars	are	not	aware	of	the	ways	these	technologies	are	developed,	much	less	how	
they	declare	the	world.	Ford	and	Graham	(2016)	provide	an	excellent	example	to	show	some	of	
the	practical	and	theoretical	consequences	of	the	move	to	the	semantic	web,	but	only	point	to	
a	need	for	further	research	to	understand	how	those	processes	occur	and	how	their	
information	subjects	are	brought	into	being.	So,	it	is	an	understanding	of	those	declarations	
that	this	study	attempts	to	expose.	Much	like	the	laboratory	studies	from	years	past,	this	study	
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opens	Pandora’s	black	box	before	its	contents	become	cemented	and	obscured	(Knorr-Cetina	
1999;	Latour	1988;	Latour	and	Woolgar	1986;	Mol	2002).	Thus,	I	am	led	to	the	following	
empirical	question,	how	are	these	semantic	data	assemblages	enacted?	Such	a	question	is	not	
easy	to	answer,	as	it	first	involves	unearthing	the	answers	to	a	host	of	subsidiary	questions.	
First	among	them,	investigates	how	ontological	states	are	declared	in	the	processes	of	
developing	and	using	the	semantic	web.	This	question	is	primarily	theoretical	in	that	it	attends	
to	the	particular	delimiting	of	meaning	space.	The	second	question	asks,	how	are	the	
complexities	of	a	flexible	and	non-deterministic	world	represented	to	a	deterministic	machine?	
This	question	is	primarily	empirical,	as	it	attends	to	the	various	interactions	between	actual	
components	of	a	given	data	assemblage.	
	 These	two	overarching	questions	are	both	questions	of	ontologies.	At	first	glance,	they	
appear	as	distinct	interpretations	of	the	term,	but	under	closer	analysis	they	converge	to	
describe	the	same	underlying	thing.	This	discussion	is	not	driven	by	the	classical	questions	of	
what	it	is	to	be,	but	rather	how	one	becomes.	A	Deleuzian	ontology	concerns	itself	not	with	
essences	or	the	nature	of	a	thing,	but	with	capacities	and	how	a	thing	is	actualized	as	it	enters	
into	webs	of	relationships	(DeLanda	2006,	2011;	Deleuze	1964[1995];	Deleuze	and	Guattari	
1987;	May	2005).	A	thing,	or	multiplicity	for	Deleuze,	has	no	essential	character	but	that	which	
is	active	in	a	given	moment,	as	a	part	of	a	given	assemblage.	Thus,	the	question	of	what	
something	is,	takes	on	less	significance	than	how	something	becomes,	as	it	requires	an	
understanding	of	the	processes	of	connection.	His	approach	to	ontology	rests	on	the	
assumption	that	the	ontological	is	unstable	and	cannot	ever	be	known,	only	modeled	through	
its	integration	in	an	assemblage	under	the	particular	expressive	logic	of	that	assemblage.	As	
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such,	we	can	equate	the	contexts	of	activation	and	integration	with	the	ontological	state	of	the	
thing.	So,	the	previous	question	on	becoming	can	be	reframed	as	a	question	of	how	the	
assemblage	is	enacted,	or	called	into	being	(Mol	2002;	Woolgar	and	Lezaun	2013).	Accordingly,	
ontology	is	not	fixed	and	it	demands	an	understanding	of	its	settlement,	particularly	as	
ontologies	in	this	paradigm	are	multiple	(Deleuze	1964[1995];	Hoffman	2015;	May	2005;	Mol	
2002;	Woolgar	and	Lezaun	2013).	In	simpler	and	more	directly	relevant	terms,	how	is	ontology	
declared	by	ontologies?	The	trick,	as	Deleuze	would	argue,	is	uncovering	those	enrollments	and	
activations	in	assemblages.	This	is	the	task	that	I	will	turn	to,	shortly.		
	 The	answer	to	my	questions	requires	an	understanding	of	the	data	assemblage	
surrounding	the	semantic	web.	To	understand	a	data	assemblage,	one	needs	to	take	stock	of	its	
various	components	and	examine	the	ways	in	which	those	components	interact	to	continually	
produce	the	assemblage.	Broadly	speaking,	the	semantic	web	is	too	large	and	dispersed	a	thing	
for	a	focused	empirical	study,	as	it,	like	all	assemblages,	is	composed	of	many	other	
assemblages.	In	this	case,	that	means	many	other	ontologies,	users,	consumers,	technologies,	
etc.	In	an	effort	to	set	empirical	boundaries	and	to	focus	this	study,	I	engage	with	one	such	
assemblage,	Schema.org.	As	only	one	component	of	the	larger	semantic	web,	Schema.org	is	an	
ontology	development	project	spearheaded	by	Google,	Microsoft,	Yahoo,	and	Yandex	that	
attempts	to	create	semantic	data	for	the	World	Wide	Web.	Currently,	it	is	among	the	largest	
and	most	used	semantic	web	ontologies,	covering	approximately	10%	of	existing	Web	content,	
with	major	users	including	the	Google,	Microsoft,	Yahoo,	and	Yandex	search	based	ecosystems,	
in	addition	to	a	substantial	number	of	other	large	Web	domains	(Guha	2014;	Nevile	2014).		
	9	
	 This	study	relies	on	the	in-depth	case	study	of	the	users,	developers,	vocabulary,	
markup	standards,	and	digital	artifacts	directly	associated	with	the	Schema.org	project.	As	both	
the	objects	of	investigation	and	their	impact	on	my	research	questions	are	diverse,	multiple	
methodological	approaches	drawn	from	recent	work	on	digital	technologies	are	employed.	I	
deploy	netnographic,	or	digital	ethnographic,	methods	across	a	number	of	digital	sites	that	are	
central	to	Schema.org’s	development.	Netnographic	practice	allows	for	a	situated	analysis	of	
community	engagement	available	in	online	forums,	providing	a	set	of	observational	data	similar	
to,	but	more	reliable	than	field	notes	and	artifacts	from	traditional	ethnographic	methods	
(Kozinets	2010;	Springer	2015).	Additionally,	I	use	an	object	based	analysis,	similar	to	
multimodal	discourse	analysis,	to	interrogate	the	markup	standards	used	by	the	project.	This	
approach	allowed	me	to	identify	and	interrogate	the	ways	that	discursive	patterns	help	to	
shape	affordances	and	prohibitions,	the	ways	of	being	and	the	constraints	that	might	be	placed	
on	being,	the	ways	of	doing	and	the	constraints	placed	on	practice,	and	the	ways	of	
representing	and	the	constraints	on	possible	claims	making	through	markup	standards	(Introna	
2005,	2014;	Introna	and	Hayes	2011;	Kress	and	van	Leewuen	2006;	Lupton	2014;	O’Halloran	
2011).	
	 The	remainder	of	this	work	unfolds	in	the	following	way:	first,	in	chapter	two	I	provide	a	
detailed	explanation	of	how	the	semantic	web	works	in	both	theory	and	practice.	In	addition	to	
explaining	its	operation,	I	discuss	the	limited	amount	of	work	directly	pertaining	to	the	
semantic	web.	This	work,	like	Ford	and	Graham’s	(2016)	study,	offers	us	a	set	of	critiques	and	
potential	consequences	in	implementing	a	semantic	web.	However,	it	is	not	focused	on	the	
processes	of	its	development	or	use,	and	makes	no	reference	to	the	various	standards	involved.	
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The	most	notable	of	its	consequences	include	the	interrelated	processes	of	ontological	over-
determination	and	ontic	occlusion	(Ginsberg	2008;	Knobel	2010).	This	section	argues	that	
ontologies,	as	taxonomic	orderings	of	the	world,	are	fully	determinate	systems,	and	what	can	
be	known	and/or	represented	in	them	is	bound	completely	by	the	terms	set	out	in	those	
ontologies.	That	is,	they	permit	a	predetermined	range	of	claims	that	can	be	made	against	
them.	This	is	inadequate	for	representing	the	indeterminacy	of	natural	language	and	the	
environment	of	meaning	in	which	it	exists.		
	 Chapter	three	establishes	my	theoretical	assumptions	and	engages	with	the	extant	
literature	relevant	to	data	assemblages	and	their	components.	I	expand	on	recent	attempts	to	
study	data	assemblages	by	situating	my	research	within	an	assemblage	theoretical	perspective	
(Kitchin	2014a,	2014b;	Kitchin	and	Lauriault	2014;	Kitchin	et	al.	2015a,	2015b).	An	assemblage	
based	approach	to	my	main	questions	requires	resolving	a	number	of	smaller	questions	
relevant	to	literatures	describing	and	explaining	the	various	components	of	data	assemblages.	
The	small,	but	growing,	work	on	data	assemblages	encourages	researchers	to	take	these	
various	components	as	interrelated	features	of	the	larger	assemblage,	studying	not	what	the	
components	do	in	isolation,	but	how	they	interact	to	produce	the	assemblage	of	which	they	are	
a	part.	Among	the	ones	drawn	on	in	this	chapter	are,	literatures	on	standards,	infrastructures,	
classification,	and	communities	of	practice.	The	existing	work	on	standards	argues	that	
standards	play	a	central	role	in	affording	and	constraining	action	and	interpretation	vis-à-vis	
technologies,	and	in	so	doing,	they	help	to	bridge	diverse	communities	of	practice	and	
infrastructures	as	mechanisms	for	interoperability.	However,	the	ways	in	which	these	
communities	negotiate	these	limitations	is	under-studied.	Relatedly,	classification	systems	play	
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a	similar	role,	enabling	the	storage	and	retrieval	of	information.	Problematically,	they	can	
render	certain	beings	invisible	when	they	are	neglected	by	the	system.	Thus,	what	is	included	
and	excluded,	as	well	as	how	those	decisions	are	made,	take	on	a	central	importance.	
Sociological	research	in	these	areas,	particularly	that	which	engages	with	science	and	
technology	studies,	situates	these	classification	systems,	infrastructures,	and	standards	in	
communities	of	practice	that	bring	to	bear	a	diverse	set	of	knowledges,	assumptions,	and	
techniques	in	their	interactions	with	these	components.	So,	this	literature	prompts	
consideration	of	questions	about	how	these	communities	of	practice	engage	with,	and	
negotiate,	the	affordances	and	constraints	of	not	only	the	standards	involved,	but	also	the	
limitations	of	classification,	and	techniques	of	representation	presented	by	those	other	
components.		
	 Chapter	four	provides	a	detailed	description	of	how	one	goes	about	studying	hidden	
infrastructure-like	systems	such	as	the	semantic	web.	In	this	case	and	methodology	chapter,	I	
provide	further	detail	about	Schema.org	as	a	specific	implementation	of	the	semantic	web.	In	
this	chapter,	I	describe	the	case	that	guides	my	research.	This	part	includes	a	description	of	
Schema.org,	the	major	institutions	attached	to	the	project,	the	communities	of	practice	that	are	
most	closely	involved	in	its	development	and	its	use,	the	vocabulary	that	constitutes	the	
project,	and	the	primary	markup	standards	implicated	in	its	creation	and	use.	The	next	segment	
in	this	chapter	describes	the	primary	sites	where	my	research	occurred.	This	included	
Schema.org’s	GitHub	repository,	the	World	Wide	Web	Consortium	(W3C)	message	boards,	and	
sources	of	documentation	for	the	three	markup	standards	supported	by	Schema.org.	
Additionally,	this	chapter	provides	a	detailed	explanation	of	both	the	data	collection	process	
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and	the	preparation	for	analysis.	In	this	section,	I	also	provide	a	detailed	outline	of	the	two	
main	methodological	techniques	used	in	this	study	as	alluded	to	above.	Lastly,	I	review	the	
limitations	of	my	methodology	and	include	a	statement	of	researcher’s	standpoint	and	bias	that	
such	a	study	necessarily	brings	about.	I	also	include	a	description	of	the	ways	that	my	research	
changed	as	the	investigation	unfolded.			
	 Answering	my	larger	questions	necessitates	that	I	first	attend	to	smaller	questions.	
Specifically,	I	need	to	uncover	the	ways	in	which	the	various	components	of	the	Schema.org	
assemblage	interact.	Two	central	components	are	the	communities	of	practice	and	the	markup	
standards	that	enable	Schema.org	to	function	as	a	semantic	web	ontology.	Chapter	five	
explains	the	three	markup	standards	supported	by	Schema.org	and	the	way	that	they	condition	
its	development	and	use.	This	chapter	extends	recent	work	that	both	locates	standards	at	the	
level	of	professional	practice,	and	that	investigates	how	blockages	are	negotiated	and	how	the	
restrictions	created	by	standardization	are	relaxed	while	still	permitting	the	interoperability	
they	are	designed	to	enable.	I	show	how	the	markup	standards	used	with	Schema.org	are	
deployed	across	the	two	primary	fields	of	practice	implicated	in	the	project.	In	line	with	existing	
work	on	standards	and	classification,	I	show	the	ways	in	which	they	set	certain	affordances	and	
constraints	on	the	development	and	use	of	the	Schema.org	ontology,	and	thus	the	affordances	
and	constraints	placed	upon	the	enactment	of	the	data	assemblage.	However,	I	also	show	the	
ways	that	these	standards	work	against	the	thing	they	are	supposed	to	enable,	and	how	the	
communities	of	practice	negotiate	those	restrictions,	adding	to	recent	work	on	this	front	
(Halpin	2016).	Furthermore,	I	detail	some	of	the	unintended	consequences	of	those	
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negotiations	and	how	they	can	serve	to	over-determine	and	occlude	certain	understandings	of	
the	world.	
As	previously	noted,	the	particular	form	that	any	given	assemblage	takes	is	dependent	
on	the	interactions	between	the	assemblage’s	components.	Thus,	following	from	chapter	five,	
the	study	of	semantic	web	ontologies	must	necessarily	engage	with	the	questions	relating	to	
processes	of	creation	and	the	interactions	between	other	components.	In	chapter	six,	I	am	
concerned	with	the	specific	apparatuses	that	include,	systems	of	thought,	practices,	and	
communities	(Kitchin	2014b:25).	Within	these	apparatuses	are	the	conceptual	models,	
rationalities,	techniques,	conventions,	and	the	communities	involved	in	applying	those	systems	
of	thinking	and	forms	of	practice.	As	such,	this	chapter	examines	the	interactions	between	
those	various	elements	of	the	Schema.org	data	assemblage.	In	this	section	I	concentrate	on	the	
two	main	communities	of	practice	relevant	to	Schema.org,	the	ontologists	charged	with	the	
vocabulary’s	creation	and	maintenance,	and	the	Web	developers	who	deploy	the	vocabulary	to	
convert	their	content	into	semantic	data.	Through	this,	I	reveal	the	ways	that	Schema.org’s	
ontologists	adapt	the	Resource	Description	Framework	(RDF)	data	model	to	their	specific	
needs.	Additionally,	I	examine	their	underlying	philosophical	approach	to	modeling	semantic	
data,	the	problems	they	encounter	in	doing	so,	and	the	consequences	of	the	ways	in	which	they	
negotiate	those	problems.	I	argue	here	that	these	approaches	have	the	consequences	of	
creating	indeterminacy	surrounding	a	trade-off	of	semantic	precision	and	coverage	that	cannot	
be	resolved.	Furthermore,	their	approach	creates	a	certain	path	dependency	that	helps	
contribute	to	the	over-determination	and	occlusion	mentioned	above.		
	14	
Finally,	in	chapter	seven,	I	draw	together	the	various	threads	developed	throughout	this	
study,	both	to	answer	my	motivating	questions,	as	well	as	to	outline	my	contribution	to	the	
emerging	literature	on	data	studies	and	the	semantic	web.	Here	I	argue	that	the	combination	of	
negotiating	the	affordances	and	constraints	of	markup	standards	and	the	particular	approach	
to	modeling	semantic	data,	leads	to	a	premediated	Web	environment	(Aneesh	2017).	The	
representation	of	the	world,	and	thus	the	version	of	it	that	becomes	available,	is	being	read	
behind	the	scenes	and	being	presented	as	already	digested	information.	Returning	to	my	initial	
vignette	and	to	Ford	and	Graham	(2016),	I	expose	and	examine	the	processes	and	technologies	
by	which	a	computer	can	know	the	nature	of	a	news	source	and	claim,	as	well	as	how	a	city	like	
Jerusalem	can	be	over-determined	as	simply	the	capital	city	of	Israel,	as	opposed	to	a	city	of	a	
rich,	but	contested	linage.	Not	only	is	this	study	a	problematization	of	the	means	for	
representing,	but	it	is	also	a	new	provocation	to	the	sociological	study	of	information	access.	
This	is	not	pass	normative	judgment	on	the	semantic	web	or	the	way	that	its	various	
practitioners	implement	it,	as	they	themselves	recognize	the	imperfect	nature	of	their	work.	
Instead,	it	is	recognition	that	the	information	environment	is	being	encoded,	and	that	encoding	
is	rapidly	being	settled	outside	of	visible	Internet	space.		
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2.	What	is	the	Semantic	Web?	
	
This	chapter	serves	as	an	orientation	to	the	semantic	web	and	the	data	model	
underpinning	it.	As	such,	it	begins	to	unravel	the	puzzle	of	its	deployment	and	ossification.	It	
charts	a	description	of	the	semantic	web	and	outlines	its	essential	differences	from	the	World	
Wide	Web.	Through	a	series	of	empirical	examples,	it	provides	an	initial	understanding	of	how	a	
machine	can	come	to	know	something,	how	the	system	that	permits	that	knowing	ontologically	
orders	the	world,	and	offers	glimpses	of	potential	consequences	of	such	orderings.		
Initially	a	proposal	by	Sir	Tim	Berners-Lee,	the	inventor	of	the	World	Wide	Web,	the	
semantic	web	is	an	additional	layer	sitting	on	top	of	the	existing	Web	where	content	is	given	
machine-readable	context	and	meaning	(Berners-Lee	et	al.	2001;	Giri	2011;	Halford	et	al.	2012;	
Legg	2013).	On	the	World	Wide	Web,	information	is	essentially	“raw”	text,	i.e.,	what	we	
experience	is	a	web	of	textual	documents	that	have	been	encoded	for	display	and	use	through	
a	set	of	website	development	standards	such	as	HTML	and	Extensible	Markup	Language	(XML).	
The	meaning	derived	from	this	text	is	the	sole	result	of	processes	of	human	interpretation.	
While	those	sets	of	standards	applied	to	the	web	of	text	are	often	machine-readable,	they	
supply	no	semantic	content.	Search	algorithms	and	other	computational	agents	are	only	able	to	
crawl	the	textual	documents	for	simple	instances	of	identified	keywords	of	criteria,	i.e.	there	is	
nothing	that	identifies	Barack	Obama	as	the	44th	President	of	the	United	States	apart	from	the	
co-occurrence	of	those	discrete	terms	within	a	set	of	texts,	and	any	attribution	of	the	
presidency	to	Barack	Obama	is	done	by	the	user	themselves	based	on	their	knowledge	of	U.S.	
politics.	So,	while	“Barack	Obama”	and	“44th	President	of	the	United	States”	may	appear	in	the	
same	text,	the	link	between	the	two	is	never	made	by	the	computational	agent.	A	Web	search	
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for	“Who	is	the	44th	president	of	the	United	States?”	would	search	for	each	of	those	terms	and	
present	information	in	the	form	of	a	series	of	hyperlinks	to	the	user	via	some	relevancy	
algorithm.	Any	determination	of	fact	or	interpretation	of	underlying	meaning	is	left	to	the	user,	
despite	the	algorithm’s	likelihood	of	presenting	one	set	of	results	over	another.	That	is,	the	
determination	that	Donald	Trump	is	the	current	president,	and	not	Barack	Obama,	is	never	
made	by	the	computational	agent	in	this	case.		
The	current	Web	environment	is	much	different	than	the	one	just	described,	however.	
Search	algorithms,	and	other	capable	computational	agents,	engage	in	semantic	search.	These	
agents	parse	an	additional	layer	of	site	markup	that	converts	“raw”	text	into	semantic	data.	The	
technology	that	makes	this	“raw”	textual	information	machine-readable	–	semantic	data	–	
relies	on	providing	a	definition	of	terms,	properties,	types,	and	a	formal	statement	of	
relationships,	all	of	which	become	marked	and	interlinked	by	Web	developers.	There	are	a	
number	of	requirements	for	this	to	occur.	First,	there	needs	to	be	a	schema,	or	set	of	schemas,	
for	describing	types	and	how	they	relate	to	other	things	as	well	as	the	set	of	properties	they	
have	and	inherit.	Next,	there	needs	to	be	a	semantic	structure	to	determine	how	those	
properties	connect	things	to	one	another	and	to	specific	instances.	Instances,	things,	and	their	
properties	all	need	to	be	uniquely	identifiable	to	a	machine	through	the	use	of	International	
Resource	Identifiers	(IRIs)2.	Lastly,	the	collection	of	statements	needs	to	be	represented	in	a	
																																																						
2	IRIs	are	a	more	general	version	of	Universal	Resource	Identifiers	(URIs)	that	draw	on	a	Unicode	
typeset	and	allow	for	international	characters,	where	URIs	draw	on	ASCII	which	do	not.	Both	IRI	
and	URI	are	a	more	general	type	of	identifier	than	something	like	a	Universal	Resource	Locator	
(URL),	which	only	points	to	a	resource’s	location	and	not	its	name.	
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formal	set	of	relationships,	called	an	ontology	or	vocabulary3.	These	ontologies	define	the	rules	
of	representation	and	establish	all	permissible	relationships,	property	attachments,	and	
instance	values.	That	is,	they	construct	the	very	existence	of	the	world	to	a	machine.		
	
2.1	How	Does	It	Order	the	World?		
Crucial	to	understanding	the	development	of	these	ontologies	is	the	type	of	data	model	
used	in	their	creation.	The	semantic	web	relies	on	a	graph	theoretic	model	called	the	Resource	
Description	Framework	(RDF).	The	RDF	conceptual	model	uses	nodes	to	model	subjects	and	
objects	and	edges	or	arcs	to	model	properties	and	relations.	Each	of	which	is	identified	
specifically	in	the	ontology	
	
Figure	1.	Graph	Model	of	Presidential	Succession	in	Terms	
Figure	1.	provides	an	example.	This	example	shows	a	graph	of	recent	presidential	succession	
																																																						
3	Ontology	and	vocabulary	can	be,	and	are	often,	used	interchangeably.	In	this	study,	I	do	use	
the	two	terms	interchangeably	for	the	purposes	of	sentence	structure	and	readability.	
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and	the	set	of	spousal	relationships.	Within	Figure	1.,	each	node	is	a	subject	and/or	object	and	
each	edge	or	arc	is	a	predicate	or	property4.	An	agent	parsing	this	graph	could	begin	at	any	
point	and	divine	information	about	any	other	point	in	the	graph.	For	example,	one	could	ask	
“Who	is	George	W.	Bush’s	successor’s	spouse?”	and	an	agent	could	parse	the	graph	and	tell	you	
that	it	is	“Michelle	Obama”.	Moreover,	this	very	simple	graph	could	be	much	more	complex.	In	
this	current	case,	the	graph	actually	would	include	the	entire	expanded	set	of	presidents,	
spouses,	presidential	sitting	dates,	and	where	each	identified	president	sits	in	the	line	of	
presidential	succession.	A	graph	of	this	sort	would	also	include	an	entire	set	of	additional	
subjects	and	relationships.	If	asked	the	name	of	the	current	President	of	the	United	States,	the	
agent	could	look	at	this	graph	and	tell	you	that	it	was	Donald	Trump5.	If	drawing	on	the	
expanded	graph,	you	could	also	ask	an	agent	“Who	is	Laura	Bush’s	spouse,	when	was	he	the	
President,	and	who	did	he	succeed?”.	The	agent	would	parse	all	the	relevant	property	and	
subject	positions	in	the	graph	to	provide	“George	W.	Bush,	2000-2008,	and	William	J.	Clinton”.	
This	principle	functionality	is	one	of	the	technologies	that	underpin	artificial	intelligence	
systems	like	Google	Assistant,	Siri,	Cortana,	Alexa,	and	Hound	among	others.	It	is	so	pervasive	
																																																						
4	The	designation	of	subject	or	object	or	the	determination	of	edge	or	arc	depends	on	the	way	
that	a	relationship	is	framed	and	the	ability	for	a	relationship	to	be	interpreted	in	reverse.	For	
example,	Donald	Trump	is	the	successor	of	Barack	Obama,	in	this	example.	This	reads	from	right	
to	left	as	Donald	Trump	as	the	subject,	Barack	Obama	as	the	object,	and	successor	as	a	directed	
arc.	We	could	simply	reframe	the	statement	as	Barack	Obama	hassuccessor	Donald	Trump.	
Here	Obama	is	the	subject	and	Trump	is	the	object,	with	hassuccessor	being	a	directed	
predicate.	Modeling	the	inverse	in	graph	theory	is	simple,	but	the	actual	application	of	inverse	
properties	relies	on	a	markup	standards	supporting	reverse	parsing	and/or	the	presence	of	
specified	inverse	properties	in	the	ontology.	In	this	case,	if	the	Dbpedia	vocabulary	and	the	
chosen	markup	both	permitted	inverse	interpretation,	the	arc	would	be	an	undirected	edge.	
5	This	is	exactly	the	approach	Google’s	Knowledge	Graph	takes.	
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that	it	is	also	embedded	in	smaller	systems	like	Gmail,	Microsoft	Outlook,	and	various	calendar	
applications,	among	others.	
	
Figure	2.	Graph	Model	of	Presidential	Succession	in	IRIs	
	
	 However,	Figure	1.	is	not	how	a	computational	agent	views	semantic	data.	These	are	
terms	that	ultimately	have	no	meaning	to	an	agent.	They	are	just	literal	values.	In	other	words,	
this	graph	has	no	machine-readable	context.	Figure	2.	shows	the	same	graph	as	an	agent	would	
see	it6.	Here	we	are	identifying	each	node	and	edge	with	a	unique	IRI.	In	this	particular	case,	
each	IRI	points	to	a	specific	location	in	the	DBpedia7	database.	We	can	ask	the	same	questions	
as	before,	but	now	the	agent	knows	where	and	what	to	look	at	for	each	node	and	edge.	We	
have	provided	the	agent	and	the	graph	the	context	from	DBpedia.	Returning	to	the	original	
																																																						
6	Agents	do	not	see	graphs	in	this	same	visual	sense,	they	parse	markup	that	is	embedded	into	
webpages,	emails,	application	program	interfaces	(APIs),	etc.	Showing	the	graph	form	is	simply	
for	clarification.	
7	DBpedia	is	a	semantic	version	of	Wikipedia.	It	is	both	an	ontology	and	a	database,	which	is	the	
collection	of	applied	semantic	content	to	a	domain	or	domains.	
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query,	the	agent	would	now	know	who	Donald	Trump	was	and	what	the	President	of	the	
United	States	is	and	how	the	two	instances	relate	to	one	another.	Furthermore,	by	providing	
the	context	from	DBpedia,	the	agent	can	abstract	the	entire	context	that	DBpedia	provides.	
Meaning,	it	can	see	that	Melania	Trump	has	one	son,	and	know	who	he	is.	In	this	actual	case,	it	
would	also	know	that	Melania	was	born	in	the	former	Yugoslavia	(now	Slovenia),	what	the	
capital	city	was,	and	that	she	was	born	under	Tito’s	regime8.	This	is	all	to	say	that	by	providing	
the	necessary	context,	any	set	of	properties	or	objects	that	are	connected	to	Melania	Trump	to	
any	degree,	can	be	understood	by	an	agent.		
	
Figure	3.	Graph	Model	Connection	Multiple	Databases	
	
																																																						
8	The	relationship	between	the	former	Yugoslavia	and	the	current	Slovenia	is	over	determined	
and	occluded	in	DBpedia.	In	Melania	Trump’s	page,	there	is	no	machine-readable	designation	
that	permits	an	agent	to	understand	that	relationship.	Furthermore,	the	capital	city	in	this	case	
is	Belgrade,	not	Ljubljana,	the	current	capital	of	the	country.	This	highlights	a	central	ontological	
problem	with	the	semantic	web.	
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	 This	specific	use	of	the	RDF	model	is	one	application	of	the	semantic	web;	however,	it	
only	represents	a	closed	system.	All	of	the	subjects,	objects,	and	predicates	in	this	graph	have	
only	referenced	DBpedia,	and	so	a	computational	agent	can	only	know	what	is	contained	in	that	
ontology/database.	Much	of	the	development	of	the	semantic	web,	as	well	as	its	initial	
imagining,	rests	on	the	principles	of	linked	data.	Linked	data	contextualizes	those	instances	and	
properties,	by	supplying	more	information	on	that	data,	providing	a	way	for	machines	to	more	
easily	understand	information	by	both	traversing	class	hierarchy	paths	and	linking	of	bits	of	
meaningful	data	across	domains	and	uses	(Berners-Lee	et	al.	2001;	Coyle	2008;	Giri	2011;	
Halford	et	al.	2012).	As	it	actually	happens,	DBpedia	is	a	linked	database.	Continuing	with	the	
previous	example,	an	agent	only	knows	Melania	Trump	to	the	extent	that	DBpedia	explains	her	
and	her	set	of	relationships.	Furthermore,	an	agent	only	knows	that	specific	version	of	Melania	
Trump,	not	the	many	other	and	potentially	different	representations	of	her.	That	is,	it	cannot	
understand	that	the	Melania	Trump	of	DBpedia	is	the	same	Melania	Trump	of	a	New	York	
Times	article	or	an	Us	Weekly	article.	Linked	data	allows	us	to	tell	the	agent	that	the	various	
instances	of	Melania	Trump	are	referring	to	the	same	person.	The	semantic	web	community	
developed	a	technique	for	marking	this	type	of	equivalency.	The	Web	Ontology	Language	
(OWL)	has	a	property	–	owl:sameAs9	–	which	publishers	can	use	to	tell	a	parser	that	one	
instance	is	equivalent	across	actual	use	cases.	Figure	3.	shows	a	graph	theoretic	model	of	this	
example10.	In	actual	usage	DBpedia	does	use	owl:sameAs	to	link	its	database	with	the	New	York	
																																																						
9	Italics	are	used	to	represent	language	statements,	class,	types,	and	properties.	
10	Figure	3.	creates	a	third	dimension	to	the	graph	model	where	each	node	has	additional	depth	
in	their	sets	of	relationships.	This	new	relationship	has	been	separated	from	Figures	1.	and	2.	
for	ease	of	interpretation.					
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Times.	This	equivalency	means	that	the	whole	set	of	relationships	in	which	Melania	Trump	is	
embedded	in	DBpedia	is	applicable	to	the	Melania	Trump	instances	found	in	the	New	York	
Times.	Furthermore,	it	means	that	the	set	of	relationships	in	the	New	York	Times	are	applied	to	
the	set	in	DBpedia	as	well.	
					 The	interlinking	does	not	stop	between	two	ontologies,	however.	In	this	limited	
example,	the	Melania	Trump	entry	in	DBpedia	links	not	only	to	the	New	York	Times	but	also	to	
Wikidata,	marking	exact	equivalences	between	all	three11.	Practically,	this	means	that	all	the	
sets	of	relationships	that	each	ontology	carries	for	those	applied	to	Melania	Trump	are	
applicable	across	all	vocabularies	and	use	cases	that	are	marked	up	in	this	way.	The	underlying	
idea	here	is	that	ontologies	do	not	need	to	be	redundant.	They	can	simply	link	to	other	
ontologies	that	already	cover	the	content	domains	that	they	need,	allowing	ontology	
developers	to	focus	on	just	their	area	of	expertise	or	interest.	However,	in	actual	practice,	
ontologies	are	often	redundant,	built	differently,	with	different	approaches	to	the	application	
of	the	RDF	model,	and	at	different	levels	of	complexity.	That	there	are	no	universal	ontologies,	
fully	agreed	upon	standards,	and	different	philosophies	regarding	ontology	depth	and	breadth	
means	that	there	will	be	practical	issues	in	markup	and	epistemological	issues	in	
representation.	The	problem	of	drawing	on	a	number	of	different	ontologies,	or	ontologies	in	
general,	is	that	they	can	sometimes	serve	to	occlude	differences,	and	make	equivalency	
statements	between	instances	that	may	or	may	not	be	valid	(Halpin	et	al.	2010;	Poirier	2015).	
This	problem	is	exacerbated	when	two	or	more	linked	ontologies	treat	an	instance	differently.		
																																																						
11	This	interlinking	across	ontologies	can	be	used	to	apply	any	number	of	ontologies	to	an	
instance.	
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2.2	What	Are	Its	Consequences?		
	 One	often	noted	issue	among	the	semantic	web	community	stems	directly	from	the	use	
of	the	owl:sameAs	statement.	Many	developers	and	ontologists	are	reluctant	to	use	
owl:sameAs	because	it	has	the	necessary	consequence	that	any	statements	about	one	instance	
are	true	about	the	others.	While	the	statement	is	helpful	in	delineating	equivalencies	across	
Web	domains	when	they	are	not	textually	referred	to	in	the	same	ways,	it	obscures	real	
differences	in	aboutness,	and	identity	(Halpin	et	al.	2010).	For	instance,	Poirier	(2015)	notes	
that	in	DBpedia,	content	about	Caitlyn	Jenner	is	owl:sameAs	content	about	Bruce	Jenner	
despite	the	very	important	and	relevant	identity	transformations	and	political	problems	that	
exist	in	such	a	statement.	The	linked	nature	of	the	semantic	web	makes	it	so	that	any	link	to	
existing	data	sets	with	owl:sameAs	makes	a	statement	about	that	instance	applicable	to	both,	
independent	of	the	truth	of	the	statement.	This	presents	clear	issues	relating	not	only	to	
accurate	representation	but	also	classification.	DBpedia	makes	a	similar	false	equivalence	
between	Yugoslavia	and	Slovenia	in	the	example	above.		
A	second	issue	arises	when	there	are	contextual	differences.	Using	owl:sameAs	to	link	
instances	may	not	be	appropriate	across	use	case	contexts.	Making	such	an	equivalency	erases	
the	distinctions	that	contexts	add	to	identity	and	definition.	For	example,	the	identity	a	
developer	is	trying	to	cultivate	for	Bill	Gates	the	father	is	not	the	same	as	Bill	Gates	the	
philanthropist,	or	Bill	Gates	the	former	Chief	Executive	Officer	(CEO)	of	Microsoft.	Here	an	IRI	
does	mark	the	same	referent	and	the	properties	describing	referent	hold	across	contexts,	but	it	
isn’t	necessarily	appropriate	to	re-use	an	IRI	when	it	is	out	of	context.	In	that	case,	the	
properties	linked	to	that	IRI	do	not	matter,	as	the	ontology	itself	works	to	recreate	context.	This	
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point	will	be	discussed	in	more	detail	in	Chapter	six.	A	third	issue	is	the	confusion	of	identity,	
representation,	and	properties	of	things.	Properties	of	things,	or	that	describe	things,	are	not	
the	same	as	representations	or	identities	of	those	things,	though	equivalency	statements	are	
often	made	between	the	properties	and	the	thing	itself.	Furthermore,	representation	is	not	the	
same	as	identity.	URIs	–	pictures,	email	addresses,	social	security	numbers,	etc.	–	can	stand	in	
as	signifiers	of	a	person,	referring	to	a	representation	of	a	person,	but	are	not	reducible	to	the	
person	itself	and	in	no	way	addresses	the	complexities	of	their	identity.	The	question	of	
representation	is	a	very	real	problem	confronting	the	semantic	web.	However,	this	question	of	
representation	has	long	been	debated	in	philosophy	and	will	not	be	the	focus	of	this	work.	The	
aim	here	is	to	move	past	the	intractable	philosophical	problems	of	possibility	to	the	empirical	
problem	of	actual	practice.	
Another	major	criticism	of	semantic	web	technologies	comes	from	their	treatment	of	
ontological	indeterminacy.	Ontological	indeterminacy	is	“the	inescapable	fact	that	two	or	more	
incompatible	conceptual	systems	can	often	be	applied	to	a	domain	of	interest	with	equal	
empirical	adequacy.”	(Ginsberg	2008:1).	This	can	occur	when	two	communities	of	practice	
approach	the	same	concept	differently	and	hold	different	meanings	for	it.	These	terminological	
boundary	objects	lose	their	indeterminacy	when	coded	into	ontologies.	Ontologies,	as	
taxonomic	orderings	of	the	world,	are	fully	determinate	classification	and	representation	
systems.	What	can	be	known	and/or	represented	in	them	is	bound	completely	by	the	terms	set	
out	in	the	various	ontologies	that	are	drawn	on.	That	is,	it	permits	a	predetermined	range	of	
claims	that	can	be	made	against	it.	Natural	language,	on	the	other	hand,	is	not	fully	
determinate.	Differences	can	occur	in	actual	use,	and	disagreements	may	arise	about	the	
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applicability	to	particular	contexts	(Ginsberg	2008;	Waller	2016).	The	translation	processes	
involved	in	converting	the	indeterminacy	found	in	natural	language	to	the	fully	determinate	
language	of	the	semantic	web	results	in	a	state	of	ontological	over-determination.	I	adopt	
Ginsberg’s	(2008:7)	definition	that	ontological	over-determination	applies	to	“situations	in	
which	the	use	of	a	formally	defined	[semantic	web]	term	ipso	facto	commits	one	to	accepting	
certain	implications	or	consequences	that	one	could	refrain	from	accepting	in	natural	language	
while	still	using	the	term	in	the	same	way”.		
	
Figure	4.	Marriage	Defined	in	Opposite	Sex	Ontology	
	
Source:	Ginsberg	(2008:8)	
					 Ginsberg	(2008)	shows	the	practical	effects	of	ontological	over-determination	as	it	
applies	to	two	states	and	their	acceptance/treatments	of	gay	marriage.	To	say	that	homosexual	
couples	can	marry	is	an	ontologically	indeterminate	statement.	At	the	time	of	the	article’s	
writing	(2008)	gay	marriage	was	only	legal	in	two	states,	but	its	very	legality	in	those	states	
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means	that	the	statement	is	both	empirically	true	and	false.	The	author	compares	two	
ontological	descriptions	of	couples	and	the	ability	to	marry.	In	one	ontology	(Figure	4.)	the	class	
“couple”	has	subtypes	“male	couple”,	“female	couple”,	and	“opposite-sex	couple”.	The	subtype	
“opposite-sex	couple”	has	its	own	subtype	“married	couple”	that	is	not	a	shared	subtype	of	the	
other	two	types	of	couples.	This	constructs	the	knowable	world	as	one	where	marriage	only	
exists	as	a	possibility	for	heterosexual	couples.	In	programming	logic,	a	decision	is	made	based	
on	the	evaluation	of	presence.	Presence	indicates	the	truth	of	a	statement,	where	absence	
marks	falsity.	Here,	however,	the	ability	to	make	a	claim	of	marriage	extends	beyond	simply	an	
evaluation	of	a	binary	true/false	input	and	instead	forecloses	on	any	alternate	possibilities	by	
eliminating	the	need	for	the	binary	decision	rule.	The	realm	of	knowledge	here	is	prealgocratic,	
meaning	that	what	can	be	represented	and	known	is	decided	before	an	AI	or	computational	
agent	can	even	act.	In	this	way,	meaning	spaces	are	premediated	(Aneesh	2017).	
	
Figure	5.	Marriage	Defined	in	Ontology	Regardless	of	Sex	
	
Source:	Ginsberg	(2008:8)	
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					 In	the	second	ontology	(Figure	5.),	the	class	“couple”	has	the	types	“same	sex	couple”,	
which	itself	contains	“male	couple”	and	“female	couple”,	“opposite-sex	couple”,	and	“married	
couple”.	In	this	second	ontology,	marriage	is	independent	of	the	couple’s	sex	determined	
makeup.	The	problem	arises	when	a	married	homosexual	couple	enters	the	state	that	is	using	
the	first	ontology.	In	this	ontology,	marriage	is	ontologically	over-determined.	Despite	being	
legally	married,	a	computational	agent	in	the	state	where	gay	marriage	is	illegal	has	no	ability	to	
comprehend	the	couple’s	marriage.	The	two	ontologies	are	incompatible	but	not	in	
disagreement	because,	as	Ginsberg	(2008:10)	argues,	they	“cannot	be	referring	to	the	same	
concept”.	To	an	AI	in	the	illegal	state,	gay	marriage	is	not	illegal,	it	simply	does	not	exist.	This	
would	result	in	the	complete	erasure	of	the	married	couple	from	any	decision	rule	that	used	
marriage	as	a	factor	in	that	state,	despite	its	legality	in	the	state	where	the	couple	is	a	citizen.	
This	second	ontology,	as	are	all	ontologies,	is	prealgocratic,	only	it	is	more	flexible	and	
expressive	in	delimiting	the	boundaries	it	has	constructed.			
					 This	example	brings	up	a	related,	but	distinct	issue	with	ontologies,	that	of	ontic	
occlusion.	While	not	used	in	the	study	of	the	semantic	web,	Knobel’s	(2010:3)	definition	is	
helpful	here.	He	defines	ontic	occlusion	as	a:	
mechanism	by	which	representational	differences	exert	control	over	discourse.	That	is	
to	say,	one	representation	of	an	idea,	situation,	or	event	can	take	precedence	and	
occlude,	or	block,	another	representation.	Thus,	the	elements	of	the	occluded	
representation	do	not	enter	into	the	discourse	and	are	left	without	legitimate	role	in	
shaping	the	narrative.	
	
Returning	to	Ginsberg’s	(2008)	gay	marriage	example,	in	both	ontologies	marriage	is	a	sub	type	
of	couple,	the	only	difference	is	based	on	the	sex	and	implied	sexuality	of	the	couple	involved.	
This	makes	a	number	of	statements	about	the	world	and	the	nature	of	sex,	sexuality,	and	
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coupling.	First,	it	creates	a	world	where	polygamy	does	not	exist.	While	this	might	make	sense	
in	many	places	like	the	United	States,	where	polygamy	is	criminalized,	it	does	not	make	sense	
when	considering	the	many	countries	where	it	is	legal	or	recognized.	Furthermore,	even	in	
places	where	polygamy	is	criminalized,	it	still	occludes	the	actual	fact	of	its	existence.	Second,	it	
reinforces	a	binary	view	of	sex	and	sexuality	while	reducing	sexuality	to	a	derivative	of	sex.	It	
does	not	begin	to	allow	for	a	more	complex	and	nuanced	understanding	of	sex	and	sexuality	
that	might	be	more	closely	aligned	with	actual	individuals	involved.	Here,	the	choice	to	
represent	marriage	in	the	couple	form,	between	two	men,	two	women,	or	a	man	and	women,	
is	an	act	of	ontic	occlusion,	rendering	alternate	states	of	being	invisible.	It	thus	becomes	
essential	to	critically	examine	the	process	by	which	this	pre-data	text	becomes	semantic	linked	
data.	To	do	so	requires	that	we	also	examine	the	data	assemblages	that	organize,	and	provide	
the	means	for	sharing	and	consuming	that	data.	
Thus	far,	little	work	has	engaged	with	this	topic.	While	scholarly	interest	in	the	semantic	
web	has	been	growing	in	recent	years,	there	are	no	systematic	and	empirical	studies	of	its	
development	or	the	conditions	of	its	use.	Ford	and	Graham	(2016)	have	convincingly	shown	
some	of	the	consequences	for	our	understanding	of	place	and	space	in	semantic	
representations.	They	argue	that	semantic	content	obscures	data	provenance,	topical	nuance,	
and	the	ability	for	users	to	interrogate	content	as	information	seeking	agents.	Waller	(2016)	
correctly	argues	that	the	semantic	web	is	seeing	a	consolidation	whereby	a	few	major	
ontologies	are	coming	to	represent	the	whole	of	the	semantic	content	on	the	Web.	Like	Ford	
and	Graham’s	(2016)	work,	the	major	sociological	implication	here	is	that	people	are	being	
placed	in	a	new	set	of	trust	relationships	with	information	providers,	particularly	given	the	
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recent	shifts	to	mobile	and	semantically	driven	AI.	The	unstated	consequence	of	their	work	is	
that	semantic	web	ontologies	ontologically	order	the	world	for	machine	interpretation	
(McCarthy	2017).	Problematically,	these	authors	engage	only	with	the	interpretive	capacity	of	
individuals	at	the	front	end	of	these	relationships.	I	echo	their	concerns	and	in	principle,	I	agree	
with	their	attributed	causes,	but	their	work	neglects	any	discussion	of	how	those	causal	
mechanisms	work.	Specifically,	they	do	not	provide	any	insight	into	how	these	ontologies	are	
developed	or	how	they	are	actually	deployed,	let	alone	the	interactions	various	additional	
components	contribute	to	these	processes.	This	is	the	task	undertaken	here.			
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3.	Semantic	Assemblages:	Their	Ontologies	and	Their	Components	
	 The	semantic	web	is	a	data	assemblage.	It	creates	a	specific	type	of	data	environment	
for	machine	readability.	In	so	doing	it	enacts	a	set	of	specific	states	of	being	with	each	
ontological	state	dependent	on	the	boundaries	set	by	the	relevant	semantic	ontology.	To	
understand	how	ontological	states	are	declared	by	these	ontologies	we	need	to	examine	how	
the	world	is	translated	in	a	way	that	in	amenable	to	machines.	Thus	far,	literature	is	lacking	in	
this	area.	While	work	on	translating	tacit	knowledge	and	expertise	is	helpful,	the	question	
extends	beyond	the	simple	translation	of	knowledge	between	experts	in	a	field.	As	semantic	
web	ontologies	are	themselves	assemblages	composed	of	various	systems	of	thought,	
standards,	infrastructures,	practices,	and	understandings	of	data,	the	literatures	surrounding	
each	of	those	components	can	help	to	situate	an	understanding	of	this	translation	process	and	
thus	an	understanding	of	how	semantic	data	assemblages	are	created	and	deployed	to	
construct	worlds.		
	 At	the	outset,	I	should	state	that	this	study	is	not	making	the	argument	that	
representation	is	impossible.	That	argument	has	been	debated	by	philosophers	of	language	and	
science	for	some	time.	I	argue	from	the	position	which	assumes	that	the	problem	of	
representation	is	intractable.	Instead,	this	is	a	study	of	interactions,	of	process,	and	of	making,	
or	as	recent	work	argues,	empirical	ontology	(Coopmans	et	al.	2014;	Sismondo	2015;	Woolgar	
and	Lezuan	2013,	2015).	In	what	follows	I	outline	an	assemblage	based	theory	of	ontology	that	
argues	ontological	states	are	dependent	on	their	activations	in	assemblages.	Rather	than	
engaging	with	the	nature	of	being,	it	focuses	its	attention	on	those	empirically	activated	
existences.	Next,	I	examine	the	literature	on	data	and	data	assemblages	showing	that	data	is	a	
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specific	effect	of	the	interactions	between	components	of	the	data	assemblage	and	that	the	
contexts	of	those	interactions	remain	under	studied.		
Following	that	will	be	a	discussion	of	work	that	examines	knowledge	representation	
specifically	as	it	pertains	to	knowledge	engineering	in	expert	systems	and	information	
infrastructures.	While	this	work	details	the	production	of	knowledge	and	the	transfer	of	
expertise	between	humans,	as	well	as	the	interpretation	of	machine	output	by	humans,	it	does	
not	attend	to	the	translations	from	human	to	machine	and	the	resulting	machine	to	machine	
communication	that	ontologies	imply.		Since	this	problem	is	not	only	just	a	process	of	
translation	and	explication,	but	also	a	problem	of	classification,	the	next	section	will	examine	
the	ways	that	classification	systems	and	standards	serve	as	one	way	of	creating	terminological	
states.	Classification	systems	implicate	standards	in	ways	that	are	often	imperfect.	I	extend	
recent	work	on	this	matter	arguing	that	these	rough	interactions	with	classification	systems	and	
standards	require	that	practitioners	negotiate	with	them	in	multiple	ways.	Lastly,	I	return	to	the	
discussion	of	ontology	as	it	pertains	to	the	empirical	enactment	of	ontologies	in	practice.		
	
3.1	An	Assemblage	Theory	of	Ontology	
Derrida	argues	that	the	problems	with	ontology	begin	at	the	terminological	level	
(Derrida	1967[2016]).	Any	attempt	to	articulate	a	manner	of	essential	ontology	only	ever	
pushes	that	essence	away,	as	those	terms	only	serve	to	implicate	the	very	things	they	are	trying	
to	obscure	or	differentiate	from,	thus	subverting	the	effort	to	make	meaning	inhere	within	an	
object.	Words	are	simply	too	slippery	to	refer	to	anything	in	such	a	positive	way.	Views	such	as	
this	reflects	an	abandonment	of	ontology	all	together,	as	attempts	to	establish	some	sort	of	
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fixity	belie	the	impossibility	of	such	projects.	More	directly,	such	deferments	cannot	be	
modeled	precisely,	as	terms	cling	to	their	overly	determined	subjects	or	objects	and	the	
inherent	meanings	that	their	connections	produce.				
A	similar	problem	exists	at	the	level	of	relationships.	Two	things	cannot	be	said	to	simply	
relate	in	such	and	such	a	way,	as	that	just	relocates	the	identification	of	two	things	to	their	
relationship,	reducing	difference	to	positive	identity.	In	this	sense	“things	are	different	because	
they	fall	into	different	categories.	They	are	different	precisely	in	not	being	identical	or	the	
same.”	(May	2005:77).	While	Deleuze	focuses	on	the	relations	of	identity,	analogy,	opposition,	
and	resemblance,	for	the	semantic	web	we	might	focus	on	type,	sameAs,	action,	or	category.	
They	each	require	that	we	have	not	only	the	understanding	of	the	terms	of	relating,	but	the	
stability	of	the	terms	that	are	to	be	related.	That	is,	our	predicate	determines	the	relationship	
between	our	subject	and	our	object	where	the	subject	is	always	the	subject,	and	the	object	
always	the	object	(Deleuze	1968).		
While	some	distance	themselves	from	the	ontological	project	for	reasons	relating	to	its	
impossibility,	others	embrace	the	ontological	project	from	a	different	perspective.	In	the	
continental	tradition,	thinkers	have	developed	an	ontology	that	attempts	at	an	explanation	to	
account	for	what	there	is.	Deleuze	relates	this	approach	to	the	quest	for	finding	a	solution	to	a	
question.	The	problems	of	being,	identity,	and	definition	are	problems	that	look	for	a	particular	
answer,	they	expect	an	answer	of	certain	definite	type	which	renders	the	problem	posed	in	the	
question	obsolete.	May	(2005)	calls	this	approach	an	ontology	of	discovery.	Deleuzian	ontology,	
however,	is	an	ontology	of	creation.	Rather	than	declaring	these	problems	of	definition	solved,	
we	accept	that	a	definition	is	but	one	of	many	within	a	field	of	possibilities,	whose	limit	is	not	
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knowable	(Deleuze	1968;	May	2005).	This	is	creative	in	that	the	question	acts	as	a	prompt	to	
explore	a	particular	expression	or	solution,	not	determine	it.	The	assignation	of	meaning,	
identity,	distinction,	etc.	is	a	particular	form	of	activation	in	this	ontology.	The	form	activated,	is	
the	result	of	a	set	of	individuation,	or	distinguishing,	processes	occurring	in	the	field.	For	
Deleuze,	the	field	is	the	plane	of	intensities,	for	Luhmann,	the	environment,	for	the	Schema.org,	
the	Web	(Deleuze	1968;	Deleuze	and	Guattari	1987;	Luhmann	2012).		
This	form	of	ontology	does	not	to	say	that	things	have	no	existence	apart	from	their	
interpretations,	in	fact	it	obviates	the	need	for	such	constructivist	understandings.	The	question	
of	“what	is?”,	either	essential	or	constructed,	misses	the	point	entirely.	The	answer	to	this	
question	demands	an	understanding	of	“how	it	is?”,	but	hides	that	fact	just	as	all	claims	of	
ontology	hide	their	underlying	instability	(DeLanda	2006;	Latour	2005;	May	2005).	Following	
from	this,	a	Deleuzian	approach	to	ontology,	is	an	approach	which	tries	to	understand	
becoming,	as	opposed	to	being.	It	is	an	attempt	to	understand	the	activations	and	
distinguishing	processes	that	express	certain	forms	and	not	others,	affording	certain	
interpretations	while	constraining	others.	This	approach	of	multiple	ontologies,	like	similar	
approaches	by	Actor	Network	Theory,	are	about	the	processes	of	connection,	interaction,	and	
assembly	(DeLanda	2006;	Deleuze	and	Guattari	1987;	Latour	1987,	2005;	May	2005).	
Working	backwards,	uncovering	how	a	given	state	is	declared	becomes	a	matter	of	
exploring	the	processes	of	connection	and	interaction	between	components	of	the	semantic	
data	assemblage.	We	need	to	examine	the	ways	in	which	those	components	specifically	enact	
and	create	contextual	fields	within	which	meanings,	identities,	definitions,	and	forms	come	to	
take	shape.	However,	assemblages	are	not	composed	of	perfectly	integrated	parts.	DeLanda	
	34	
(2006)	calls	the	relations	between	these	components	“contingently	obligatory”	(DeLanda	
2006:10).	The	actual	fact	of	integration	between	the	various	components	of	any	given	
assemblage	are	only	a	matter	of	their	empirical	co-evolution.	They	exist	together,	but	also	
apart,	changing	both	as	co-related	elements	and	as	elements	involved	in	many	other	sets	of	
relationships.	As	these	relations	are	defined	as	relations	of	exteriority,	they	are	not	specifically	
beholden	to	the	particular	forms	called	forth	in	any	given	web	of	connections.	Given	this,	we	
would	expect	to	find	a	semantic	data	assemblage	to	be	filled	perturbations	and	inconsistencies.	
So,	to	understand	the	declaration	of	contextual	states	through	attempts	at	representing	a	non-
deterministic	world	to	deterministic	machines,	we	need	to	also	investigate	how	those	
perturbations	are	negotiated	and	how	the	relations	between	those	components	push	and	pull	
in	service	to	and	against	the	assemblage	at	large.		
	
3.2	Data	and	Data	Assemblages	
Studies	of	data	have	taken	center	stage	in	many	different	areas	in	recent	years.	Work	in	
this	area	has	primarily	focused	on	big	data,	investigating	its	epistemology,	biases	in	its	model	
construction,	the	unequal	distribution	of	data	and	the	skills	to	utilize	it,	and	the	consequences	
of	its	use	for	privacy,	identity,	social	sorting,	and	development,	among	other	concerns	
(Andrejevic	2013;	Arora	2016;	Barocas	and	Selbst	2016;	Bowker	2013;	boyd	and	Crawford	2012;	
Cheney-Lippold	2011;	Choudhury	et	al.	2014;	Friedman	and	Nissenbaum	1996;	Gillespie	2014;	
Leonelli	2014;	Noble	2013;	Sweeny	2013;	Vaidhnayathan	2011;	Warf	and	Grimes	1997).	While	
this	emerging	interdisciplinary	field	is	producing	large	volumes	of	valuable	work	on	data	and	
their	infrastructure,	the	focus	thus	far	has	been	dominated	by	big	data,	its	use	in	sorting	
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algorithms,	and	its	ethical	implications.	Missing	from	this	growing	body	of	scholarship	are	
studies	that	investigate	alternate	forms	of	data,	their	production,	and	their	assemblages.	
Echoing	Seaver	(2013),	I	argue	that	the	components	of	algorithms,	how	they	are	constructed,	
and	how	they	are	classified	are	an	essential	part	of	understanding	code-based	systems.	He	
argues	that	social	scientists	are	operating	with	a	flawed	understanding	of	algorithmic	systems.	
Reverse	engineering	studies	and	algorithmic	audit	studies	are	premised	on	the	existence	of	a	
singular	algorithm	of	study.	Not	only	does	he	argue	that	algorithms	are	not	singular,	but	also	
that	they	are	not	stable	or	unified	decision-making	tools.	For	example,	at	any	given	moment,	
any	interaction	with	Bing’s	recommendation	engine	could	be	drawing	on	a	large	number	of	
algorithms,	and	those	algorithms	are	likely	to	be	different	for	different	users	at	different	times.	
Companies,	such	as	Microsoft,	often	run	experiments	with	various	algorithms	to	optimize	user	
experience,	a	fact	neglected	by	the	experiments	employed	in	audit	studies.	The	transparency	
and	expertise	allegedly	required	for	critical	analyses	of	algorithms	overlook	the	fact	that	
algorithms	are	built	by	many	people	over	periods	of	time	who	often	are	not	even	fully	aware	of	
the	range	of	inputs	and	decision	rules	that	contextual	“real	world”	deployment	brings	about.	
Likewise,	a	sole	focus	on	transparency	of	inputs	obscures	the	potentially	more	important	
variable	of	data	and	feature	creation.	This	focus	on	the	“what”	and	not	the	“how”	is	often	the	
concern	of	code	studies.	As	Seaver	argues	while	discussing	Facebook’s	EdgeRank	algorithm,	
If	we	are	interested	in	talking	about	algorithms’	cultural	effects,	then	it	is	not	enough	to	
know	that	something	called	“affinity”	is	included.	Our	questions	should	be	more	
ambitious:	What	is	affinity?	How	is	it	defined?	What	experiences	do	the	engineers	
producing	affinity	scores	draw	on	as	they	attempt	to	formalize	it?	How	might	these	
formalizations	differ	if	we	started	from	different	assumptions	and	experiences?...	We	
need	to	examine	the	logic	that	guides	the	hands…	choosing	particular	representations	of	
data,	and	translating	ideas	into	code.	(Seaver	2013:9)	
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Here,	the	author	argues	that	despite	the	publicly	available	knowledge	of	many	of	the	
components	used	in	EdgeRank,	absent	information	about	how	those	components	are	
calculated	and	the	data	involved	are	created,	we	know,	and	can	learn,	very	little	about	the	
EdgeRank	algorithm.	To	this	point,	studies	of	data	making	practices	in	socio-technical	systems	
are	lacking.	While	researchers	engage	in	the	process	of	data	construction	every	time	they	do	
research,	there	is	a	deficiency	in	sustained	empirical	analyses	that	capture	the	ways	in	which	
data	and	their	assemblages	come	to	be.	Moreover,	the	work	that	does	either	directly	or	
tangentially	engage	with	data	making	often	treat	data	as	given,	not	something	enacted	(Mol	
2002;	Vis	2012).		
Floridi	(2012)	argues	that	what	it	is	to	be	data	is	dependent	on	the	position	one	speaks	
from.	As	Kitchin	(2014b)	summarizes,	“from	an	epistemic	position,	data	are	a	collection	of	facts,	
from	an	informational	position,	data	are	information,	from	a	computational	position,	data	are	
collections	of	binary	elements	that	can	be	processed…	form	a	diaphonic	position	data	are	
abstract	elements”	(Kitchin	2014b:4).	This	sentiment	captures	the	uncertain	nature	of	data,	as	
it	relies	on	decision	logics,	perspective,	context,	and	purpose	among	a	great	many	other	things.	
The	central	feature	of	this	argument	is	that	much	like	code	based	systems,	data	are	not	neutral	
or	objective	things	(Friedman	and	Nissenbaum	1996).	Gitelman	and	Jackson	(2013:2)	argue	that	
“data	are	always	already	‘cooked’”.	An	understanding	of	data	must	move	beyond	a	simplistic	
understanding	of	them	as	“merely	being	the	raw	materials	of	information	and	knowledge”	
(Kitchin	2014b:185).	Data	are	wound	up	in	webs	of	socio-material	relationships;	they	are	
subject	to	systems	of	thought,	discourses	of	governmentality	(Lyon	2007;	Raley	2013),	science	
(Ribes	and	Jackson	2013),	privacy	(Nissenbaum	2004;	Solove	2004),	and	economy	(Brine	and	
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Poovey	2013;	Gandy	Jr.	1993;	Mackenzie	2008),	among	others.	Data	do	not	exist	in	a	vacuum	as	
they	are	both	subject	to	the	field-specific	discourses	in	which	they	are	a	part,	the	practices	of	
users,	and	the	specific	forms	of	the	standards	and	infrastructures	that	enable	them	(Bowker	
2005).	Any	understanding	of	data	must	mind	these	contexts,	systems	of	thought,	
infrastructures,	standards,	classification	schema,	technologies,	communities	of	practice	and	
institutions	that	are	involved	in	their	creation,	collection,	warehousing,	and	analysis.	In	other	
words,	the	study	of	data	must	also	be	the	study	of	the	data	assemblage.	
These	data	assemblages	are	complex	systems	that	are	grounded	in	specific	modes	of	
thinking,	classification,	infrastructures,	standards,	practices,	institutions,	policies,	and	
technologies.	Tables	1.	&	2.	detail	the	elements	of	data	assemblages,	outlining	the	various	ways	
that	different	components	“frame	what	is	possible,	desirable,	and	expected	of	data”	(Kitchin	
2014b:24).	A	consequence	of	this	assemblage	based	approach	to	the	study	of	data	is	that	they	
are	not	simply	the	result	of	stable	forms	of	classification	and	recording,	they	are	dependent	on	
the	specific	interrelations	between	and	amongst	elements	of	the	data	assemblage.	While	the	
list	of	an	assemblage’s	components	shows	the	various	inputs	into	what	makes	data,	work	in	this	
emerging	area	argues	that	data	and	their	assemblages	actually	co-constitute	one	another.	That	
is,	while	the	assemblage	produces	data,	the	data	act	back	upon	the	assemblage	to	modify	its	
form	and	function	(Kitchin	2014b;	Kitchin	and	Lauriault	2014;	Ribes	and	Jackson	2013).	A	
consequence	of	this	reflexivity	is	that	the	data	and	the	assemblage	are	in	a	constant	state	of	
potential	flux;	that	data	and	the	assemblage	both,	are	purely	contingent.	The	interactions	
between	components	and	the	interpretations	of	the	data	produced	open	the	possibility	of	all	
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states	of	being,	but	not	the	necessity	of	any.	The	particular	state	and	the	way	that	it	is	
determined	is	the	question	to	consider.		
	
Table	1:	The	Apparatus	and	Elements	of	a	Data	Assemblage	
Apparatus		 Elements		
Systems	of	thought		 Modes	of	thinking,	philosophies,	theories,	
models,	ideologies,	rationalities,	etc.		
Forms	of	knowledge		 Research	texts,	manuals,	magazines,	
websites,	experience,	word	of	mouth,	chat	
forums,	etc.		
Finance		 Business	models,	investment,	venture	
capital,	grants,	philanthropy,	profit,	etc.		
Political	economy		 Policy,	tax	regimes,	incentive	instruments,	
public	and	political	opinion,	etc.		
Governmentalities	and	legalities		 Data	standards,	file	formats,	system	
requirements,	protocols,	regulations,	laws,	
licensing,	intellectual	property	regimes,	
ethical	considerations,	etc.		Materialities	and	infrastructures		 Paper/pens,	computers,	digital	devices,	
sensors,	scanners,	databases,	networks,	
servers,	buildings,	etc.		
Practices		 Techniques,	ways	of	doing,	learned	
behaviors,	scientific	conventions,	etc.		
Organizations	and	institutions		 Archives,	corporations,	consultants,	
manufacturers,	retailers,	government	
agencies,	universities,	conferences,	clubs	
and	societies,	committees	and	boards,	
communities	of	practice,	etc.		
Subjectivities	and	communities		 Of	data	producers,	experts,	curators,	
managers,	analysts,	scientists,	politicians,	
users,	citizens,	etc.		
Places		 Labs,	offices,	field	sites,	data	centers,	server	
farms,	business	parks,	etc.,	and	their	
agglomerations		
Marketplace		 For	data,	its	derivatives	(e.g.,	text,	tables,	
graphs,	maps),	analysts,	analytic	software,	
interpretations,	etc.		
Source:	Kitchin	(2014b,	pg.	25)	 	
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Table	2:	The	Apparatus	and	Elements	of	Schema.org	
Apparatus		 Elements		
Systems	of	thought		 Graph	theory,	resource	description	
framework,	entity	property	representation,	
generalized	application,	pragmatic	modeling		
Forms	of	knowledge		 Research	texts,	manuals,	websites,	
experience,	W3C	best	practices,	W3C	
community	forum,	Schema.org	
recommendation	and	use	examples.		Finance		 Financed	by	sponsor	companies		
Political	economy		 Emerged	in	vacuum	left	from	original	
semantic	web	vision	as	a	way	to	improve	
search	and	content	embedded	in	sponsor	
applications.		
Governmentalities	and	legalities		 Microdata,	RDF	and	its	serializations,	JSON-
LD,	version	control	systems	(Git),			
Materialities	and	Infrastructure		 Computers,	databases,	server	farms,	etc.	
Practices		 Bricolage,	generalization,	acontextual	
mapping,	ontology	modifications,	etc.	
Organizations	and	institutions		 W3C,	Google,	Microsoft,	Yahoo,	Yandex,	
independent	contractors,	major	corporate	
users	
Subjectivities	and	communities		 Schema.org	ontologists,	users,	community	
members,	academic	participants	
Places		 Virtual	spaces	via	Skype,	conference	calls,	
GitHub,	Google	docs,	W3C	message	boards	
and	IRC	chats		
Marketplace		 Collection	of	use	cases		
Source:	adapted	from	Kitchin	(2014b)	
	
The	dilemma	of	context	is	also	a	prominent	critique	in	recent	studies	of	coded	systems	
and	big	data.	Work	here	argues	that	they	enact	a	new	brand	of	heightened	technological	
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positivism	that	constructs	a	particular	epistemic	viewpoint	where	there	is	only	what	appears	in	
the	data.	In	this	construction,	not	only	do	numbers	simply	speak	for	themselves,	but	there	is	
also	nothing	to	be	found	outside	of	the	numbers	(Andrejevic	2014;	Bowker	2014;	boyd	and	
Crawford	2012;	Floridi	2012;	Kitchin	2014a;	Leonelli	2014;	Seaver	2015;	Thatcher	2014).	One	of	
the	charges	against	this	techno-positivism	is	that	it	strips	away	any	context	from	problem	
formulation,	data	collection,	the	algorithm,	and	the	results.	Thus,	this	removal	of	context	
renders	the	entire	data	processing	operation	meaningless	(boyd	and	Crawford	2012;	Seaver	
2015).	Critics	argue	that	this	is	especially	the	case	with	aggregated	datasets	or	data	processed	
automatically	through	machine	learning	algorithms	(Bowker	2013;	Busch	2014;	Mittelstadt	and	
Floridi	2016).	Busch	(2014:1734)	calls	this	process	“layering”.	In	short,	layering	involves	the	
process	of	factor	reduction	whereby,	in	our	collective	efforts	to	produce	greater	precision,	
clarity,	and	objectivity,	those	aspects	of	things	that	are	not	amenable	to	numerical	or	statistical	
analysis—that	situate	particular	phenomena—are	systematically	downgraded	or	removed	from	
consideration”	(Busch	2014:1735).	Here	the	contexts	of	data	collection,	processing,	analysis,	
and	any	other	ontological	positions	that	are	implied	by	those	methods	are	made	invisible	in	the	
process	of	creating	large	datasets.	That	is,	big	data	obscures	the	various	ways	that	phenomena	
and	the	resulting	data	are	enacted	(Mittelstadt	and	Floridi	2016).		
Seaver	(2015),	however,	counters	this	trend,	arguing	that	debates	about	the	big	data	
revolution	stripping	context	from	data	miss	the	point	entirely.	He	argues	that	context	is	exactly	
the	battleground.	Context	is	imputed	to	the	instance,	by	the	community,	practitioner,	or	
interpreter	in	every	encounter.	It	is	everywhere	and	always	a	matter	of	selection	and	
investigation.	Big	data	work	establishes	a	context	in	the	particular	selection	and	mobilization	of	
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data.	This	occurs	in	each	stage	of	a	problem	solving	such	as	target	variable	definition,	data	
collection	and	labeling,	feature	selection,	and	model	interpretation.	This	is	not	to	say	that	critics	
of	the	big	data	revolution	are	incorrect	or	misguided	in	their	critiques,	but	rather	that	social	
science’s	critiques	of	big	data	and	algorithms	are	looking	for	a	different	type	of	context	that	big	
data’s	epistemological	stance	cannot	ever	satisfy.	That	is,	data	analysts	and	social	scientists	are	
using	two	different	types	of	context.	In	this	literature	those	types	are	positivistic	and	
interpretive.	In	the	positivistic	set	of	contexts,	“context	is	considered	to	be	a	stable	container	
for	activity:	one’s	context	can	be	described	as	an	accumulation	of	data	points	such	as	location,	
weather,	the	people	nearby,	or	the	time	of	day”	(Seaver	2015:1105).	This	type	of	context	is	a	
matter	of	pure	construction	from	the	data	themselves.	In	the	interpretive	mode,	context	is	
performative	and	built	up	in	the	process	of	interactions,	not	something	that	can	be	reduced	to	
a	simple	quantitative	representation	in	a	dataset.	While	it	is	clear	that	the	two	disciplinary	
views	of	context	are	speaking	past	one	another,	the	major	takeaway	for	Seaver	and	this	study	is	
that	context	is	everywhere	and	at	all	times	a	matter	of	making	decisions	and	statements	about	
the	state	of	the	world.	This	means	that	context	“is	a	necessarily	political	project”	and	as	a	result	
becomes	a	question	of	is	creation	(Seaver	2015:1106).	So,	while	the	development	of	semantic	
ontologies	purportedly	strips	away	context	from	Web	text,	it	actually	only	ever	displaces	the	
creation	of	context.	This	ontological	displacement,	occurs	at	the	level	of	the	ontology	as	it	sets	
the	boundaries	within	which	the	world	can	be	spoken	of.	This	construction	and	its	effects	have	
not	yet	been	investigated.		
	 As	mentioned,	the	role	that	context	plays	in	the	semantic	web	is	complicated.	
Ontologists	develop	their	ontologies	to	be	acontextual	and	able	to	be	applied	across	dissimilar	
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use	cases.	However,	as	I	will	show	in	later	chapters,	context	plays	a	central	role	in	their	
development.	Likewise,	the	actual	use	of	ontologies	by	Web	developers	never	occurs	outside	of	
a	specified	context.	Waller	(2016),	drawing	on	Heidegger	(1973)	and	Lakoff	(1987)	shows	that	
the	definitions	of	concepts	and	their	attachments	to	properties	always	necessarily	rely	on	social	
context.	Indeed,	as	Bakhtin	(1981)	argues,	all	claims	are	inextricably	embedded	in	specific	
contexts.	As	we	will	see,	this	dilemma	of	context	will	create	problems	for	creating	and	applying	
semantic	data,	as	there	is	no	way	to	establish	or	reconcile	differences	in	the	intention	of	
development	and	intended	application.	
In	her	study	of	research	use	of	the	Twitter	data,	Vis	(2012)	takes	a	step	to	understand	
and	critically	evaluate	the	process	of	data	making	through	an	analysis	of	the	application	
programming	interfaces	(APIs),	researcher	questions,	data	selection	practices,	and	the	
computer	programs	they	use.	The	author	argues	that	APIs	can	expose	or	occlude	certain	types	
of	data	depending	on	access,	sentiments	echoed	by	work	on	the	“big	data	divide”	(Andrejevic	
2014;	boyd	and	Crawford	2012;	McCarthy	2016;	Mittelstadt	and	Floridi	2015).	Additionally,	this	
work	finds	that	APIs	often	present	data	where	data	provenance	is	left	in	question.	In	this	
particular	example,	the	Twitter	API	often	displays	imputed	data	that	has	its	provenance	hidden	
since	it	was	imputed	prior	to	its	availability	through	the	API.	Relatedly,	Ford	and	Graham	(2016)	
find	similar	issues	with	geopolitical	information	in	semantic	search	applications.	In	their	earlier	
mentioned	study	of	semantic	representations	of	the	city	of	Jerusalem,	they	show	that	
representations	of	the	city,	its	history,	and	entanglements	with	global	politics	are	blunted,	and	
the	sources	of	the	underlying	data	are	obscured.	Obscured	data	provenance	is	significant	
because,	our	concerns	when	studying	the	sociology	of	information	should	not	just	be	about	
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which	components	are	included	or	not,	but	where	they	came	from,	and	how	those	components	
were	created	in	the	first	place	(Seaver	2013).	A	clear	picture	of	data’s	provenance	is	essential	to	
those	aims.	For	example,	Twitter	location	data	are	created	from	processes	of	investigation	and	
imputation.	While	they	may	be	accurate,	they	also	may	not	be.	In	the	large	majority	of	cases,	
location	data	are	imputed.	These	imputations	may	be	based	on	neglected	profiles,	poor	
secondary	data,	or	overly	broad,	thus	inaccurate,	location	predictions.	Regardless	of	the	
particular	reason,	the	data	are	used	and	are	applicable	in	analyses	and	decision	making.			
In	addition	to	data’s	unknown	origin,	how	they	were	developed	is	a	central	concern.	Vis	
(2012)	shows	that	researcher	data	making	is	a	complex	process	of	decision	making.	She	argues,	
Decisions	about	what	to	collect	(what	is	in,	what	is	out),	from	which	API	data	is	
collected,	for	which	period,	including	which	metadata,	including	an	awareness	of	how	
this	collected	data	is	itself	created	by	APIs,	are	important	stages	in	the	data	making	
process.	(Vis	2012:no	page).		
	
Here	the	author	highlights	just	a	few	of	the	many	decisions	that	researchers	need	to	make	in	
the	process	of	constructing	their	datasets.	Moreover,	these	decisions	are	made	in	the	context	
of	specific	systems	of	thought,	theoretical	debates,	and	from	specific	ontological	and	
epistemological	positions	(Boellstorff	2013).	As	Gitelman	and	Jackson	(2013)	argue,	to	think	
about	data,	we	need	to	understand	how	researchers	envisage	their	objects	of	research.	Data	in	
many	cases	are	modeled.	Here	I	do	not	mean	used	in	modeling	techniques,	though	that	is	
certainly	a	common	use	of	data.	Instead,	I	mean	to	say	that	data	are	modeled	as	a	part	of	their	
creation	in	a	process	of	establishing	their	ontological	state.	These	data	producing	models	have	a	
co-constitutive	relationship	to	the	data	they	model.	They	are	created	based	on	the	disciplinary	
understanding	of	the	world,	itself	an	interpretation	of	sets	of	data	and	used	to	produce	new	
data	through	transformation.		
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					 Superficially,	data	would	seem	to	occupy	a	first	order	position	in	the	knowledge	of	one’s	
object	of	study.	This	orientation	suggests	that	data	is	the	necessary	condition	for	conceiving	of	
one’s	subject.	However,	data’s	real	relationship	to	a	discipline	inverts	that	perspective.	How	
one	understands	their	object	of	study	has	a	mutually	constituting	relationship	to	the	data	the	
one	creates	and	mobilizes	toward	that	understanding	(Brine	and	Poovey	2013;	Gitelman	and	
Jackson	2013).	In	their	analysis	of	Irving	Fisher’s	contributions	to	data-driven	economic	theory,	
Brine	and	Poovey	(2013)	show	the	ways	in	which	the	understanding	of	economics	comes	to	
influence	the	understanding	of	data.	Their	analysis	of	Fisher’s	Appreciation	and	Interest	shows	
that	economist’s	understanding	of	value	and	financial	modeling	contributed	to	the	
transformation	and	creation	of	data	to	better	fit	the	calculations	and	theory	at	hand.	The	
process	of	transformation	for	theory	matching	is	indicative	of	the	distance	between	data	and	
what	they	allegedly	represent.	Their	works	suggest	that	the	particular	understanding	of	
economic	theory	has	a	role	in	conditioning	the	data	mobilized	in	support	of	that	economic	
theory.		
Edwards	(2010)	remarks	on	a	similar	process	with	regards	to	the	use	of	climate	data.	
Discussing	the	infrastructure	involved	in	climate	data,	Edwards	argues	that	what	we	know	as	
climate	data	has	already	undergone	filtration,	interpretation,	and	modeling	by	computer	
systems.	Amassing	the	large	stores	of	climate	data	is	not	a	matter	of	collection.	Since	the	
existing	climate	infrastructure	was	developed	over	extended	periods	of	time	with	shifting	aims,	
the	measurements	produced	by	the	available	instruments	were	diverse,	scattered	across	the	
globe	in	less	than	systematic	ways,	uncalibrated,	and	not	always	relevant	to	the	new	tasks	of	
measuring	global	climate.	This	existing	set	of	measurements	were	processed	to	become	data	by	
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climate	scientists.	In	effect,	the	newly	emerging	understandings	of	global	climate	helped	
produce	the	very	data	used	in	the	empirical	study	of	global	climates.	Scientists	first	had	to	
integrate,	normalize,	and	convert	the	disparate	sources	of	existing	data	to	reflect	the	
preexisting	models.	So	instead	of	drawing	on	available	sets	of	climate	specific	data,	climate	
science	was	a	matter	of	using	computer	models	to	transform	disparate	forms	and	locational	
measurements	into	representative,	homogenous,	and	global	climate	datasets	(Edwards	2010).			
Indeed,	data	production	as	a	function	of	the	modeling	and	interpretation	of	existing	
forms	of	data	is	commonplace.	These	same	processes	occur	in	options	pricing	models,	credit	
scoring,	risk	evaluation,	debt	rating,	and	many	other	practices	(Krippner	2011).	This	work	does	a	
good	job	establishing	that	data	are	often	managed	and	pre-processed	before	they	become	or	
are	considered	as	“data”.	This	implication	has	three	main	consequences.	First,	as	has	already	
been	established,	data	are	dependent.	They	are	dependent	on	how	a	focus	of	investigation	is	
conceived,	the	instruments	used	in	measurement,	the	practices	of	experts,	and	the	
technologies	involved	in	the	collection,	management,	and	use.	Second,	what	counts	as	data,	is	a	
matter	of	specific	perspective.	What	the	work	from	Brine	and	Poovey	(2013)	as	well	as	Edwards	
(2010)	clearly	indicates	is	that	existing	data	is	not	always	sufficient	for	the	task	at	hand.	
Moreover,	as	Stanley	(2013)	echoes,	data	may	be	insufficient	for	the	task	which	can	exclude	it	
from	being	considered	data	at	all.	That	is,	data,	like	technology,	establishes	a	standing	reserve	
of	possibility	which	allows	it	to	be	understood	as	data	or	not.	The	specific	contextual	
relationship	that	the	data	have	to	the	set	of	interpretations	to	be	applied	to	it,	mark	its	
ontological	status	as	data.	Vis	(2012)	argues	similarly	that	big	data	analyses	and	the	choice	of	
data	based	on	difficulty,	convenience,	or	technical	ability	can	serve	to	exclude	certain	types	of	
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potentially	very	relevant	and	important	data	from	analyses.	She	uses	the	analysis	of	images	as	
an	example.	Until	recently,	and	now	only	in	limited	ways,	techniques	used	to	analyze	big	data	
were	insufficient	for	analyzing	images.	While	images	were	an	important	potential	source	of	
data,	they	were	not	included	as	data	due	to	the	inability	for	automated	analysis.	Third,	what	
follows	is	that	data	assemblages	are	enacted.	The	specific	set	of	technologies,	practices,	and	
orientations	brought	to	bear	on	data	call	them	into	being	as	data	of	specific	types	and	allow	
them	to	declare	certain	things	and	not	others.	Tools	and	practices	both	create	and	display	data	
in	certain	ways	and	not	others.	Moreover,	the	complexity	of	these	tools,	their	actual	
programming,	and	the	decisions	built	into	them	are	not	transparent	or	standardized.		
What	the	above	make	clear	is	that	data	depend	on	a	wide	range	of	inputs.	They	are	the	
product	of	many	different	people,	framings,	and	goals.	Work	has	only	recently	begun	to	
investigate	these	data	assemblages	and	their	outcomes.	Indeed,	researchers	in	this	area	have	
highlighted	the	need	for	more	work	that	engages	in	the	sustained	empirical	investigation	of	
data	infrastructures,	standards,	modeling,	and	creation	practices	(Kitchin	2014b;	Kitchin	and	
Lauriault	2014;	Kitchin	et	al.	2015a,	2015b).	This	work	calls	attention	to	the	diverse	forms	of	
data	and	data	assemblages,	as	well	as	the	need	to	investigate	the	components	of	these	
assemblages	and	their	interactions.	For	all	the	recent	work	on	data	assemblages,	there	is	still	a	
dearth	of	work	that	investigates	how	a	data	assemblage’s	components	interact	as	part	of	its	
expression.	This	study	seeks	to	fill	that	gap	by	investigating	how	specifically	the	interactions	
between	components	not	only	enact	the	semantic	data	assemblage,	but	the	particular	state	of	
being	it	engenders.			
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3.3	Information	Infrastructures	and	Expert	Systems	
Related	to	the	set	of	tools	and	practices	are	the	infrastructures	that	come	to	bear	on	
data.	Data	infrastructures	are	“the	institutional,	physical,	and	digital	means	for	storing,	sharing,	
and	consuming	data	across	networked	technologies.”	(Kitchin	2014b:32).	There	are	a	wide	
range	of	types	and	examples	of	data	infrastructures	including	data	holding	systems,	archives,	
catalogs	and	directories,	repositories,	and	cyber-infrastructures.	Of	significant	note,	however,	
are	studies	that	show	the	particular	effects	of	the	way	infrastructure,	and	cyber-infrastructures	
in	particular,	are	designed,	maintained,	and	developed.		
Data	infrastructures	are	technologies	for	interoperability	between	various	communities	
of	practice.	These	boundary	objects	are	approached	with	sometimes	divergent	interpretations	
of	purpose,	form,	and	function	specific	to	those	communities	(Bowker	and	Star	1999).	The	use	
of	agreed	upon	standards	in	these	infrastructures	can	reduce	this	tension,	allowing	for	smooth	
interoperability.	However,	mobilizing	the	set	of	standards	on	offer	is	not	always	as	simple	or	
predictable	as	an	infrastructure’s	background	operation	would	suggest.	In	information	
infrastructures,	particularly	in	scientific	e-infrastructure,	these	tensions,	or	“data	friction”,	can	
result	in	the	breakdown	and	failure	of	work	processes	and	the	underlying	infrastructure	
(Edwards	et	al.	2011).	In	their	study	of	two	distributed	environmental	science	projects,	Edwards	
and	colleagues	(2011),	show	that	standards,	rather	than	being	stable,	predictable,	and	uniform	
means	for	enabling	interoperability	are	often	mobilized	in	ad	hoc	ways.	Scientific	practice	is	
often	messy	and	encounters	novel	situations	that	defy	the	sort	readily	handled	by	the	existing	
configurations	of	the	infrastructure	and	its	standards.	This	work	shows	that	standards,	
particularly	metadata	standards,	can	be	mobilized	in	creative	and	unpredictable	ways	to	suit	
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the	task	at	hand	and	navigate	the	contradictory	pressures	required	of	standardization	and	
flexibility	(Hanseth	et	al.	1996).	However,	those	mobilizations	can	come	with	the	unintended	
consequences	of	affecting	the	form	of	data,	its	availability,	and	sharing.		
				 	In	addition	to	the	use	specific	characteristics	and	contexts,	the	development	of	
information	infrastructures	has	substantial	effects	on	the	form	and	content	of	their	related	
data.	Infrastructures	are	long	duree	systems,	meaning	that	the	focus	on	development	needs	to	
be	cognizant	of	long-term	problems,	needs,	and	possibilities.	However,	the	developers	of	these	
infrastructures	are	not	always	in	agreement	about	the	challenges	and	direction	that	the	
infrastructure	is,	or	will	be,	facing.	The	tensions	surrounding	the	goals,	purposes,	and	
motivations	of	participants	affect	the	design,	development,	and	implementation	of	these	
infrastructures	(Ribes	and	Finholt	2009).	These	effects	have	far-reaching	consequences.	The	
specific	infrastructural	states	and	practices	affect	the	possible	ways	that	data	can	be	stored,	
which	affect	the	type	of	data	that	will	be	stored,	which	affect	the	type	of	data	to	be	collected.	
Much	like	classification	standards,	information	infrastructures	have	a	jussive	power	over	the	
data	and	their	possible	uses.	They	define	and	implicitly	impute	values	to	what	is	stored	and	
what	counts	as	data	(Bowker	2005).	Moreover,	the	data	stored	in	these	infrastructures,	their	
uses,	and	their	users,	shape	one	another	in	different	ways.	Users	of	the	Social	Science	Data	
Archive	(SSDA)	adjusted	its	data	collection	efforts	to	respond	to	the	increasing	scholarly	
demand	for	different	forms	of	data,	while	at	the	same	time,	old	and	new	audiences	for	SSDA	
data	engaged	in	new	types	of	analyses	and	new	research	partnerships	with	different	
governmental	and	institutional	participants,	as	well	as	altering	their	outlook	on	their	field	(Ribes	
and	Finholt	2009;	Shankar	et	al.	2016).	All	of	this	is	to	say	that	the	specific	form	information	
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infrastructures	take	and	the	specific	decisions	made	by	the	developers	of	those	infrastructures	
have	a	significant	bearing	on	the	types,	amount,	and	uses	of	data	connected	to	those	systems	
as	well	as	the	range	of	possibilities	that	those	infrastructures,	and	their	data,	engender.		
Work	in	the	social	sciences	that	investigates	ontologies	as	cyber	infrastructure	is	limited	
but	growing.	One	early	study	by	Ribes	and	Bowker	(2009)	offers	some	initial	inroads	to	
understanding	their	development.	In	their	study	of	the	geoscience	network	(GEON)	ontology,	
they	examine	the	processes	of	translation	between	domain	experts	and	ontology	developers.	
This	work	shows	the	problems	that	occur	between	two	different	expert	groups	who	share	no	
domain	knowledge	and	have	different	epistemic	cultures	(Knorr-Cetina	1999).	While	the	
geoscience	community	held	a	great	deal	of	geological	subject	matter	expertise,	they	had	little	
computer	science	expertise.	The	reverse	can	be	said	of	the	ontologists	charged	with	converting	
geoscience	domain	knowledge	into	a	format	able	to	be	represented	in	a	linked	data	ontology.		
Thus,	the	fundamental	problem	that	Ribes	and	Bowker	identify	is	one	of	“reapprehension”,	or	
how	domain	experts	approach	their	knowledge	bases	in	new	ways	(Ribes	and	Bowker	
2009:200).	Much	domain	specific	knowledge	is	tacit	and	held	by	the	communities	of	experts	in	
those	domains.	As	such,	a	great	deal	of	that	knowledge	is	taken	for	granted	and	rests	in	the	
background	of	practice	(Ribes	and	Bowker	2009;	Schutz	and	Luckmann	1973,	1989).		
Domain	expertise	is	such	that	experts	spend	their	time	deploying	information	and	
interrogating	its	quality,	but	little	time	thinking	about	the	underlying	organization	of	their	
background	knowledge	in	its	own	right.	As	Ribes	and	Bowker	put	it,	“the	term	reapprehension	
is	intended	to	emphasize	how	they	come	to	see	data	and	knowledge	anew	as	a	question	of	
informational	order,	and	then	seek	to	act	on	its	organization	as	information.”	(Ribes	and	
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Bowker	2009:215).	In	the	GEON	project,	the	interactions	between	domain	experts	forced	both	
sets	of	experts	to	approach	their	tacit	knowledge	bases	in	new	ways,	not	only	to	render	them	
explicit,	but	also	enable	communication	across	disciplinary	boundaries.	In	their	case,	this	
involved	community	discussions	to	triangulate	and	establish	a	community	wide	consensus	
about	the	best	ways	that	their	tacit	knowledges	could	be	translated	as	faithful	representations	
of	expertise.			
As	instrumental	in	understating	the	self-reflection	involved	in	translating	knowledge	as	
this	work	may	be,	there	are	some	causes	for	concern,	however.	While	the	translation	between	
experts	and	ontologists	is	a	necessary	step	in	trying	to	represent	specific	forms	of	knowledge	in	
machine-readable	ways,	it	obscures	the	fact	that	this	process	is	inherently	political,	as	
knowledge	engineers,	experts,	ontologists,	as	so	forth,	are	all	engaging	in	processes	of	selection	
and	modification	as	they	grasp	at	bits	of	meaningful	information,	while	pushing	away	those	bits	
that	are	seemingly	unimportant.	Furthermore,	even	small	subsets	of	the	disciplinary	knowledge	
are	far	too	complex	to	represent	and	so	those	representations	tend	to	over-determine	
concepts.	While	they	recognize	the	many	contested	meanings	both	across	and	within	
disciplinary	boundaries,	there	is	little	recognition	of	the	difficulty	or	problems	of	trying	to	
capture	that	disagreement	in	such	determinate	systems.	In	essence,	they	do	not	provide	an	
understanding	of	how	the	translation	between	humans	and	machines	is	performed,	which	
prohibits	understanding	the	crux	of	ontologies,	which	is	the	translation	from	machine	to	
machine.		
We	can	look	to	past	research	on	expert	and	formal	systems	to	engage	with	these	
omissions.	This	work	points	to	a	similar	problem	regarding	the	translation	of	expert	knowledge	
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across	domains	called	the	knowledge	acquisition	bottleneck	(Collins	1990;	Forsythe	1993).	This	
concept	defines	a	problem	where	knowledge	engineers	attempt	to	extract	knowledge	from	
domain	experts.	This	process	is	time	consuming	and	fraught	with	complications,	as	much	of	
that	domain	knowledge	is	not	amenable	to	modeling	in	computer	systems.	For	Collins	(1990,	
2010)	the	problem	is	one	of	socio-cultural	understanding.	Collins	(1990)	stresses	that	
deterministic	systems,	such	as	AI,	can	only	approach	the	forms	of	expertise	and	knowledge	that	
most	closely	resemble	the	formalisms	of	computers	(Berg	1997).	That	is,	formalization	is	only	
ever	possible	where	society	itself	has	been	constructed	to	resemble	the	processes	of	machines.	
While	rule	based	knowledge	–	tacit,	heuristic,	or	otherwise	–	can	often	be	modeled	here,	they	
have	trouble	grasping	many	other	forms	of	tacit	and	socio-cultural	knowledge,	which	includes	
the	ability	to	understand,	use,	and	interrogate	those	knowledges,	a	point	echoed	by	Ager	
(2003).	Collins	argues	that	the	success	of	an	expert	system	vis-à-vis	knowledge	acquisition	rests	
on	the	availability	for	interpretation	since	all	knowledge	cannot	easily	be	transferred	through	
the	system.	Forsythe	(1993)	agrees	here,	noting	that	certain	domains	are	more	amenable	for	
knowledge	extraction	and	modeling	than	others.	However,	there	is	some	reason	for	skepticism,	
as	it	obscures	the	fact	that	ambiguity	exists	at	all	levels	of	language,	regardless	of	domain.	
Problematically	for	the	semantic	web,	a	consumer’s	interpretive	capacity	is	often	stripped	away	
as	data	provenance	is	obscured	(Ford	and	Graham	2016).	Furthermore,	while	I	agree	with	both	
Collins	(1990,	2010)	and	Agre	(1995,	2003)	that	agents	must	always	make	sense	of	
communication	in	every	instance,	as	interpretation	is	situated	activity,	this	does	not	deal	with	
the	fact	that	situated	context	is	the	thing	to	be	negotiated.		
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Forsythe	(1993)	echoes	Collins	and	Agre,	but	argues	that	the	problem	of	representation	
is	also	a	problem	of	the	approach	to	knowledge	that	the	engineers	have.	She	argues	that	
engineers	approach	knowledge	and	the	acquisition	problem	in	two	ways.	First,	they	are	like	
Star’s	(1994)	naïve	formalists,	only	viewing	knowledge	as	something	codified	and	formalized.	
She	argues	that	knowledge	engineers	do	not	consider	tacit	of	socio-cultural	knowledge	as	
knowledge.	Rather,	knowledge,	in	their	view,	is	something	that	is	able	to	be	made	explicit	in	
texts,	as	something	to	be	extracted	or	transferred.	The	second	understanding	is	in	the	way	they	
evaluate	knowledge.	Here,	she	argues	that	engineers	evaluate	knowledge	introspectively,	not	
through	seeking	empirical	evidence.	These	understandings	of	knowledge	lead	her	to	argue	that	
knowledge	modeling	in	expert	systems	is	a	matter	of	deletion,	noting	that	a	“notion	of	
straightforward	transfer	completely	obscures	their	own	role	in	the	selection	and	interpretation	
of	what	goes	into	a	knowledge	base.”	(Forsythe	1993:463).	Furthermore,	she	argues	that	while	
sometimes	these	knowledge	engineers	are	aware	of	what	they	are	doing,	this	selection	process	
is	bracketed	from	direct	consciousness.	Elsewhere,	Agre	(1995)	argues	that	knowledge	
engineers	viewed	the	formalization	process	as	creating	a	sort	of	precision	that	the	original	
knowledge	and	language	lacked	where	“the	vagueness	and	ambiguity	of	ordinary	language	are	
repaired	through	mathematical	definition”	(Agre	1995:no	page)	accordingly	these	engineers	did	
not	care	much	about	the	bias	and	semantic	inaccuracy	that	resulted.		
These	authors	deal	well	with	the	problems	of	translation	between	experts,	and	the	
intractability	of	converting	certain	types	of	knowledge	in	a	machine-readable	way.	However,	
the	actual	processes	of	translating	that	knowledge	for	computer	specific	consumption	is	not	
well	covered.	While	past	work	investigates	the	specific	natures	of	certain	type	of	knowledge,	
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the	orientation	to	experts,	and	the	approaches	to	knowledge	that	engineers	have,	they	lack	any	
discussion	of	the	interactions	with	other	important	components	of	technical	systems.	That	is,	
they	do	not	examine	the	data	modeling	approaches,	methods	for	classification,	or	the	
standards	used	in	creating	machine-readable	data.	It	is	my	contention	that	only	an	assemblage	
based	approach	that	explores	those	interactions	between	components	can	truly	help	us	
understand	how	human-machine	translation	occurs	and	how	specific	representations	of	the	
world	become	codified	in	technical	systems.		
	
3.4	Classification	and	Standards	
Semantic	web	ontologies,	like	all	classification	systems,	are	more	than	just	assigned	tags	
to	existing	phenomena.	They	are	more	than	just	reflections	of	some	alleged	underlying	reality.	
Ontologies	and	all	classification	systems	are	socially	constructed	systems	that	play	a	role	in	
constituting	the	realities	that	they	purportedly	represent	(Bowker	and	Star	1999;	Westbrook	
and	Saperstein	2015;	Zerubavel	1996).	Our	attention,	then,	must	be	directed	to	ways	those	
systems	are	constructed,	the	realities	they	construct,	and	the	consequences	of	the	
institutionalized	classification	schemes	used	in	these	systems.	In	this	case	specifically,	we	must	
look	at	the	construction,	output,	and	consequences	of	semantic	web	ontologies.			
In	sociology,	studies	of	classification	systems	have	been	primarily	in	organizational,	neo-
institutional,	and	cognitive	domains.	Organizational	studies	of	categories	have	directed	their	
focus	on	the	various	ways	category	construction	and	adoption	mark	similarities	and	differences	
between	companies	and	their	products	(Zhao	2008,	Zuckerman	1999,	2000).	Neo-institutional	
work	on	classification	has	primarily	focused	on	the	contests	surrounding	institutionalized	
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meanings	of	categories	and	the	institutional	isomorphism	that	arises	from	shared	
understandings	of	institutional	fields	(DiMaggio	1987,	DiMaggio	and	Powell	1983,	1991).	Lastly,	
cognitive	sociology	has	investigated	the	ways	in	which	people	draw	on,	and	construct,	
categories	in	“shaping	how	we	perceive	and	organize	our	realities”	(Brekhus	2007:450).	While	
approaching	the	topic	of	classification	systems	from	two	different	vantages,	cultural	cognition	
and	neo-institutional	approaches	in	particular	share	an	outlook	that	classification	systems	
provide	the	social	substrate	from	which	actors	can	meaningfully	engage	with	the	world	through	
a	set	a	stable	and	shared	interpretive	schemas	and	rules	(DiMaggio	and	Powell	1991;	Meyer	
and	Rowan	1977;	Zhao	2008).			
Recent	work	in	survey	design	research	questions	how	best	to	structure	a	given	
classification	system,	showing	a	degree	of	self-awareness	in	the	problematic	way	that	
classification	systems	may	be	built.	This	recent	work	criticizes	the	running	first	order	
assumption	that	surveys	and/or	classification	systems	can	more	or	less	accurately	and	without	
fundamental	faults,	represent	the	world,	rather	than	constitute	it.	As	such,	within	this	work,	
there	has	been	very	little	critical	attention	to	the	construction	identities	as	a	consequence	of	
the	classificatory	sorting	that	happens	when	categories	are	chosen	and/or	ignored	(Westbrook	
and	Saperstein	2015).		
In	their	study	of	large	social	survey	designs,	Westbrook	and	Saperstein	(2015)	being	to	
fill	this	void	by	showing	that	surveys	create	serious	political	problems	where	they	represent	sex	
and	gender.	In	their	work,	they	find	that	surveys	largely	limit	sex	and	gender	choices	to	two	
normative	dichotomous	states	foreclosing	on	other	possibilities.	While	steps	have	been	taken	
to	expand	the	range	of	representations,	particularly	in	popular	culture,	work	still	remains	
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(Oremus	2014;	Westbrook	and	Saperstein	2015).	In	addition	to	the	limitations	presented	by	
overly	broad	classificatory	categories,	surveys	also	tend	to	conflate	sex	and	gender,	obscuring	
the	significant	conceptual	differences	between	the	two	things.	This	form	of	reduction	in	
classification	systems	leads	interpreters	to	ignore	both	the	between	and	within-category	
differences	to	the	effect	of	not	only	valorizing	the	choices	on	offer	but	also	overcoding	diversity	
in	categorical	distinctions	(Zerubavel	1996).	For	Deleuze,	this	represents	the	failings	of	
continental	ontology	as	it	asserts	positive	identity	at	the	expense	of	difference	(Deleuze	1964;	
May	2005).	In	the	process	of	reducing	the	anxiety	surrounding	ambiguous	categories,	the	realm	
of	possible	states	and	interpretations	is	foreclosed.	The	political	issues	potentially	involved	in	
binary	classification	systems	are	not	new.	Neither	are	the	implications	of	exclusion	and	
inclusion	of	categories	or	conflating	ontological	states	with	one	another,	as	category	
boundaries	are	rarely	neatly	drawn	or	equally	valued	(Lakoff	1987;	Wittgenstein	2009).	We	
have	long	seen	the	effects	these	classification	issues	have	had	on	subjectivity,	legitimate	forms	
of	knowing,	and	world	building,	particularly	as	they	have	been	described	in	post-structuralist,	
feminist,	and	post-colonial	theories	(Bowker	and	Star	1999;	Derrida	1967[2016];	Haraway	1991;	
Spivak	1999).		
Many	scholars	have	theorized	the	consequences	of	classification.	Foucault,	in	the	
preface	to	The	Order	of	Things,	writes	while	referring	to	the	oddities	of	animal	classification	in	a	
Chinese	encyclopedia,	“In	the	wonderment	of	this	taxonomy,	the	thing	we	apprehend	in	one	
great	leap,	the	thing	that,	by	means	of	the	fable,	is	demonstrated	as	the	exotic	charm	of	
another	system	of	thought,	is	the	limitation	of	our	own,	the	stark	impossibility	of	thinking	that.”	
(Foucault	1973[1995]:	xv).	Here,	Foucault	is	making	a	critique	on	the	analogous	Western	system	
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of	classification	and	its	supposed	objectivity.	Rather	than	capturing	any	real	connection	to	the	
world,	classification	systems	are	only	ever	specific	versions	and	attached	to	specific	cultural	
contexts.	Where	a	classification	system	exists,	an	alternative	might	always	be	found.	For	his	
part,	these	classification	schemes	are	the	discursive	regimes	that	order	our	interpretations	of	
phenomena	and	act	to	construct	our	subjectivities	(Foucault	1973[1994],	1977[1995];	Haraway	
1991).	The	ontological,	or	state	of	being,	in	this	view	is	only	ever	historical	contingency	in	
disguise.		
In	debt	to	Foucaultian	archeology,	Hacking	(1986,	1999)	developed	an	analytical	
framework	for	studying	the	act	of	“making	up	people”.	In	this	framework,	he	examines	the	way	
in	which	scientific	classifications	create	new	ways	of	thinking	about	people	that	reflexively	act	
back	upon	the	very	people	classified.	Lauriault	(2012)	draws	out	five	features	in	this	process,	
classification,	people,	institutions,	knowledge,	and	experts.	In	this	“looping	effect”,	people	are	
classified	and	made	to	fit	into	modified	or	altogether	new	categories	and	they	then	come	to	
interpret	those	categories	differently,	often	self-identifying	with	those	categories.	As	these	
categories	gain	familiarity	and	internalized	acceptance,	they	begin	a	process	of	
institutionalization.	Once	institutionalized,	they	often	go	through	refinements,	and	
reproductions	as	groups	of	experts	enact	those	classification	systems,	beginning	the	process	
again.	While	Hacking	(1986,	1999)	uses	the	looping	effect	to	describe	the	classification	of	
people,	and	Lauriault	(2012),	the	classification	of	space,	this	framework	can	apply	to	the	study	
of	semantic	data,	specifically	at	the	point	where	the	loop	turns	back	upon	itself.	
					 No	doubt	inspired	by	this	work,	contemporary	studies	of	big	data	echo	Hacking’s	
findings.	These	scholars	argue	that	modern	data	analytic	practices	can	have	major	ramifications	
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for	a	data	subject’s	self-determination	(Cheney-Lippold	2011;	Gillespie	2014).	As	categories	are	
inferred	from	data	streams	and	applied	to	people,	algorithms	are	being	used	to	automatically	
determine	individual	and	group	level	traits	and	characteristics.	These	classifications,	however,	
are	simultaneously	being	recreated	and	their	meanings	are	being	newly	re-determined.	The	
products	of	those	algorithms	create	the	new	conditions	in	which	those	same	algorithms	
operate.	As	Cheney-Lippold	argues,	“We	are	effectively	losing	control	in	defining	who	we	are	
online,	or	more	specifically	we	are	losing	ownership	over	the	meaning	of	the	categories	that	
constitute	our	identities.”	(Cheney-Lippold	2011:178).		
The	implication	of	their	thought	is	the	act	of	classification	is	not	an	act	of	naming,	it	is	an	
act	of	creation	that	constitutes	the	very	thing	that	it	names.	While	this	may	seem	overly	
constructivist,	it	bears	more	similarity	to	the	a	Deleuzian	perspective	as	well	as	those	aligned	
with	Gibsonian	affordances	(Introna	2007;	Lauriault	2012;	Parchoma	2012).	Hacking	explains	
thusly,	“Who	we	are	is	not	only	what	we	did	do,	and	will	do	but	also	what	we	might	have	done	
and	may	do.	Making	up	people	changes	the	space	of	possibilities	for	personhood…	our	
possibilities,	although	inexhaustible,	are	also	bounded.”	(Hacking	1986:114).	The	importance	of	
this	sentiment	is	that	essence	and	existence	are	artifacts	of	contextual	interpretation,	that	
classification	classifies	and	creates,	but	not	completely	and	not	immutably.	The	space	for	
interpretation	here	is	bounded	by	the	particular	activations	that	make	up	people.		
Other	work	in	the	area	has	directed	its	focus	on	classification	systems’	their	taken-for-
grantedness	and	their	embedding	in	standards	and	infrastructures	(Bowker	and	Star	1996,	
1999).	This	line	of	work	investigates	classification	systems	along	four	primary	themes.	First,	
classification	systems	are	ubiquitous	and	pervade	all	aspects	of	our	lives.	Moreover,	these	all-
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pervasive	classification	systems	are	not	discrete,	they	are	interwoven	with	one	another.	
However,	that	they	are	ubiquitous	and	interwoven,	does	not	mean	that	they	are	intertwined	in	
a	completely	fluid	or	stable	way.	As	classification	systems	vary	by	internal	logics,	divergent	
perspectives,	and	applied	context,	some	components	may	be	antithetical	to	one	another	
despite	other	shared	similarities.	This	last	complication	has	major	significance	for	semantic	web	
ontologies,	as	their	ability	to	supply	semantic	content	and	to	function	as	part	of	a	web	of	linked	
data	relies	on	the	smooth	interoperability	and	a	shared	set	of	perspectives	on	a	given	topic.		
The	second	theme	is	that	classification	systems	have	materiality.	While	investigations	in	
this	area	tend	to	focus	how	classification	systems	are	embedded	into	built	environments	and	
offer	certain	affordances	to	material	structures,	the	central	insight	is	that	classification	systems	
do	actual	work	in	the	world	and	are	not	just	virtual.	While	this	study	recognizes	the	various	
server	farms,	companies,	personal	and	organizational	resources,	etc.	that	materially	comprise	
the	semantic	web,	it	does	not	investigate	its	material	aspects	in	this	way.	While	these	concerns	
are	valid	in	their	own	right,	a	focus	on	this	aspect	of	the	semantic	web	draws	attention	away	
from	my	central	questions.	
A	third	thematic	approach	is	that	classification	systems	order	the	past	in	indeterminate	
ways.	This	orientation	to	classification	systems	seeks	to	uncover	the	ways	that	seemingly	
universal	and	natural	orderings	of	the	world	come	to	be	constructed	and	how	alternate	
perspectives	are	made	invisible.	This	is	particularly	important	to	my	investigation	into	how	
semantic	web	ontologies	declare	ontological	states.	Attention	drawn	to	the	particular	orderings	
of	classification	systems	serve	only	to	obscure	the	what	is	left	aside,	or	ontologically	over-
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determined	and	occluded.		The	last	major	strand	of	this	research	involves	unpacking	the	politics	
of	classifying.	As	Bowker	and	Star	(1996:4)	note:		
There	are	two	aspects	of	these	politics:	arriving	at	categories	and	standards,	and,	in	the	
process,	deciding	what	will	be	visible	within	the	system	(and	of	course	what	will	thus	
then	be	invisible).	The	negotiated	nature	of	standards	and	classifications	follows	from	
indeterminacy	and	multiplicity	that	whatever	appears	as	universal	or,	indeed,	standard,	
is	the	result	of	negotiations	or	conflict.		
	
Much	like	code-based	systems,	all	classification	schemes	are	constructed	by	and	for	someone.	
Someone	or	some	people	must	decide	the	nature	of	the	categories,	what	the	decisions	rule	of	
inclusion	in	a	category	will	be,	and	the	way	that	the	classification	will	be	applied	in	a	
standardized	way.	The	crucial	question	then	is	to	understand	what	that	seemingly	invisible	code	
is,	how	the	system	is	developed,	how	categorical	incoherence	is	negotiated,	what	
consequences	emerge	from	inclusion/exclusion	criteria,	and	what	is	rendered	invisible	(Epstein	
2007).		
These	analyses	ultimately	understand	categorization	systems	as	fields	for	the	exercise	of	
power	and	politics	(Bowker	and	Star	1996,	1999;	Epstein	2007).	A	major	focus	of	this	work	is	on	
the	development	and	deployment	of	standards,	particularly	classification	standards.	As	
standards	often	rest	in	the	background,	their	power	and	the	outcomes	they	enable	are	not	
always	obvious.	The	jussive	power	that	standards	hold	has	inspired	a	large	body	of	research	
into	questions	about	who	benefits	from	them,	how	they	are	implemented,	what	happens	when	
they	come	into	conflict,	and	what	outcomes	they	promote,	among	others	(Timmermans	and	
Epstein	2010).	The	particular	investment	in	a	standard	can	have	a	transformative	effect	on	the	
environment	it	is	applied	to	(Becker	1992).	Standards	do	work	that	shapes	the	world	(Bowker	
and	Star	1999;	Star	and	Lampland	2009).	Thus,	the	particular	form,	application,	and	underlying	
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decision	logics	in	which	a	given	standard	is	utilized	are	likely	to	have	differing	effects	depending	
on	the	niche	that	they	are	being	applied	to	(Epstein	2007).	For	this	study,	this	is	particularly	
relevant	as	it	pertains	to	classification	standards	and	their	deployment.	Scott	(1998)	reminds	us	
that	not	only	are	the	particular	configurations	of	classification	standards	central	to	shaping	
outcomes,	but	those	standards	and	outcomes	privilege	a	particular	point	of	view.	The	
development	of	a	standardized	system	of	permanent	last	names,	cadastral	surveys,	taxation,	
and	agricultural	metrics	shaped	the	way	that	individuals	related	to	larger	institutional	bodies	as	
the	subject	of	a	state.	Moreover,	we	see	that	the	application	of	a	classification	standard	does	
not	necessarily	bear	any	resemblance	to	an	actual	given	ontological	state,	but	does	serve	to	
create	it	when	applied.		
The	form	a	classification	system	takes	depends	on	the	particular	schema	mobilized	in	its	
construction	and	the	particular	form	of	institutional	or	cultural	logic	adopted	in	the	field	
(Douglas	1986).	Zhao	(2008)	investigates	the	two	different	wine	classification	systems	used	for	
Californian	and	French	wines.	He	notes	that	Californian	wines	adopt	a	system	based	on	the	type	
of	grape,	wine	making	process,	and	location	in	the	state,	with	a	horizontal	form	of	classification	
where	inputs	are	not	explicitly	more	valuable	than	others.	French	wines,	on	the	other	hand,	use	
a	system	based	on	a	wine’s	terroir.		In	this	system,	a	wine	is	explicitly	ranked	in	a	hierarchy.	The	
significance	of	this	work	is	that	“under	diverse	classificatory	schemes	and	structures	based	on	
distinct	institutional	logics,	similar	categories	may	have	different	significances	in	consumers’	
valuation	of	wines	across	these	two	industries”	(Zhao	2008:169).	While	this	study	does	not	
adopt	a	neo-institutional	framework,	it	does	take	this	essential	argument	to	be	important.	The	
particular	schemas	and	rationales	used	to	develop	a	classification	system	have	inevitable	
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effects	on	the	uses	and	interpretations	of	artifacts	that	draw	on	that	classification	system.	For	
the	present	case,	the	particular	schema	and	decision-making	affect	not	only	what	and	how	
semantic	data	can	be	represented,	or	which	domain	actors	can	mobilize	a	given	classification	
scheme,	but	also	how	those	ontologies	can	interact.		
Bowker	and	Star	(1999)	refer	to	the	things,	where	an	instance	does	not	fit	the	delimited	
borders	of	one	category	or	meaning	set,	as	boundary	objects.	Elsewhere,	Zuckerman	(1999)	
notes	that	when	products	are	affiliated	with	diverse	categories,	they	are	structurally	
incoherent,	meaning	that	they	break	with	the	structural	organization	of	the	classification	
system	that	holds	categories	as	mutually	exclusive,	even	if	that	represents	a	near	impossibility	
(Bowker	and	Star	1999).	Zhao	(2008)	argues	that	a	boundary	object’s	coherence	is	a	function	of	
the	importance	and	specificity	of	the	categories	the	object	is	transgressing.	Where	a	boundary	
is	subject	to	greater	contests	of	significance,	or	more	firmly	established	inclusion/exclusion	
criteria,	a	boundary	object	is	less	likely	to	occupy	a	transgressing	role.	The	existence	of	these	
boundary	objects	depends,	in	large	part,	on	the	particular	decision	logics	and	classification	
schema	at	hand.	
In	practice,	we	know	that	classification	systems	are	often	not	mono-schematic.	That	is,	
they	are	often	integrations	and	compromises	between	multiple	schemas	and	multiple	social	
worlds.	This	is	particularly	the	case	where	large-scale	technical	systems	are	being	developed	
and	the	very	development	depends	on	coordinating	multiple	communities	of	experts	(Bower	
and	Star	1996,	1999).	As	Timmermans	and	Epstein	(2010:84)	argue,	“standards	transform	by	
coordinating	disparate	elements,	but	the	outcomes	that	standards	achieve	depend	on	the	
specific	standards	and	the	circumstances	under	which	they	are	made	to	work.”.	This	argument	
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is	inspired	by	a	number	of	studies	into	the	workings	and	deployment	of	standards.	First,	these	
specific	circumstances	are	relative	to	specific	social	worlds.	While	standards	bridge	
communities,	there	are	specific	sets	of	users	and	communities	of	practice	that	surround	any	
individual	standard,	and	the	adoption,	and	mobilization	of	a	standard	is	impacted	by	the	
specific	target,	user,	or	institution	involved.	For	instance,	research	has	shown	that	the	specific	
standards	applied	to	different	bodies	for	biomedical	research	and	insurance	classification	
depends	on	the	specific	body	in	question	(Epstein	2007,	2009;	Lengwiler	2009).	In	other	work,	
researchers	found	that	the	type	of	metadata	standards,	the	opinions	about	them,	and	the	
future-oriented	outlook	on	their	success	used	in	scientific	research	varied	based	on	the	specific	
scientific	community	interacting	with	those	standards	(Edwards	2011	et	al.;	Millerand	and	
Bowker	2009).	In	these	cases,	holding	favorable	opinions	and	successful	outlooks	depended	on	
one’s	proximity	to	the	standard’s	creation	and	the	level	of	knowledge	one	had	of	the	intricacies	
of	the	standard.	Their	findings	suggest	that	the	way	one	interacts	with	a	standard	is	contingent	
on	one's	location	in	the	social	world	surrounding	the	standard.		
In	addition	to	standards	being	relevant	to	specific	users	and	communities,	they	are	
partially	dependent	on	the	specific	technological	infrastructure	of	which	they	are	a	part.	
Millerand	and	Bowker’s	(2009)	work	shows	that	the	successful	implementation	of	a	metadata	
standard	for	classifying	ecological	research	depended	on	tools	used	to	implement	the	standard,	
the	standards	compatibility	with	existing	infrastructure	and	work	practice,	and	the	data	storage	
and	management	techniques	and	technologies	in	use.	This	is	in	line	with	Bowker’s	(2005)	earlier	
work	that	suggests	that	way	we	understand	information	depends	on	the	“memory	practices”	
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that	we	utilize,	including	the	technical	means	for	storing,	the	practices	of	labeling,	and	other	
components	of	recording	information.			
As	standards	are	embedded	in	larger	sets	of	relationships,	interactions	with	them	are	
not	always	smooth	and	they	do	not	always	work	to	enable	interoperability.	Like	Latour’s	(1987)	
useless	facts,	standards	sometime	get	in	the	way.	While	Bowker	and	Star	(1999)	argue	that	
standards	tend	to	have	stabilizing	effects,	they	are	in	actuality	often	disruptive	things	to	be	
negotiated.	Some	work	has	noted	these	negotiations	where	practitioners	work	around	the	
limitations	presented	by	tools	(Berg	1997;	Whooley	2010).	Using	electronic	medical	records	as	
an	example,	Berg	(1997)	shows	how	nurses	work	around	the	limitations	of	software.	Nurses	in	a	
medical	ward	were	tasked	with	recording	patient	conditions	in	computerized	software.	
Problematically,	though,	when	a	patient	is	unstable	or	when	only	incidental	changes	occur,	
frequent	updates	can	either	be	too	cumbersome	or	unnecessary.	Additionally,	poorly	designed	
records	systems	require	can	sometimes	inhibit	efficient	work	practices.	Berg’s	nurses	often	
times	write	patient	conditions	on	paper,	to	be	entered	later,	or	use	a	second	terminal	to	work	
around	limited	information	visible	in	a	given	screen.	Likewise,	Whooley	(2010)	shows	that	
psychiatrists	often	attempt	to	assert	their	professional	autonomy	in	diagnosing	mental	illness	
by	creating	workarounds	to	standardized	diagnosis	typologies	like	the	Diagnostic	and	Statistical	
Manual	of	Mental	Disorders	(DSM).	He	argues	that	working	around	the	DSM	involves	drawing	
on	alternate	diagnosis	typologies,	manipulating	illness	codes	on	formal	documents,	and	
negotiating	the	extent	of	diagnoses	with	patients.	Koehne	et	al.	(2013)	have	similar	findings	in	
their	study	of	diagnoses	of	borderline	personality	disorder	in	adolescents.	Halpin	(2016)	builds	
on	this	work,	but	disagrees	arguing	that	psychiatric	professionals	work	within	the	boundaries	of	
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the	DSM,	as	opposed	to	around	it.	He	argues	that	even	though,	professionals	negotiate	DSM	
diagnoses,	they	still	do	so	in	line	with	the	DSM.	They	deploy	the	manual	strategically	in	
different	ways	depending	on	the	professional	and	institutional	context,	noting	that	its	influence	
is	felt	across	research,	clinical,	and	institutional	domains.	The	major	difference	is	that	the	way	
the	DSM	is	used	to	enact	diagnoses	depends	on	that	setting.		
While	much	past	work	has	located	standards	within	communities	of	practice,	work	still	
remains	to	explain	the	way	that	standards’	affordances	and	constraints	are	negotiated	
(Sandholtz	2012).	These	omissions	beg	researchers	to	situate	standards’	use	in	practice	and	
question	how	these	blockages	are	negotiated	and	how	the	restrictions	created	by	
standardization	are	relaxed	while	still	enabling	the	interoperability	they	are	designed	for.	While	
scholars	have	been	exploring	the	tensions	between	organizational	level	practices	and	the	
homogenizing	effects	of	standards	for	some	time,	work	that	both	locates	standards	at	the	level	
of	professional	communities	and	that	investigates	the	negotiations	of	barriers	is	only	just	
begging	to	emerge	(Epstein	2007,	2010;	Halpin	2016;	Heimer	2001;	Whooley	2010,	2014;	
Whooley	and	Horwitz	2013).	As	two	different	components	of	the	semantic	web	data	
assemblage,	addressing	this	gap	through	developing	an	understanding	of	how	communities	of	
practice	negotiate	with	the	limitations	and	affordances	of	standards	is	paramount.	
	
3.5	Empirical	Ontology	in	Practice	
What	is	lost	in	Hacking’s	(1986,	1999)	looping	model,	but	implicit	in	an	assemblage	
model	is	that	contextual	interpretation	is	cultural.	The	specific	“epistemic	cultures”	(Knorr-
Cetina	1999)	that	bear	on	a	given	assemblage	impact	each	point	in	the	loop.	Knorr-Cetina	
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(1999)	studies	the	ways	that	scientific	cultures	come	to	act	on	various	disciplines	–	high	energy	
particle	physics	and	molecular	biology	–	to	create	a	disunity	in	the	scientific	community.	Her	
goal	isn’t	to	show	how	knowledge	is	created	differently,	as	much	as	it	is	to	show	how	disciplines	
themselves	are	enacted	differently	and	how	the	focus	of	research	is	enacted	differently	based	
on	the	practices	of	scientists	in	those	disciplines.		Much	as	there	are	many	different	epistemic	
cultures,	there	are	many	different	ways	of	approaching	interpretive	schema	and	classifying	
phenomena	(Friese	2010).		
Practice	theory	views	practice	as	not	only	activity	but	also	the	knowledges	and	
capabilities	that	enable	it.	Furthermore,	all	activity	and	the	knowledges,	capabilities,	and	
meanings	behind	practices	are	more	or	less	organized	in	a	field,	which	can	be	demarcated	and	
subdivided	ad	infinitum.	This	type	of	thinking	holds	that	“the	social	is	a	field	of	embodied,	
materially	interwoven	practices	centrally	organized	around	shared	practical	understandings”	of	
the	world	(Schatzki	2001:12).	Practices	structure	and	are	structured	by	social	location	(Bourdieu	
1977),	discursive	regimes	(Foucault	1977[1995]),	embodied	experiences,	technology	(Latour	
2005;	Law	2010),	and	the	immediate	physical	environment,	among	other	things	(Goffman	
1959).	Accordingly,	determinism	has	little	place	in	practice	theoretical	accounts,	as	practice,	
while	durable	and	habitual,	is	emergent	and	unfolds	as	community	members	interact	with	the	
various	conditions	of	their	practice.	
					 Practice’s	durability	is	often	a	major	concern	of	social	theorists,	as	Knorr-Cetina	
(2001:184)	notes	“conceptions	of	practice	emphasize	the	habitual	and	rule-governed	features	
of	practice…	agreeing	that	practices	should	be	seen	as	recurrent	processes	governed	by	
specifiable	schemata	of	preferences	and	prescriptions.”.	This	view	of	practice,	she	argues,	is	ill	
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equipped	to	explain	the	sphere	of	activity	implicated	in	non-routine	problems	and	the	
relationship	to	objects	that	are	entirely	open-ended,	that	generate	new	lines	of	questioning,	
new	forms	of	interaction,	and	new	possibilities	of	being.	In	her	analysis	of	knowledge	work,	she	
shows	that	practice	moves	between	rule-bound,	habitual	procedures	and	emergent	intra-active	
interpretation.	Her	theory	of	objectual	practice	argues	that	objects	of	inquiry,	or	what	she	
terms	“knowledge	objects”	(Knorr-	Cetina	2001:185)	only	ever	become	partial	objects,	as	they	
are	first	simulated	and	represented	and	then	subject	to	evaluation,	correction,	and	
improvement.	They	never	completely	shift	into	the	background	of	habitual	practice.	These	
objects	and	the	relations	in	which	they	are	implicated	are	never	complete;	they	are	always	
emerging	and	transforming	based	on	the	intra-actions	between	objects	and	the	individual(s)	
engaging	with	them.	Investigation	and	interaction	with	them	produce	greater	levels	of	
complexity	rather	than	a	reduction	in	it	(Knorr-Cetina	2001).	“The	signifying	force	of	partial	
objects	resides	in	the	pointers	they	provide	to	possible	further	explorations.	In	this	sense	these	
objects	are	meaning-producing	and	practice	generating;	they	provide	for	the…	extension	of	
practice.”	(Knorr-Cetina	2001:192).	Knorr-Cetina	taps	into	Deleuzian	notions	of	molarity	and	
molecularity	here	(Deleuze	and	Guattari	1987).	As	one	attempts	to	tame	and	manage	
complexity,	features	always	evade	attempts	to	be	fully	understood.	The	complexity	of	things	is	
inimical	to	our	development	of	classificatory	schema	to	apprehend	those	things.	Here,	capture	
and	escape	are	inextricably	related	(McCarthy	2017).		
					 The	concept	of	informatic	practice	borrows	from	Knorr-Cetina’s	theory	of	objectual	
practice	as	French	(2014)	conceives	of	information,	its	relationships,	and	objects	as	never	
complete.	In	his	study	of	Big	Data	processing	in	the	Canadian	health	industry,	he	aims	to	dispel	
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the	hyperbolic	discourse	around	data	surveillance.	Advancing	the	concept	of	informatic	
practice,	or	“the	assumption	that	information	has	a	material	basis	in	the	spatio-temporal	milieu	
of	everyday	life.”	(French	2014:230),	he	details	the	ways	that	patient	data	is	collected	and	
coded	and	embedded	in	material	practice.	An	understanding	of	immaterial	information	
requires	attention	to	that	mundane	performance	of	routinized	work	–	filling	out	forms,	
categorization,	filing,	and	communicating	effectively.	For	French	(2014)	and	others	
(Albrechtslund	and	Lauritsen	2013),	practice	contains	human	error	and	deviations	from	
expected	performance.	This	material	breakdown	contributes	to	an	immaterial	breakdown	
where	data	does	not	accurately	represent	the	thing	intended.	This	study	adapts	and	improves	
this	line	of	thinking	in	at	least	two	distinct	ways.	First,	it	makes	semantic	ontologies	the	target	
of	objectual	and	informatic	practice.	In	doing	so	it	focuses	attention	on	the	practices	of	
interaction	and	construction	as	opposed	to	strictly	the	practices	of	deployment	as	does	French	
(2014).	Second,	it	extends	Bowker’s	(2005)	work	on	cataloging	and	memory	practices	by	
examining	the	data	assemblage	as	a	necessary	and	inseparable	component	of	data	creation	and	
gathering.		
					 In	recent	years,	many	science	and	technology	studies	scholars	have	shifted	their	focus	
on	the	ways	in	which	phenomena	are	brought	into	being,	or	enacted.	(Coopmans	et	al.	2014;	
Mol	2002;	Woolgar	and	Lezaun	2013,	2015).	This	“turn	to	ontology”	(Coopmans	et	al.	2014:2)	
reflects	the	philosophical	move	away	from	terminology	that	posits	any	stable	and	concrete	
entities	of	representation,	and	the	framing	of	objects	of	investigation	as	independent	of	the	
investigations	themselves.	As	many	scholars	argue,	the	object	and	its	means	for	investigation	
co-constitute	one	another	(Barad	2007;	Introna	2005,	2007;	Kitchin	2014b;	Kitchin	and	Dodge	
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2011;	Latour	2005;	MacCormick	2013;	Mackenzie	2005;	Manovich	2013).	Barad	(2007:818)	
notes,	“The	primary	ontological	units	are	not	‘things’	but	phenomena	–	dynamic	topological	
reconfigurings	/	entanglements	/	relationalities	/	(re)articulations.	And	the	primary	semantic	
units	are…	material-discursive	practices	through	which	boundaries	are	constituted.”.	In	other	
words,	in	this	intra-actional	approach,	subjects,	objects,	and	discourses	have	no	ontological	
priority;	they	are	one	another’s	common	history.	Observers,	instruments,	and	objects	of	
investigation	do	not	exist	as	such	independently	of	their	entanglements.	Moreover,	these	intra-
actions	exude	a	certain	potentiality	of	being,	affording	and	proscribing	certain	outcomes.	
Introna	(2007)	shows	that	the	intra-actions	of	the	plagiarism	detection	phenomenon	enable	
and	constrain	certain	uses,	forms,	and	meanings	of	technology	as	well	as	the	identities	and	
practices	related	to	plagiarism	detection.	The	intra-actions	involved	in	the	use	of	word	
processing,	electronic	scholarly	databases,	Wikimedia,	Turnitin	detection	software,	the	
commodification	of	education,	fairness,	and	intellectual	property	rights	all	combine	to	re-
constitute	what	it	is	to	plagiarize,	to	write,	to	instruct,	and	to	detect	plagiarism.		
					 The	shift	in	focus	from	the	epistemological	concerns	of	representation	to	the	ontological	
concerns	of	enactment	means	that	concern	is	no	longer	simply	on	how	well	science	
understands	its	object,	but	how	it	assists	in	creating	it.	Similar	to	work	on	assemblages,	studies	
of	enactment	investigate	the	ways	that	phenomena	are	called	into	being	through	practice	
(informatic	or	otherwise),	engagement,	social	interactions,	and	artifacts	(Coopmans	et	al	2014;	
French	2014;	Knorr-Cetina	2001;	Law	and	Lien	2012;	Mol	2002;	Moser	2008;	Sismondo	2015;	
Woolgar	and	Lezaun	2013,	2015).	Objects	can,	and	must,	be	understood	as	manipulated,	
created,	destroyed,	and	made	meaningful	through	these	practices.	Mol	(2002),	shows	the	
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various	ways	that	atherosclerosis	comes	to	be	enacted	in	different	ways	through	different	
practices,	arguing	that	the	enactment	of	the	disease	is	contingent	upon	the	various	practices	
engaged	in	any	intra-action.	Variations	in	practice	lead	to	the	enactment	of	multiple	realities	for	
a	given	disease,	such	that	the	meaning	of	atherosclerosis	depends	on	the	practical	engagement	
with	the	whole	of	the	wider	actor	assemblage.	For	instance,	atherosclerosis	as	pain	in	the	leg	is	
enacted	through	the	practice	of	a	patient	consultation	whereas	the	disease	is	differently	
enacted	as	arterial	blockage	through	post-mortem	or	post-amputation	investigations	in	
pathology	departments.	In	this	case,	the	creation	of	the	objects	of	investigation	is	inseparable	
from	the	investigation	itself.	Reference	and	representation	refer	only	to	the	reality	as	
constituted.	
					 Similarly,	Alač	(2013)	shows	how	results	of	fMRI	scans	acquire	meaning	through	
enactment.	The	fMRI	visual	output	acts	as	an	intermediary	between	an	embodied	individual	
and	knowledge	of	that	individual.	Often	times	lab	technicians	are	unable	to	see	the	physical	
patient	and	must	rely	solely	on	the	output	from	the	scans.	So	too,	secondary	research	has	no	
ability	to	see	a	patient	and	must	interpret	brain	signals	as	representations	of	a	given	patient.	In	
these	scans,	patient	motion	creates	brain	scan	nonalignment	and	thus	interpretive	problems	in	
the	visuals	for	technicians	and	researchers.	One	task	of	these	practitioners	is	to	spot	those	
nonalignments	and	decipher	their	origin.	Of	course,	this	is	problematic	given	that	the	observer	
is	never	actually	able	to	see	the	patient	or	their	alleged	movement.	They	rely	on	data	from	
scans	that	display	“hints”	that	an	informed	practitioner	can	decode	as	specific	types	of	
movement.	Through	the	specific	intra-action	between	instrument,	researcher,	and	the	
	70	
mobilization	of	specific	cultural	knowledge	those	hints	allow	the	practitioner	to	enact	
movements	in	any	given	nonaligned	scan.		
	 Drawing	on	this	“turn”,	Kallinikos	et	al.	(2013:357)	argue	that	digital	objects	have	
something	of	an	“ambivalent	ontology”.	Like	Knorr-Cetina’s	(2001)	knowledge	objects,	digital	
objects	–	semantic	web	ontologies	–	are	incomplete	and	always	changing.	For	the	semantic	web	
the	issues	is	not	so	much	about	representation,	because	while	practically	very	important,	we	
know	that	“real”	representation	is	not	possible.	Following	Woolgar	and	Lezuan	(2013)	I	do	not	
begin	by	assuming	that	there	is	a	picture	of	the	world	that	ontologists	are	getting	right	or	
wrong,	but	rather	stipulate	that	they	are	engaged	in	the	“practices	of	depiction”	(Woolgar	and	
Lezuan	2013:324),	but	only	in	so	far	as	those	practices	are	bound	up	in	a	larger	assemblage.	As	
Latour	(1987)	once	argued,	to	understand	the	ready-made,	we	first	need	to	understand	the	
making.	To	“get	the	most	efficient	machine”	we	first	need	to	“decide	on	what	efficiency	should	
be”	(Latour	1987:9).	The	interactions	between	components	of	the	semantic	web	are	not	as	
simple	as	the	black	box	implies.	They	are	a	set	of	negotiations	with	the	affordances	and	
constrains	standards,	design	philosophies,	other	people	and	the	existing	state	of	the	ontology.	
This	new	Janus-faced	project	needs	to	decide	how	meaning	is	to	be	made	and	how	translation	
is	to	occur	before	simply	making	the	translations.				
	
3.6	Conclusion		
The	problem	of	translating	between	humans	and	machines	posed	by	semantic	web	is	
bigger	than	just	the	translation	between	different	sets	of	experts	or	making	knowledge	explicit.	
Instead,	it	is	a	problem	of	creating	a	distinct	world	of	understandings	and	meanings	among	an	
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entire	fluid	universe	of	them.	It	is	a	process	where	decisions	about	representation	are	made	
and	codified.	It	is	a	process	by	which	the	affordances	and	constraints	of	information	
infrastructures,	standards,	and	classification	systems	are	negotiated	by	communities	of	
practice.	Lastly,	it	is	a	process	of	co-creation	between	data	and	their	assemblages.	Where	
science	studies	research	once	investigated	the	use	of	machines	to	translate	the	natural	world	
for	human	consumption,	I	now	invert	that	relationship	and	investigate	the	way	that	humans	
translate	the	world	for	machine	consumption	(Knorr-Cetina	1999;	Latour	1987;	Vertesi	2015).	In	
so	doing,	I	make	contributions	to	re-emerging	work	on	AI	and	ontologies,	negotiations	with	
standards,	and	data	studies.	Furthermore,	I	answer	Woolgar	and	Lezuan’s	(2013,	2015)	call	to	
open	new	provocations	for	empirical	ontology.		
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4.	Researching	Schema.org	and	the	Semantic	Web	
How	does	one	unpack	the	semantic	web’s	black	box?	As	code	based	systems	tend	to	be,	
its	operations	are	hidden	within	complicated	computer	languages,	behind	the	walls	of	trade	
secrets,	and	embedded	within	other	larger	technological	systems.	Similar	to	other	information	
infrastructures,	these	features	make	the	semantic	web	more	or	less	invisible	and	taken	for	
granted.	Much	of	this	is	by	design,	as	ontologists	purposefully	work	to	make	the	semantic	web	
as	seamless	and	simple	to	use	as	possible,	so	that	it	can	be	the	substrate	of	larger	more	visible	
technologies.	Research	on	information	infrastructures	argues	that	such	features	–	size,	
ubiquity,	embeddedness,	and	community	specialization	–	work	to	render	these	systems	
invisible,	but	has	provided	a	number	of	means	to	expose	them,	such	as	ethnographic	
observation,	examining	systemic	breakdown,	and	specialized	techniques	like	infrastructural	
inversion	(Bowker	and	Star	1999;	Bowker	et	al.	2010;	Edwards	2010;	Ribes	and	Finholt	2009;	
Star	1999).		
My	research	problem	confronts	two	main	methodological	quandaries.	First,	what	case	is	
large	enough	to	draw	significant	insights	from,	but	exposed	enough	that	it	has	not	completely	
disappeared	into	the	Web’s	architecture,	and	thus	permits	investigation?	As	I	explain	below,	
Schema.org	is	such	a	case.	Second,	following	from	my	chosen	case,	what	methodological	
approaches	will	allow	for	an	examination	of	a	system	whose	work	processes	are	dispersed,	
natively	digital,	and	will	fit	with	an	assemblage	based	approach	to	answering	my	chosen	
research	questions?	This	chosen	methodologies	will	by	necessity	attend	not	only	to	the	
communities	of	practice,	but	the	standards	they	encounter,	the	systems	of	thought	they	bring	
to	bear	on	their	work,	and	the	ontologies	they	interact	with,	among	other	things.	
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The	ensuing	chapter	resolves	these	two	quandaries	though	a	justification	and	
explanation	of	my	case,	as	well	as	the	methodologies	deployed	to	answer	my	research	
questions.	This	dissertation	relies	on	the	in-depth	case	study	of	the	users,	developers,	
vocabulary,	code	standards,	and	digital	artifacts	directly	associated	with	the	Schema.org	
project.	As	both	the	objects	of	investigation	and	their	impact	on	my	research	questions	are	
diverse,	multiple	methodological	approaches	drawn	from	recent	work	on	digital	technologies	
are	employed.	This	chapter	is	divided	into	five	parts.	In	the	first	part,	I	will	describe	the	case	
that	guides	my	research.	This	section	will	involve	a	description	of	Schema.org,	the	major	
institutions	involved	with	the	project,	the	communities	of	practice	that	are	most	closely	
involved	in	its	development	and	its	use,	the	vocabulary	that	constitutes	the	project,	and	the	
primary	code	standards	implicated	in	its	creation	and	use.	The	second	section	will	describe	the	
primary	sites	in	which	my	research	occurred.	The	third	section	will	describe	both	the	data	
collection	processes	and	the	preparations	for	analysis.	The	fourth	section	of	this	chapter	will	
discuss	the	two	main	methodological	techniques	used	in	this	study.	The	fifth	and	final	section	of	
this	chapter	will	describe	the	limitations	of	my	methodology	and	include	a	statement	of	my	
standpoint	as	a	researcher	and	the	biases	that	such	a	standpoint	and	approach	may	bring	
about.		
	
4.1	Schema.org	
I	selected	Schema.org	as	my	case	to	study	the	processes	involved	in	constructing	data	
assemblages	for	a	few	main	reasons.	First,	the	project	is	unique	in	that	it	represents	a	nearly	
even	participation	between	industry	competitors.	The	four	major	search	engines,	Google,	
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Microsoft	(Bing),	Yahoo12,	and	Yandex	that	are	involved	with	the	project	all	contribute	freely	
and	openly	to	Schema.org’s	development	despite	being	competitors	in	search,	and	in	the	cases	
of	Google	and	Microsoft,	competitors	in	search	based	artificial	intelligence,	a	major	use	of	
semantic	web	technology	and	structured	data.	This	collaboration	is	significant	because	it	
represents	not	only	a	consolidation	of	semantic	web	ontologies,	but	also	a	strong	symbolic	
statement	in	favor	of	Schema.org	being	the	“best”	ontology.	My	research	indicates	that	this	
statement	of	support	makes	this	particular	case	the	de	facto	semantic	web	standard	in	eyes	of	
users	and	industry	experts	alike.		
					 The	second	reason	for	selecting	Schema.org	is	that	it	is	a	public	and	transparent13	
process.	Anyone	who	has	the	desire	or	motivation	to	contribute	to	the	project’s	development	is	
welcome	to	participate.	In	practice,	participation	is	rather	limited	as	there	is	a	substantial	
amount	of	expertise,	experience,	and	knowledge	required	to	contribute	at	a	high	and	
productive	level,	or	to	be	regarded	amongst	the	core	developers	as	competent.	Nevertheless,	
there	are	many	contributions	by	less	central	community	members.	These	contributions	occur	in	
the	development	of	both	the	core	and	extended	ontologies	across	both	of	the	two	primary	
work	sites.	The	community	of	developers	places	a	high	degree	of	importance	on	transparency	
in	how	decisions	are	made.	This	is	evident	in	both	the	community	facing,	everyday	discussion,	
and	the	more	selective	steering	group	discussions,	which	are	published	in	various	formats.	
																																																						
12	At	the	time	of	writing	Yahoo	is	in	the	process	of	being	broken	up.	This	included	the	sale	of	
many	parts	of	its	core	Internet	business	to	Verizon,	the	resignation	of	its	CEO,	Marissa	Mayer,	
and	other	major	forms	of	restructuring.	It	is	uncertain,	at	this	point,	what	will	become	of	
Yahoo’s	remaining	businesses,	Verizon’s	commitment	to	search,	or	either	company’s	
involvement	in	Schema.org.	
13	This	assumes	that	one	is	both	aware	of	the	project	and	how	to	navigate	the	work	sites.	
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Moreover,	all	of	this	work	and	discussion	regarding	development	and	use	happens	in	public14.	
All	discussion	is	cataloged	on	either	the	World	Wide	Web	Consortium	or	GitHub’s	websites.	
These	features	make	Schema.org	an	ideal	case	for	study	because	there	is	a	precise	and	detailed	
record	of	exactly	what	discussion	happened,	when	they	happened,	the	results	of	those	
discussions,	and	the	underlying	rationale	behind	the	community’s	decisions.		
					 The	third	reason	for	selecting	Schema.org	is	that	it	is	a	wide-ranging	and	general	
ontology.	Self-described	as	a	set	of	schemas,	the	project	aims	to	cover	diverse	content	
domains,	rather	than	specialize	in	a	single	or	a	few	more	limited	domains.	This	means	that	
Schama.org	is	more	directly	trying	to	represent	the	known	Internet,	rather	than	explicitly	
limiting	itself	to	niche	areas,	as	is	most	often	the	case	with	semantic	web	ontologies.	This	
directly	suits	the	interests	of	the	sponsor	companies,	particularly	Google	and	Microsoft,	and	has	
consequences	discussed	later.	Lastly,	Schema.org	is	one	of	the	semantic	backbones	behind	
Google,	Microsoft,	and	Apple’s	search	based	artificial	intelligence	systems.	While	these	systems	
are	all	varied	and	have	additional	proprietary	knowledge	bases,	one	of	their	major	functions	is	
to	serve	as	an	intelligent	interface	between	users	and	search.	While	the	specific	implications	of	
this	interfaced	layer	are	beyond	the	scope	of	this	study,	investigating	how	those	AI	systems	
come	to	understand	what	they	are	parsing	is	of	direct	relevance,	and	of	high	sociological	
importance.		
					 As	mentioned	above,	Schema.org	is	a	semantic	web	ontology	developed	in	collaboration	
between	four	sponsor	companies	–	Google,	Microsoft,	Yahoo,	Yandex	–	independent	
																																																						
14	Excepting	the	conference	calls	between	steering	group	members.	This	is	a	limitation	that	I	
address	later	in	this	chapter.	
	76	
contributors,	and	the	W3C.	The	central	stated	aim	of	this	project	is	“to	create,	maintain,	and	
promote	schemas	for	structured	data	on	the	Internet,	on	webpages,	in	email	messages,	and	
beyond.”	(Schema.org	2017a).	Schema.org	is	an	open	source	and	peer	produced	project	that	is	
attempting	to	create	a	single	unified	place	for	webmasters	to	go	to	learn	about	and	apply	
semantic	markup	to	their	web	domains.	The	project	is	particularly	focused	on	defining	content	
domains	and	types	that	are	of	value	to	search	engines	and	the	sponsor	companies’	search	
based	properties.		
					 Unlike	most	other	semantic	web	ontologies,	Schema.org	is	continuously	developed,	
extended,	and	modified.	As	Schema.org	is	an	effort	to	bolster	search	and	search	based	artificial	
intelligence,	it	takes	a	general	approach	to	content	coverage.	While	there	are	other	broad	form	
ontologies,	Schema.org	is	among	the	largest	and	most	used,	covering	over	10%	of	existing	web	
content,	as	it	is	employed	on	over	10	million	websites	and	integrated	into	many	applications	
including,	but	not	limited	to,	the	New	York	Times,	The	Guardian,	IMDB,	Monster.com,	Pinterest,	
LinkedIn,	Yelp,	Zillow,	and	the	Google,	Microsoft,	Yahoo,	and	Yandex	search	based	ecosystems	
(Guha	2014).	As	of	writing,	Schema.org	has	258	contributors	from	private	industry,	non-profit	
standards	groups,	academia,	and	independent	origins.	Currently,	the	core	vocabulary	contains	
583	types,	846	properties,	and	114	enumeration	values.	The	core	vocabulary	covers	a	wide	
range	of	content	including,	but	not	limited	to:	creative	works,	events,	people,	places,	products,	
organizations,	and	actions.	In	addition	to	the	core	vocabulary,	Schema.org	also	has	three15	
distinct	hosted	extensions	–	automotive,	bibliographic,	and	health-life	science	–	one	fully	
																																																						
15	There	are	actually	five	hosted	extensions,	but	two	of	those	extensions	are	tools	for	the	
development	process	and	not	extensions	for	website	developers	to	use	for	content	markup	
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developed	and	mapped	external	extension	–	GS1	–	and	one	extension	in	the	process	of	being	
mapped	and	considered	as	an	extension	–	Wikidata16.	Within	these	hosted	extensions	there	are	
an	additional	114	types,	217	properties,	and	153	enumeration	values.	In	addition	to	those	
operational	extensions,	there	are	a	number	of	other	Schema.org	community	groups	that	are	
working	on	extensions	to	the	core	ontology.	These	include	such	content	domains	as,	
educational	courses,	archival	information,	tourism,	finance,	sports,	legislation,	and	meat17.	In	
addition	to	creating	semantics	for	simple	Web	content,	Schema.org	is	also	beginning	to	branch	
out	into	semantically	linked	relational	databases,	the	Internet	of	Things,	and	civic	participation,	
though	these	aspects	of	the	project	are	in	early	stages	of	development.	
					 Schema.org	is	organized	into	two	primary	groups.	The	first	is	a	steering	group	comprised	
of	paid	employees	of	the	sponsor	companies,	a	few	independent	contractors,	and	a	
representative	of	the	W3C.	The	steering	group	oversees	the	development	of	the	project,	as	well	
as	the	approval	and	implementation	of	new	proposals.	The	second,	community	group,	is	a	
group	open	to	any	interested	persons,	who’s	role	“is	to	propose,	discuss,	prepare	and	review	
changes	to	Schema.org,	for	final	review	and	publication	by	the	steering	group.”	(Schema.org	
2017b).	One	member	of	the	steering	group	chairs	the	community	group,	and	all	members	of	
the	steering	group	participate	in	and	monitor	the	developments	and	discussion	in	community	
																																																						
16	There	is	an	ongoing	process	of	mapping	Schema.org	and	Wikidata	to	one	another.	Currently,	
there	are	debates	occurring	within	the	two	communities	to	consider	Wikidata	as	an	official	
extension	of	Schema.org.	Thus	far	there	is	no	resolution	on	the	proposal	and	the	individuals	
involved	are	unsure	whether	or	not	to	consider	it	an	external	or	hosted	extension.			
17	Of	note	is	that	many	community	members	report	being	involved	in	creating	their	own	
external	extensions.	The	details	about	these	extensions	are	not	readily	available	and	their	
development	is	not	recorded	or	publicized	for	scrutiny.	These	external	extensions,	much	like	
the	GS1,	happen	outside	of	the	purview	of	the	broader	Schema.org	community.	
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group.	Apart	from	the	paid	employees	of	the	sponsor	organizations,	contribution	to	Schema.org	
is	voluntary.	However,	many	of	the	frequent	contributors	are	consultants	who	are	paid	to	
implement	semantic	markup	for	their	clients,	and	so	while	their	contributions	are	formally	
voluntary,	they	are	often	in	service	to	their	paid	professional	work.		
					 While	all	large	Web-scale	technical	projects	like	Schema.org	rely	heavily	on	a	vast	array	
of	standards	and	protocols,	it	would	be	counterproductive,	and	potentially	impossible	to	
explore	the	full	range	of	them	in	this	study.	Discussions	of	many	of	these	and	other	protocols,	
standards,	and	their	effects	are	discussed	in	detail	elsewhere	(Abbate	2000;	Coyle	2008;	
DeNardis	2009;	Galloway	2004,	2006).	However,	there	are	standards	that	are	of	central	
importance	to	the	development	and	use	of	Schema.org	that	I	will	discuss	in	detail.	These	
markup	standards	all	apply	the	RDF	data	model,	or	something	that	approximates	it	to	varying	
degrees	of	sophistication,	and	enable	the	Schema.org	ontology	to	be	applied	to	Web	content.	
Thus,	they	are	central	to	the	process	of	enacting	semantic	data.	Schema.org	supports	the	use	of	
three	markup	standards	in	particular,	Microdata,	the	Resource	Description	Framework	for	
attributes	(RDFa),	and	Javascript	Object	Notation	for	Linked	Data	(JSON-LD).	This	marks	a	point	
of	departure	from	other	semantic	web	ontologies,	as	most	do	not	actively	specify	a	preferred	
standard	or	set	of	them.		
					
4.2	Research	Sites	and	Sources	
					 My	research	took	place	in	three	primary	sites,	the	W3C	community	message	boards,	
Schema.org’s	GitHub	repository,	and	Schema.org’s	own	website.	In	addition	to	those	three	
sites,	I	conducted	additional	research	on	the	three	markup	standards	which	included	the	W3C	
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specifications	pages	for	Microdata,	RDFa,	and	JSON-LD.	While	not	research	sites,	per	se,	these	
documents	were	instrumental	in	understanding	not	only	how	the	project	is	implemented,	but	
the	affordances	and	constraints	presented	by	these	technical	standards.	Below,	I	will	describe	
each	site	and	its	operation	in	additional	detail.	
The	W3C	message	boards	are	the	public	discussion	forum	for	the	Schema.org	project.	
They	are	publicly	accessible	from	the	both	the	W3C’s	website	and	Schema.org’s	main	page.	The	
message	boards	are	similar	to	an	email	list	server,	recording	each	post	and	response	in	a	
threaded	fashion.	The	message	boards	are	used	for	the	proposal,	discussion,	and	debate	of	“all	
updates,	changes,	and	improvements	to	Schema.org”	(Brickley	2016).	However,	in	practice,	the	
message	boards	also	include	large	amounts	of	questions	and	answers	from	confused	or	
uncertain	Web	developers	who	are	trying	to	apply	the	Schema.org	vocabulary.	Additionally,	the	
detail	and	sophistication	of	the	discussion	and	debate	that	happens	on	the	W3C	message	
boards	is	far	less	active	and	detailed	than	the	what	happens	on	GitHub.	Often	times	the	
discussion	and	debates	on	the	message	boards	are	simply	a	springboard	for	inclusion	on	the	
project’s	GitHub	site.	The	community	group	chair18	is	responsible	for	managing	the	workflow	
between	the	W3C	message	boards	and	GitHub,	but	in	practice,	other	steering	group	members	
and	core	contributors	do	the	same.		
	 My	main	site	of	research	for	this	project	occurred	on	GitHub.	GitHub	is	a	platform	for	
coordinating	software	development	projects	amongst	multiple	people,	that	draws	on	the	
distributed	version	control	system,	Git.	It	allows	for	distributed	and	non-linear	work	and	is	
particularly	useful	for	hosting	and	developing	open	source	and	peer-produced	code	systems.	
																																																						
18	Also	a	steering	group	member	in	Google’s	employ	
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Like	many	professional	disciplines,	code	work	on	GitHub	has	its	own	specialized	jargon	that	will	
be	important	to	have	as	a	reference	going	forward.	Such	a	reference	is	available	in	the	
appendix.	Among	the	platform's	many	features,	there	were	some	that	were	particularly	
important	to	this	project.	These	features	included,	housing	project	documents	and	the	master	
repository,	project	Wikis,	labeled	issue	tracking,	feature	and	pull	requests,	commit	histories,	
and	workflow	documentation.		
				 GitHub	is	the	site	of	most	of	the	work	on	Schema.org.	While	many	proposals	originate	
from	the	W3C	message	boards,	many	bypass	that	forum	and	are	proposed	directly	on	GitHub.	
Moreover,	all	actionable	work,	regardless	of	where	it	is	proposed	happens	and	is	discussed	on	
GitHub.	Each	work	item	commit	and	discussion	is	logged,	linked	to	other	related	issues,	and	
tagged	with	metadata	on	the	GitHub	page.	The	type	of	participant	on	GitHub	displays	a	higher	
degree	of	understanding	and	sophistication	regarding	semantic	web	standards,	ontology	
development,	and	markup.	Communication	and	work	here	are	generally	from	a	smaller	core	
group	of	a	few	dozen	community	members.		
	 While	GitHub	houses	the	complete	documentation	for	Schema.org,	the	project's	own	
website	(Schema.org)	contains	much	of	that	information	in	a	more	easily	digestible	form.	
Likewise,	GitHub	contains	the	actual	vocabulary,	but	this	file	is	designed	for	machine	
consumption,	which	does	not	lend	itself	to	human	investigation.	Schema.org’s	website	contains	
the	entire	vocabulary	in	an	accessible	and	interlinked	form.	This	allowed	me	to	traverse	type,	
class,	property,	enumeration	connections	with	relative	ease.	With	this	I	could	see	the	full	range	
of	properties,	expected	values,	and	instructions	relating	to	any	given	markup.	Additionally,	the	
project’s	website	has	an	unpublished	mirror	of	itself	(pending.schema.org)	that	allows	one	to	
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view	pending	changes	before	they	are	actually	added	to	the	vocabulary.	Both	sites	also	contain	
a	detailed	chronological	list	of	additions	and	modifications	to	the	ontology	along	with	links	to	
the	specific	issues	on	the	GitHub	issue	tracker.	Lastly,	the	site	contains	a	number	of	helpful	
resources	for	Web	developers	on	using	and	understanding	markup	and	the	Schema.org	
workflow.		
	 My	final	data	for	investigation	came	from	the	specification	sheets	for	the	three	markup	
standards	supported	by	the	project.	While	not	all	three	standards	are	all	W3C	
recommendations,	the	W3C	contains	the	specification	sheets	and	best	use	practices	in	their	
Web	domain.	These	specification	sheets	define	the	basic	terminology	for	each	standard,	
provide	a	detailed	overview	of	their	syntax	and	data	models,	instructions	for	use,	how	the	
syntax	is	interpreted	by	computational	agents,	their	general	affordances	and	constraints,	and	
their	relationships	to	other	markup	standards.	Problematically,	they	suffer	from	a	high	degree	
of	technicality	and	as	general	standards	and	specification	documents,	they	do	not	refer	
specifically	to	their	use	with	Schema.org19.	
	
	4.3	Data	Collection	and	Preparation	
					 Data	collection	took	place	at	two	different	junctures.	The	initial	collection	stage	began	in	
September	2015	and	took	place	over	the	course	of	two	weeks.	During	this	time,	I	manually	
scraped	all	posts	organized	monthly,	by	subject,	in	threaded	form,	from	the	W3C	message	
boards.	The	W3C	message	board	data	dates	as	far	back	as	April	2015	when	all	community	group	
																																																						
19	In	the	JSON-LD	development	community	group,	there	is	substantial	overlap	between	the	
developers	for	the	syntax	and	the	core	community	members	of	Schema.org.	This	has	had	the	
effect	of	making	JSON-LD	align	well	with	Schema.org’s	needs.			
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work	on	the	Schema.org	project	shifted	to	their	servers.	Scraping	the	posts	in	threaded	form	
allowed	for	the	best	way	to	keep	track	of	posts	and	their	direct	responses.	However,	since	the	
message	boards	are	a	continuously	operating	work	platform,	there	were	many	instances	where	
a	response	to	a	thread	happened	in	a	different	month	than	the	thread	originated	in.	This	was	
particularly	the	case	near	the	beginning	and	end	of	months.	Where	applicable,	those	responses	
were	added	to	the	original	discussion.	This	left	me	with	a	series	of	documents	that	tracked	the	
history	of	all	discussions	on	the	community	boards	in	order.	In	total	this	accounted	for	278	
distinct	messages	across	66	subjects.	The	initial	phase	of	data	collection	from	GitHub	was	
similar	to	that	of	the	W3C	message	boards.	Schema.org’s	GitHub	page	allows	one	to	view	all	
issues,	regardless	of	metadata	tags,	in	both	open	and	closed	statuses.	Much	like	the	W3C	data,	I	
manually	scraped	all	content	from	each	thread,	then	organized	them	by	subject	and	issue	
number.	GitHub	extended	further	back	in	time	than	the	data	from	the	W3C,	with	coverage	
beginning	in	April	2014.	In	total	this	accounted	for	345	distinct	issues.	The	W3C	markup	
specifications	were	also	scraped	into	their	own	separate	documents.	Data	from	Schema.org’s	
website	was	referenced	in	situ	to	preserve	the	benefits	offered	by	the	digital	objects	embedded	
in	both	the	ontology	and	the	history	of	releases.		
					 Following	data	collection,	all	textual	data	was	stored	in	both	an	encrypted	portable	flash	
drive	and	on	Dedoose’s	servers.	Once	uploaded	to	Dedoose,	I	added	metadata	tags	to	capture	
the	source,	the	number	of	participants,	and	the	length	of	discussion.	During	this	process,	I	also	
added	the	metadata	tags	that	were	originally	included	in	the	GitHub	data	but	were	lost	when	
the	data	was	first	scraped.	These	tags	designate	the	type	of	issue	are	assigned	by	the	steering	
group	members.	They	include	administrative,	extension	tracking,	for	Steering	Group	attention,	
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guidelines	documents	and	examples,	standards	and	organizations,	vocabulary,	rough,	small,	
exact,	and	large	proposals,	and	tricky	problems	among	others.	Next,	I	marked	each	issue	by	its	
status	as	open	or	closed.	
					 To	capture	the	ongoing	work	on	the	project,	as	well	as	the	improvements,	changes,	and	
new	releases	since	my	initial	collection	phase,	I	completed	the	second	phase	of	data	collection	
in	July	2016.	The	process	of	collection	was	similar	to	the	initial	phase,	except	for	the	added	
complication	of	there	being	additions	to	the	already	collected	material.	For	the	W3C	data,	this	
was	not	an	issue	because	the	message	board’s	platform	allows	sorting	by	date.	While	GitHub	
also	allows	sorting	by	modification	date,	it	forced	me	to	append	each	original	issue	that	had	
recorded	changes	from	the	initial	data	collection	phase.	This	meant	that	many	of	my	originally	
captured	issues	were	closed	or	merged	with	other	issues.	Fortunately,	GitHub	readily	provides	
that	information	so	making	the	amendments	was	relatively	simple.	This	second	phase	of	data	
collection	brought	my	data	totals	to	682	W3C	messages	across	164	subjects	and	971	distinct	
GitHub	issues.		
While	both	platforms	are	publicly	open,	contributors	are	primarily	Web	developers	
looking	to	apply	Schema.org	to	their	sites	or	prominent	community	members	contributing	to	
the	day-to-day	development	and	operation	of	the	project.	Nearly	all	participation	is	from	
Western	collaborators,	the	vast	majority	coming	from	people	located	in	the	United	States,	
England,	and	Germany.	There	is	substantial	variation	in	the	length	of	issue	threads	and	message	
board	chains,	as	well	as	in	how	detailed	those	data	are.	They	range	from	zero	to	forty-two	
responses,	averaging	six	responses	per	issue,	with	each	response	at	a	paragraph	or	more	in	
length	and	often	including	lengthy	examples	of	existing	or	proposed	Web	markup.		
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Code	and	Web	markup	were	not	scraped	and	uploaded	to	Dedoose	but	were	included	in	
the	analysis.	On	GitHub	the	specific	changes	to	a	code	are	highlighted	in	the	code	itself,	most	of	
which	is	too	large	to	be	manageable	in	Dedoose,	while	the	important	data	for	my	analyses	are	
just	these	highlighted	segments,	removing	them	from	the	context	of	the	larger	code	set	
removes	potentially	important	information.	Additionally,	this	particular	way	that	code	is	
formatted	and	presented	is	important	to	preserve	because	the	specific	formatting	and	
characters	used	to	display	and	organize	scripts	serve	important	purposes	in	programming	
languages.	Copying	these	bits	of	information	to	a	text	document	compromises	that	formatting	
and	at	times	the	characters	involved.	Fortunately,	all	of	this	information	is	preserved	in	the	
correct	form	on	GitHub.		
	
4.4	Analytic	Approach	
This	study	adopted	two	main	methodological	techniques.	The	first	followed	the	
netnographic	approach	developed	by	Kozinets	(2010)	on	conducting	digital	ethnographies	of	
online	communities.	The	second	methodological	technique	was	a	variation	on	multimodal	
critical	discourse	analysis.	The	first	was	used	to	investigate	the	development	and	use	of	
Schema.org,	and	the	second	was	used	in	combination	with	the	first	to	understand	the	
affordances	and	constraints	imposed	by	the	three	markup	standards.		
Ethnography	has	a	long	history	in	the	study	of	science	and	technological	systems.	
Ethnographic	laboratory	research	emerging	from	the	field	of	science	and	technology	studies	
(STS)	have	shown	the	central	roles	of	communities	of	practice,	technological	artifacts,	and	their	
intra-actions	in	the	production	of	scientific	facts	(Knorr-Cetina	1999;	Latour	and	Woolgar	1986;	
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Latour	1987;	Mol	2002;	Traweek	1988).	Additionally,	similar	methods	have	been	used	to	study	
the	development	of	expert	systems	by	early	AI	researchers	(Forsythe	1993a,	1993b;	Suchman	
1987).	These	studies	have	been	instrumental	in	showing	the	ways	that	the	seemingly	black	
boxed	inner	workings	of	scientific,	medical,	and	computer	science	communities	come	to	
produce	their	objects	in	active	and	dynamic	ways	(Knorr-Cetina	2001;	Mol	2002).	Moreover,	the	
ethnographies	that	have	come	out	of	the	STS	field,	in	particular,	have	given	us	license	to	
interrogate	the	intra-actions	between	human	and	non-human	actors	with	the	same	levels	of	
priority	while	assuming	the	same	levels	of	potential	agency.	While	research	setting	and	cultural	
artifacts	have	always	been	a	central	component	of	ethnographic	research,	the	affordance-
based	perspectives	that	are	both	explicitly	and	implicitly	adopted	in	contemporary	
ethnographies	provide	a	stable	footing	for	understanding	the	ways	that	communities	of	
practice	interact	with	technologies	in	varied,	changing,	and	emergent	ways.	Ways	that	are	
inseparably	connected	to	the	socio-material	contexts	in	which	those	intra-actions	occur.	This	
form	of	agentive	realism	reflects	an	ontological	and	epistemological	commitment	to	take	the	
two	as	unsettled	and	incomplete	achievements	(Barad	2007;	Mol	2002).		
Now	old	discussions	of	digitally	mediated	interactions	enabled	by	ubiquitous	computing	
and	the	increasing	role	that	digital	media	play	in	community	creation,	have	coincided	with	
digitally	oriented	forms	of	ethnography.	Often	termed,	digital	ethnography,	virtual	
ethnography,	or	cyber-ethnography,	these	methodological	approaches	mirror	the	grounded	
concerns	of	lived	experience,	interactions,	gestures,	and	situated	action	of	traditional	
ethnographies.	Research	in	this	area	has	studied	the	construction	of	identity	in	online	
communities,	digital	interactions	as	extensions	of	face-to-face	interactions,	impression	
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management	in	social	media,	and	the	construction	of	publics	in	discussion	forums	among	other	
aims	and	digital	contexts	(Boellstorff	2010;	Hine	2000;	Markham	1998;	Springer	2015;	Turkle	
1995).		
While	many	of	these	digitally	inspired	ethnographies	view	the	digital	as	only	one	
component	of	the	total	social	experience,	this	study	orients	differently.	Natively	digital	artifacts,	
like	software	and	code	systems,	require	a	focus	that	is	also	natively	digital,	particularly	in	the	
present	case	where	the	boundaries	of	practice	are	coterminous	with	the	boundaries	of	the	
digital	(Rogers	2013).	These	types	of	digital	technologies	and	their	interfaces	reconfigure	social	
interactions	and	“this	reorganization	changes	how	empirical	knowledge	is	produced	and	
transmitted	among	users	in	a	digital	environment.	It	also	restructures	how	we	as	ethnographers	
observe,	analyze,	and	categorize	empirical	knowledge.”	(Hsu	2014:1).	Thus,	to	study	a	natively	
digital	site,	such	as	GitHub,	one	must	adopt	a	methodology	that	is	sensitive	to	these	
reconfigurations	that	mark	distinctions	between	online	communities	and	communities	online	
(Kozinets	2010).	While	this	study	recognizes	the	false	dichotomy	of	material/immaterial	that	
often	underpins	sensationalized	studies	of	digitality,	this	study	follows	Hsu	(2014)	and	focuses	
on	the	digital	as	a	pragmatic	decision	for	the	sake	of	methodological	and	analytic	lucidity.	
However,	this	comes	with	the	acknowledgement	that	work	occurs	only	through	the	benefit	of	a	
wide-ranging	set	of	material	artifacts	and	practices.		
Kozinets	(2010:60)	defines	the	practice	of	netnography	as,	“research	based	in	online	
fieldwork.	It	uses	computer-mediated	communications	as	a	source	of	data	to	arrive	at	
ethnographic	understanding	and	representation	of	a	cultural	or	communal	phenomenon.”	
Netnographic	practice	allows	for	a	situated	analysis	of	community	engagement	available	in	
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online	forums.	While	I	abstained	from	participation	to	avoid	being	disruptive,	netnographic	
research,	like	traditional	ethnographic	methods,	necessarily	includes	a	range	of	techniques	
including	archival	and	documentary	analysis,	the	tracing	of	event	timelines	and	narratives,	and	
in-depth	case	study	all	as	deployed	here.	Springer	(2015)	argues	that	this	provides	a	set	of	
observational	data	similar	to,	but	more	reliable	than	field	notes	and	artifacts	from	traditional	
ethnographic	methods.	It	additionally	provided	an	increase	potential	for	researcher	reflexivity,	
as	I	was	able	to	easily	revisit	data	in	its	original	pre-coded	form	(Springer	2015).		
					 As	netnography	is	a	necessarily	diverse	set	of	methods,	my	approach	to	the	data	was	
also	diverse.	The	first	stage	in	my	research	process	was	to	familiarize	myself	with	the	
community	and	their	sets	of	practice.	This	involved	the	daily	monitoring	of	both	primary	
research	sites	to	situate	myself	in	the	day	to	day	operation	and	development	of	the	project.	
This	occurred	in	two	ways.	First,	I	constructed	a	running	set	of	field	notes	that	described	the	
situation	on	the	ground	in	its	own	terms.	This	involved	a	simple	summary	of	what	happened	
and	why	based	on	the	information	directly	available.	Given	my	interest	in	the	specific	ways	this	
system	is	brought	into	being,	I	was	focused	on	how	new	developments	were	proposed,	who	
proposed	them,	why	they	proposed	them,	as	well	as	the	process	and	results	of	the	debates	that	
surrounded	any	given	issue.	Of	crucial	importance	was	uncover	the	rationales	behind	both	the	
initial	proposals	and	proposed	solutions.		
					 Once	familiar	with	the	process,	I	was	able	to	look	back	at	older	data	and	make	sense	of	
the	issues,	discussions,	and	resolutions	of	the	past.	By	systematically	following	the	thread	of	
debates,	proposed	and	acted	upon	solutions,	commits,	and	interactions	between	the	
assemblage’s	components	I	was	able	to	construct	a	working	history	of	the	project	from	the	
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perspective	of	work	practice,	rather	than	project	releases,	and	one	that	contained	multiple	
timelines	based	on	specific	concurrent	issues.	However,	having	the	timeline	of	actual	releases	
at	hand	was	helpful	in	determining	the	types	of	issues	that	make	it	to	the	release	stage,	and	the	
types	of	issues	that	get	stuck	in	production	for	whatever	reasons.	This	allowed	me	to	uncover	
patterns	in	work	priority,	coverage	areas,	treatment	of	certain	forms	of	proposals,	rationales	
for	decisions,	and	the	power	dynamics	of	the	immediate	community.	Importantly,	it	also	
allowed	for	reoccurring	issues	to	emerge	in	the	data	in	a	more	meaningful	way.	The	
construction	of	a	narrative	timeline	allowed	these	problem	areas	to	emerge	through	
reoccurrence	over	time	and	also	through	tracking	issue	assignments	and	mergers.		
					 In	addition	to	the	common	ethnographic	practices	surrounding	field	notes,	I	engaged	in	
a	more	formal	textual	analysis	that	followed	the	approaches	of	Berg	(2004)	and	Strauss	and	
Corbin	(1990).	Continuing	from	my	desire	to	approach	the	case	in	a	grounded	manner,	I	began	
this	coding	process	by	establishing	codes	derived	from	the	language	of	the	actors	themselves.	
This	had	the	benefit	of	providing	a	view	towards	the	meanings	that	actors	gave	to	their	actions.	
At	this	stage,	I	had	read	all	of	the	data	so	I	was	able	to	look	for	the	linkages	between	data	points	
(threads,	issues,	commits,	etc.).	As	a	step	in	the	data	analysis	process,	I	allowed	in	vivo	codes	
and	categories,	as	well	as	previously	undefined	narratives	and	codes	that	relate	to	my	research	
project,	but	were	unspecified,	to	emerge	from	the	data.	Much	of	these	codes	related	to	
efficiency,	pragmatics,	and	coherence	across	the	applied	data	model.	Next,	I	established	
grounded	categories	where	I	placed	this	material	into	context	with	the	narrative	and	action	
specific	conditions	of	the	texts	–	e.g.	limiting	complexity	because	of	across	standard	variations	
or	intentional	ambiguity	to	account	for	missing	coverage.	In	this	stage,	a	number	of	unexpected	
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categories	and	themes	emerged.	Notably,	these	included	the	tendency	to	opt	for	simplicity	
over	semantic	accuracy	and	decoupling	the	context	of	creation	from	the	contexts	of	use.		
The	second	stage	of	the	research	involved	revisiting	selected	data	in	light	of	sociological	
constructs	drawn	guided	by	the	themes	of	my	research	and	the	concerns	of	the	relevant	
literature.	Here	I	reconstructed	my	“field	notes”	in	a	way	the	a	drew	out	the	ontological	issues	
of	over-determination	and	occlusion,	as	well	as	other	issues	of	position	taking,	representation,	
and	negotiating	affordances	of	the	technological	environment.	Much	of	this	portion	of	the	
research	involved	a	close	critical	reading	of	the	ontology	and	the	markup	standards	used	by	
Schema.org.	This	study	takes	the	view	that	the	ontology	and	the	relevant	markup	standards	are	
forms	of	computer	language	based	digital	objects.	Kallinikos	et	al.	(2013)	offer	a	useful	
definition	of	the	concept.	Digital	objects,	they	argue,	are	editable,	interactive,	reprogrammable,	
and	distributed	digital	cultural	artifacts.	As	cultural	artifacts,	they	contain	the	implicit	
assumptions,	norms,	and	values	that	exist	in	the	immediate	cultural	landscapes	from	which	
they	emerge	(Lupton	2014).	As	language-based	standards	they	contain	the	ability	to	shape	the	
means	for	representation,	everyday	practice,	and	our	interactions	with	them	(Busch	2011;	
Fiormonte	et	al.	2015).	As	mentioned	earlier,	however,	these	digital	objects	are	not	
deterministic,	nor	are	the	entirely	within	the	realm	of	free	play.	Like	all	cultural	artifacts,	
standards	contain	certain	affordances	and	constraints	that	shift	and	reshape	as	contexts	
change.	Additionally,	as	cultural	artifacts,	they	can	be	interpreted	as	texts.	
					 To	analyze	these	digital	objects,	I	adopted	an	approach	frequently	used	to	study	
affordances	of	technological	artifacts	(Introna	2005,	2014;	Introna	and	Hayes	2011;	Lupton	
2014).	This	approach	has	similarities	to	multimodal	discourse	analysis	(MDA),	a	recent	
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methodological	technique	that	allows	the	researcher	to	investigate	meaning	in	objects	beyond	
the	simple	confines	of	language.	It	takes	other	objects	like	images,	symbols,	actions,	audio,	and	
I	argue	code	based	markup	standards	as	semiotic	resources	(O’Halloran	2011).	MDA	has	been	
applied	in	a	number	of	different	areas	to	articulate	the	meaning	potential	in	visual	design	(Kress	
and	van	Leewuen	2006),	artwork	(O’Toole	1994),	mathematics	(O’Halloran	2005),	and	televised	
news	(O’Halloran	2011)	among	other	areas.	The	specific	approach	of	MDA	is	a	similar	approach	
to	the	approach	used	in	other	forms	of	discourse	analysis	that	assume:	
that	discourse,	subjectivity,	and	practice	are	densely	interwoven,	and	that	discourse	is	
primary	to	subjectivity/practice	through	its	constituting	or	framing	powers.	This	means	
that	dominant	and	widespread	discourse	shapes	both	how	to	talk	about	a	subject	
matter	and	the	meaning	that	we	develop	about	it…	It	is	not	the	details	of	the	account	
and	its	context	as	much	as	a	perceived	general	tendency	that	is	deemed	significant	to	
use	(Alvesson	and	Karreman	2000:1138)	
	
This	approach	allows	a	researcher	to	identify	and	interrogate	the	ways	that	broad	discursive	
patterns	help	to	shape	affordances	and	prohibitions,	the	ways	of	being	and	the	constraints	that	
might	be	placed	on	being,	the	ways	of	doing	and	the	constraints	placed	on	practice,	and	the	
ways	of	representing	and	the	constraints	on	possible	claims	making.	The	constant	conversation	
that	I	had	between	the	data	in	my	field	notes	and	the	affordances	of	the	ontology	and	
standards	allowed	me	to	understand	specifically,	how	certain	forms	can	and	cannot	be	
represented,	how	representations	can	serve	to	over-determine	or	occlude	others,	and	how	the	
ability	to	make	semantic	data	as	a	practice	is	enabled	and	constrained	by	the	particular	forms	of	
the	standard	and	ontology	drawn	on	in	a	given	context.		
					 As	a	part	of	this	second	stage	of	research,	the	textual	analysis	involved	coding	texts	
based	on	constructs	and	questions	guided	by	themes	relevant	to	my	research	questions.	Given	
my	primary	focuses	the	interactions	between	components	and	human-machine	translations,	I	
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reread	the	data	in	light	of	these	focal	points.	Here	I	identified	statements	that	dealt	directly	
with	negotiations	with	markup	standards,	divergent	interpretations	of	semantics	and	their	
application	by	developers	and	users,	design	best	practices,	and	decision	making	and	rationales.	
These	additionally	included	issues	surrounding	conflict,	consensus,	and	proper	classification,	
which	itself	was	broken	down	into	instances	where	false	equivalencies	were	made	and	
recognized,	where	properties,	representations,	and	identities	were	conflated,	and	when	
instances	evaded	proper	classification	within	the	ontology.	This	phase	also	included	coding	of	
the	actors	and	components	involved	in	the	assemblage.	Here	I	coded	actors	by	reported	
country,	affiliation,	and	role.	Additionally,	I	coded	actors’	stated	involvements	with	other	
ontologies.		
														The	final	stage	of	the	formal	coding	process	involved	drawing	connections	between	
codes	from	both	stages	of	the	coding	process.	In	this	phase,	I	modified	and	collapsed	codes	
where	appropriate	and	the	placed	them	into	more	direct	conversation	with	the	study’s	
research	questions	and	the	contexts	they	implied.	This	allowed	me	to	draw	connections	
between	themes	that	may	have	initially	been	treated	separately	and	apply	coded	information	
directly	to	the	study’s	focal	interests.	For	example,	that	usability	and	practicality	took	
precedence	over	accuracy	in	representation	and	classification	when	divergent	interpretations	
of	semantics	and	their	application	occurred	between	participants.		
	
4.5	Researcher	Reflections	and	Limitations	
Such	and	undertaking	has	ethical	implications	that	must	be	considered	and	dealt	with	
accordingly.	This	research	was	conducted	in	full	consideration	of	the	American	Sociological	
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Association’s	(ASA)	code	of	ethics	and	complied	with	all	Internal	Review	Board	(IRB)	
prescriptions.	This	document	follows	all	ASA	recommendations	for	professional	competence,	
integrity,	professional	and	scientific	responsibility,	respect	for	people’s	dignity,	and	social	
responsibility.	As	such,	I	undertook	only	the	activities	in	which	I	was	professionally	competent.		
My	multiple	statements	of	research	were	clear	and	honest	in	intention,	and	despite	the	at	
times,	critical	nature	of	this	study,	I	do	not	seek	to	endanger	my	research	subject’s	professional	
well-being.	Throughout	the	research	process,	appropriate	measures	to	protect	research	
subject’s	confidentiality	and	anonymity,	despite	the	public	nature	of	the	two	primary	research	
sites	that	were	used.	Additionally,	all	research	subjects	were	informed	of	their	right	to	be	
omitted	from	the	research,	in	accordance	with	ASA	and	IRB	guidelines	(American	Sociological	
Association	2008).	
	 This	study	is	about	the	process	of	constructing	and	enacting	data	as	well	as	the	creation	
of	ontological	states	through	human-machine	translations.	As	such,	the	irony	of	conducting	
qualitative	research	and	making	specific	enactments	of	data	to	solve	my	questions	is	not	lost	on	
me.	The	same	biases,	rationales,	and	patterns	of	interactions	that	I	attribute	to	my	case	as	an	
ostensibly	clairvoyant	outside	body	can	be	alleged	to	this	very	investigation	with	equal	
legitimacy.	As	I	claim	that	Schema.org’s	ontologists	are	enacting	a	particular	ontology,	I	am	
doing	precisely	the	same	thing.	This	illusion	of	purity	could	be	said	of	all	social	science	research	
particularly	when	that	research	is	engaged	with	knowledge	work	(Latour	1991).		
To	mitigate	the	bias	introduced	by	my	personal	choices	of	questions,	case,	and	methods,	
I	am	left	with	only	a	few	possible	options.	The	first	of	which	was	to	follow	the	strategies	of	the	
researchers	before	me.	My	interest	in	this	study	follows	from	an	established	body	of	research,	
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drawing	on	theories,	concepts,	and	approaches	that	have	withstood	the	scrutiny	of	peer-
review.	This	work	has	shown	that	researcher	reflexivity	is	key	to	undertaking	ethical	and	valid	
social	research.	The	second	way	I	mitigated	my	own	personal	biases	was	to	allow	the	data	to	
speak	in	their	own	terms.	In	this	sense,	I	attempted	to	ground	my	research	in	the	site	and	
community	where	it	occurred,	drawing	on	their	language,	and	their	understandings	of	what	
they	were	doing	before	adding	my	own.	Of	course,	this	strategy	is	not	fool-proof	and	still	
involves	interpretations	and	assignations	of	cause	and	rationale	on	the	part	of	the	researcher.	
To	address	this	nagging	concern,	my	third	strategy	was	to	allow	the	data	to	speak	for	itself	as	
much	as	possible	throughout	this	document	and	my	analysis.	To	do	so,	context	will	be	supplied	
by	both	description	and	data	where	possible.		While	I	interpret	the	data,	and	draw	conclusions	
from	it,	I	have	tried	to	make	those	interpretations	and	conclusions	follow	logically	from	the	
data	I	present.		
The	relative	lack	of	social	science	research	on	the	semantic	web	and	on	data	enactments	
suggests	that	a	grounded	empirical	analysis	is	needed.	However,	as	a	case	study,	this	research	
only	investigates	one	semantic	web	ontology	and	one	main	form	of	data,	despite	its	various	
enactments.	While	the	case	under	investigation	is	among	the	largest	and	most	used	example	
available,	this	has	the	potential	consequence	of	limiting	some	generalizability.	However,	I	
address	the	specific	features	of	Schema.org	that	make	it	unique	and	contribute	to	its	specific	
importance	as	a	case	for	research	and	increasingly	representative	of	the	semantic	web	in	
general.	Additionally,	this	analysis	is	not	a	comparative	analysis	on	the	enactment	of	other	
types	of	data,	which	are	part	of	other	data	assemblages,	so	will	necessarily	have	different	
enactments.	However,	this	concern	is	marginal	to	this	study	as	it	represents	one	small	step	in	
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the	emerging	study	of	data.	One	contention	of	this	and	other	work	(Kitchin	2014b,	2014c;	
Kitchin	et	al.	2015a,	2015b)	is	that	disparate	types	of	data	and	their	assemblages	need	to	be	
studied	in	their	own	right.			
Additional	limitations	are	presented	by	the	data	available	to	this	study.	While	the	data	
used	contain	all	of	the	public	discussion	on	how	to	best	alter	and	apply	the	ontology,	it	does	not	
contain	any	backchannel	communications	either	in	person	or	via	email.	The	data	indicates	that	
there	are	occasional	back-channel	discussions	between	a	few	community	members	on	certain	
issues.	Most	of	the	time	those	discussions	are	disclosed	to	the	group	with	a	summary	of	the	
results,	but	the	actual	content	of	the	discussion	is	lost.	This	may	be	fine	for	continued	work	on	
the	project	from	the	perspective	of	a	developer,	but	from	an	analytic	perspective,	there	could	
be	information	important	to	my	findings,	for	or	against.	Additionally,	since	the	data	are	entirely	
textual	and	interviews	were	not	performed	for	this	study,	there	is	no	possibility	for	follow	up	or	
clarification	questions	that	are	not	in	the	text.	The	effects	of	these	limitations	seem	negligible,	
however,	since	all	modifications	are	public	and	the	data	of	primary	interest	are	the	discussions	
and	debates	about	the	ontology’s	coverage.	
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5.	Negotiated	Standards	
In	Art	Worlds,	Howard	Becker	(1982)	famously,	shows	the	ways	in	which	material	
standards	constrain	the	production	and	display	of	artwork.	Among	other	things,	he	shows	that	
building	standards	impact	the	size	of	artwork	as	well	as	how	and	where	it	can	be	displayed.	
Likewise,	Klose	(2009)	explains	how	the	adoption	of	the	Twenty	Food	Equivalent	Unit	for	
shipping	containers	has	helped	to	not	only	shape	the	course	of	globalization	but	also	the	way	
we	now	think	about	organization	and	modularity.	Furthermore,	we	know	that	classification	
standards	work	to	afford	certain	ways	of	knowing	a	thing	while	constraining	others	(Bowker	
and	Star	1999,	Epstein	2007,	Scott	1998).	This	work	shows	that	while	standards	often	exist	to	
reduce	user	friction	and	to	make	things	interoperable,	they	do	so	at	the	expense	of	competing	
understandings	and	states.	The	investment	in,	and	deployment	of,	a	specific	set	of	standards	
helps	to	set	the	boundaries	of	practice	and	its	results	as	those	communities	must	work	within	
the	affordances	set	by	those	standards.		
We	also	know	that	the	creation	of	standards	and	the	process	of	adopting	them	is	
fraught	with	conflict.	Much	time,	money,	and	effort	go	into	creating	and	adopting	ascendant	
standards,	and	for	creators	and	early	adopters,	there	may	be	substantial	costs	associated	with	
switching	between	them.	Work	has	shown	that	the	standard	that	prevails	is	not	always	the	
most	technically	proficient,	capable,	or	compatible	standard,	as	a	wide	variety	of	external	
forces	affect	their	adoption	and	use,	as	was	the	case	with	Betamax	and	VHS	(Genschel	1997;	
Yasunori	and	Imai	1993).	Additionally,	standards	development	and	deployment	does	not	
happen	evenly	across	contexts,	as	certain	actors	and	domains	are	either	not	exposed	to,	or	
reticent	to	adopt	standards	(Noble	1984).		
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More	recently,	work	has	examined	cases	where	standards	do	not	work	(Bowker	and	Star	
1999;	Epstein	2007,	2010;	Heimer	2001;	Whooley	2010,	2014;	Whooley	and	Horwitz	2013).	
Even	when	accounting	for	a	standard,	or	set	of	standards’,	propensity	to	afford	and	constrain,	
or	their	bumpy	and	contested	development	and	adoption,	the	accepted	standards	do	not	
always	work	as	supposed	or	desired.	In	these	cases,	a	standard,	or	set	of	standards,	actually	
may	work	to	inhibit	practice	and	its	smooth	operation,	or	to	constrain	results	in	ways	that	work	
against	the	standard’s	supposed	function.	While	Bowker	and	Star	(1999)	argue	that	standards	
tend	to	stabilize	systems,	rather	than	just	tending	towards	stabilization,	they	acknowledge	that	
effects	can	be	varied	as	standards	are	artifacts	to	be	negotiated.	While	work	in	neo-
institutionalism	repeatedly	show	that	decoupling	is	the	most	common	outcome	when	
standards	conflict	with	practice,	this	work	lacks	due	attention	to	when	decoupling	is	not	
possible	(Meyer	and	Rowan	1977;	Sandholtz	2012;	Thévenot	2009;	Zbaracki	1998).	These	
omissions	beg	researchers	to	situate	standards’	use	in	practice	and	question	how	these	
blockages	are	negotiated	and	how	the	restrictions	created	by	standardization	are	relaxed	while	
still	enabling	the	interoperability	they	are	designed	for.	While	scholars	have	been	exploring	the	
tensions	between	organizational	level	practices	and	standards’	homogenizing	effects	for	some	
time,	work	that	both	locates	standards	at	the	level	of	professional	communities	and	that	
investigates	the	negotiations	of	barriers	is	only	just	begging	to	emerge	(Epstein	2007,	2010;	
Halpin	2016;	Heimer	2001;	Whooley	2010,	2014;	Whooley	and	Horwitz	2013).	
The	following	section	engages	with	these	omissions.	Below	I	will	show	how	the	markup	
standards	described	in	previous	chapters	are	deployed	across	the	two	primary	fields	of	practice	
implicated	in	Schema.org.	In	line	with	existing	work	on	standards	and	classification,	I	will	show	
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the	ways	in	which	they	set	certain	affordances	and	constraints	on	the	development	and	use	of	
the	Schema.org	ontology	and	thus	the	affordances	and	constraints	placed	upon	the	enactment	
of	the	data	assemblage.	I	will	also	show	the	ways	that	these	standards	work	against	the	thing	
they	are	supposed	to	enable,	and	how	the	communities	of	practice	negotiate	those	restrictions.	
I	echo	recent	work,	showing	that	practitioners	work	around	those	limitations,	but	also	extend	
that	work	arguing	that	most	often,	practitioners	work	with	and	through	the	standards	in	their	
negotiations	(Berg	1999;	Epstein	2007,	2010;	Heimer	2001;	Whooley	2010,	2014;	Whooley	and	
Horwitz	2013).	Furthermore,	I	will	detail	some	of	the	unintended	consequences	of	those	
negotiations	and	how	they	can	lead	differential	enactments,	or	ontological	states.			
Specifically,	I	will	examine	the	three	markup	standards	adopted	by	Schema.org	and	its	
users.	Each	standard	plays	a	major	role	in	shaping	the	way	that	the	Schema.org	ontology	is	
developed	and	applied	in	actual	use.	Importantly,	each	standard	conditions	that	development	
and	use	in	subtle	but	different	ways	that	constrain	and	enable	the	enactment	of	the	
assemblage	and	the	way	that	information	can	be	encoded	for	machine	readability.	This	chapter	
details	those	affordances	and	constraints	in	both	the	general	semantic	web	and	Schema.org	
specific	contexts.	These	markup	standards	are	built	on	different	computer	languages	with	each	
containing	different	grammatical	structures	and	syntactical	rules	regarding	their	use.	As	many	
of	the	affordances	and	constraints	that	these	markup	standards	put	onto	ontologists	and	Web	
developers	are	rooted	in	these	technical	grammars,	this	chapter	pays	close	attention	to	the	
details	of	syntax	as	they	serve	to	create	protocological	control	(Galloway	2004,	2006).	The	
consequence	of	this	is	that	the	ensuing	discussions	are	by	necessity,	technical.	Much	of	the	
affordances	and	constraints	discussed	will	reference	specific	artifacts	of	these	markup	
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standards	that	evade	simple	description	and	so	each	standard	will	be	analyzed	via	reference	to	
empirical	examples	from	figures	in	the	text.	Following	a	technical	discussion	of	the	standards,	
this	chapter	introduces	some	of	the	specific	ways	that	those	technical	features	affected	
Schema.org’s	development	and	use,	as	well	as	some	unintended	consequences	of	those	effects.	
While	there	are	three	standards	in	use,	much	of	my	attention	is	paid	to	the	two	standards	that	
feature	most	frequently	in	the	data	and	are	most	important	to	Schema.org,	Microdata	and	
Javascript	Object	Notation	for	Linked	Data	(JSON-LD),	the	former	being	the	previous	preferred	
markup	syntax	and	the	latter	the	current	preference.			
	
5.1	Microdata		
Microdata	is	a	syntax	that	allows	machine-readable	data	to	be	embedded	in	Hypertext	
Markup	Language	documents.	It	provides	a	way	to	annotate	Web	content	with	sets	of	name-
value	pairs	in	sequence	with	the	rest	of	the	HTML	document.	This	means	that	Web	developers	
can	encode	machine-readable	data	in	the	same	segment	of	the	HTML	script	as	the	non-
semantic	content.	They	do	not	need	to	insert	additional	code	or	append	documents	in	any	way	
beyond	the	Microdata	markup.	However,	this	implies	that	Microdata	is	being	used	at	the	onset	
of	page	development,	as	already	existing	HTML	script	would	need	to	be	amended,	sometimes	
with	significant	difficulty,	to	include	the	machine-readable	content.	Even	still,	the	machine-
readable	content	can	be	added	in	parallel	to	the	existing	HTML	script	(Hickson	2013).	
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Figure	6.	Microdata	Markup	of	a	Government	Permit	
1. <div itemscope itemtype="http://schema.org/GovernmentPermit"> 
2.   <span itemprop="name">NYC Food Service Establishment Permit</span> 
3.   <div itemprop="issuedBy" itemscope itemtype="http://schema.org/GovernmentOrganization"> 
4.   <span itemprop="name">Department of Health and Mental Hygiene"</span> 
5.   </div> 
6.   <div itemprop="issuedThrough" itemscope itemtype="http://schema.org/GovernmentService"> 
7.   <span itemprop="name">NYC Food Service Establishment Permit Service</span> 
8.   </div> 
9.   <div itemprop="validIn" itemscope itemtype="http://schema.org/AdministrativeArea"> 
10.   <span itemprop="name">New York</span> 
11.   </div> 
12.   <time itemprop="validFor" datetime="P1Y">1 year</time> 
13. </div> 
Source:	Schema.org	(2017d)	
	
Name-values	pairs	are	akin	to	a	set	of	tags	that	can	be	attached	to	Web	content	where	a	
group	is	referred	to	as	an	item,	or	itemtype	in	syntax,	and	where	each	name-value	pair	is	a	
property,	or	itemprop,	and	the	context	for	the	description	is	supplied	by	itemscope.	The	
empirical	sample	in	Figure	6.	provides	an	illustrative	example.	In	Figure	6.,	Schema.org	is	being	
used	to	describe	“A	New	York	City	Food	Service	Establishment	Permit”	as	issued	by	the	
“Department	of	Health	and	Mental	Hygiene”	and	in	effect	for	one	year.	We	can	see	the	
itemscope	and	initial	itemtype	being	set	by	“http://schema.org/GovernmentPermit”	(Line	1),	
which	is	being	used	to	provide	the	markup’s	context	by	specifying	the	ontology’s	location,	the	
class,	its	supra-classes,	its	properties,	its	inherited	properties,	properties	for	which	instances	of	
“GovernmentPermit”	can	appear,	as	well	as	relevant	definitions,	and	the	affordances	and	
constraints	on	value	inputs	among	other	things.	This	canonical	IRI	refers	a	computational	agent	
to	“http://schema.org/GovernmentPermit”	for	the	context	in	parsing	the	ensuing	markup.	The	
entire	ability	for	an	agent	to	understand	the	marked	information	is	delimited	by	what	appears	
in	that	context	specification.	In	other	words,	the	realm	of	possible	understanding	is	bound	by	
the	ontology	specified.	Here	the	assembling	of	the	Microdata	standard	and	the	Schema.org	
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ontology	combine	to	enact	the	meaning	space	for	food	service	permits,	government	permits,	
administrative	areas,	etc.		
The	first	name-value	pair,	“name	–	NYC	Food	Service	Establishment	Permit”	(Line	2)	
establishes	a	description	of	the	permit	in	plain	text.	Note,	that	while	a	computational	agent	will	
understand	that	the	“name	-	NYC	Food	Service	Establishment	Permit”	pair	is	referring	to	the	
“http://schema.org/GovernmentPermit”	IRI	and	all	its	associations,	in	this	markup	it	does	not	
understand	any	of	the	content	found	in	the	description	since	it	is	just	a	text	string,	it	merely	
presents	that	as	part	of	the	HTML	script.	However,	this	description	could	itself	be	subset	and	
marked	up	to	indicate	things	like	“Food	Service”	and	“New	York	City	(NYC)”	as	further	semantic	
detail	specifying	the	exact	context	and	form	of	the	permit	issued,	though	only	by	a	single	
specified	type	and	through	a	single	specified	context	file.	The	decision	to	do	so	depends	on	the	
aims	and	skill	of	the	Web	developer	and	the	availability	of	coverage	in	the	ontology.		
Within	the	same	itemscope	and	itemtype,	a	subset	with	a	new	itemprop	“issuedBy”	is	
defined	by	a	separate	itemscope	and	itemtype	“http://schema.org/GovernmentOrganization”	
(Line	3),	which	itself	has	a	new	property,	“name”,	establishing	that	the	government	permit	of	
the	previously	established	name	was	issued	by	the	government	organization	“Department	of	
Health	and	Mental	Hygiene”	(Line	4).	The	markup	then	begins	a	new	code	loop	under	the	
original	itemscope	and	itemtype	to	establish	the	property	“issuedThrough”	with	yet	another	
new	subset	scope	and	type	“http://schema.org/GovernmentService”	(Line	6)	with	the	property	
“name”	and	the	value	“NYC	Food	Service	Establishment	Permit	Service”	(Line	7).	This	process	is	
further	repeated	to	describe	the	valid	administrative	area	(Line	9)	of	New	York	(Line	10)	and	the	
one-year	validity	(Line	12).	This	process	can	be	repeated	and	further	elaborated	on	for	any	
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content	that	has	corresponding	coverage	in	the	ontology.	Problematically	for	Microdata,	as	
discussed	more	below,	this	process	can	only	be	done	within	the	bounds	of	a	single	ontology	and	
type	specification.		
Microdata	was	created	for	human	readability	and	webmaster	usability	and	emerged	as	
a	markup	syntax	aimed	at	providing	structure	to	the	World	Wide	Web.	While	not	a	W3C	
recommendation,	meaning	it	lacks	the	institutional	support	and	development	of	other	
standards,	Microdata	is	part	of	the	HTML5	specification	so	that	any	parser	that	can	understand	
HTML5	can	understand	Microdata	markup,	making	it	broadly	applicable.	Additionally,	its	
embedding	in	HTML5	increases	the	likelihood	of	Web	developers	being	familiar	with	its	basic	
structure,	adding	to	the	chances	that	they	apply	markup	to	their	content.	Indeed,	this	is	one	of	
the	stated	reasons	for	Schema.org’s	initial	support	for	Microdata,	and	likely	to	be	a	significant	
part	of	the	reason	for	its	continued	popularity	despite	its	often	bemoaned	limitations	(Guha	et	
al.	2015,	Schema.org	2017c).	
Microdata	benefits	from	its	similarity	to	HTML,	its	human	readability,	simplicity,	and	
broad	support	by	browsers	and	Web	content	consumers,	however,	it	has	a	number	of	
limitations	for	creating	semantic	data.	First,	Microdata	can	only	be	used	in	HTML5,	which	
precludes	its	use	in	any	other	computer	languages,	such	as	Javascript,	which	commonly	used	to	
add	interactivity	to	websites	or	browser	specific	functionality.	This	is	significant	because	it	limits	
the	applicability	of	ontologies,	restricts	the	possible	amount	of	semantic	data,	and	blunts	a	
machine’s	understanding	of	the	Web	domain.	Additionally,	Microdata	was	specifically	designed	
so	that	content	is	structured	using	the	context	of	a	single	ontology,	making	it	difficult	to	
integrate	different	ontologies.	While	workarounds	exist,	their	use	is	rare	and	they	add	
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substantial	complexity	and	run	the	risk	of	creating	competing	sets	of	data	for	different	
consumers,	as	some	may	not	be	compatible	or	able	to	read	the	content	included	in	the	
workaround.	This	limitation	creates	the	issue	where	a	Web	developer	has	the	choice	between	
semantic	consistency	and	semantic	hegemony.	Drawing	on	a	single	ontology	has	the	benefit	
that	its	class/type/property	configurations	will	likely	be	in	agreement.	In	the	other	case,	a	
developer	is	bound	by	the	specific	construction	of	the	world	as	found	in	the	adopted	ontology.	
So,	while	you	may	consistently	describe	your	domain,	the	limits	of	how	that	human-machine	
translation	occurs	is	bound	by	the	chosen	ontology.	Relatedly,	Microdata	does	not	accept	
multiple	types	for	a	single	object	across	ontologies,	or	trans	property	use	across	types	in	a	
single	ontology,	further	restricting	its	classification	within	a	single	class/type/property	matrix.	
This	means	that	an	artifact	with	ambiguous,	but	equally	valid,	semantics	will	be	ontologically	
over-determined	in	Microdata	markup	(W3C	2011,	WHATWG	2016).	As	the	example	above	
indicates,	each	listed	itemscope	is	bound	and	determined	by	the	single	deployed	itemtype.	
Another	limitation	is	that	the	Microdata	specification	does	not	support	inverse	
properties.	Not	being	able	to	natively	reverse	property	relations	means	that	an	agent’s	ability	
to	capture	relationships	is	constrained	to	only	one	direction.	In	the	example	from	chapter	two,	
an	agent	would	not	be	able	to	understand	that	Barack	Obama	was	Donald	Trump’s	
predecessor,	only	that	Trump	was	Obama’s	successor.	To	create	inverse	data	for	use	in	the	
Microdata	syntax,	ontologies	must	be	specifically	designed	with	pairs	of	properties	to	capture	
reverse	relationships	creating	additional	problems	for	Web	developers	and	ontologists	alike.	
Generally	speaking,	such	additions	and	modifications	run	counter	to	the	ontologists’	
preferences,	as	they	do	not	like	adding	extra	complications	to	the	ontology.	However,	such	
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inverses	can	be	important	signals	of	directionality	and	intent.	They	currently	advocate	for	using	
alternate	markup	standards	or	the	experimental	@itemprop-reverse	syntax,	though	there	are	
disagreements	in	the	Microdata	community	about	using	syntax	that	is	not	a	part	of	the	official	
specification.	Not	only	do	these	affordances	and	constraints	affect	the	development	of	
ontologies	and	the	in-situ	markup,	but	they	also	contribute	to	forms	of	semantic	hegemony	
whereby	ontological	states	are	applied	to	semantic	data	in	the	form	of	a	single	context	file	
and/or	Web	content	is	constrained	to	a	single	type	despite	having	an	indeterminate	nature.	
These	types	of	semantic	hegemony	detailed	above	can	include	the	two	forces	of	ontological	
over-determination	and	ontic	occlusion	outlined	in	earlier	chapters.						
	
5.2	RDFa	
	 The	Resource	for	Description	Framework	in	Attributes	(RDFa)	is	similar	to	Microdata	in	
that	it	is	a	markup	syntax	designed	to	convert	a	Web	environment	initially	designed	for	human	
consumption	into	one	consumed	by	machines	(Herman	et	al.	2015).	Much	like	Microdata,	RDFa	
can	be	implemented	in	parallel	with	HTML	scripts	to	provide	structured	semantic	data	to	Web	
content,	only	it	does	so	with	different	sets	of	values	to	designate	attributes.	Schema.org	
supports	RDFa	but	only	a	limited	version	called	RDFa	Lite.	This	is	due	to	the	level	of	complexity	
the	RDFa	Core	standard	has	for	developers,	as	it	would	run	counter	to	the	stated	approach	of	
the	Schema.org	developers.		
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Figure	7.	RDFa	Markup	of	a	University	Alumnus	
1. <div vocab="http://schema.org/" typeof="Person"> 
2.   <span property="name">Delia Derbyshire</span> 
3.   <link property="sameAs" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Delia_Derbyshire"/> 
4.   <div property="alumniOf" typeof="OrganizationRole"> 
5.   <div property="alumniOf" typeof="CollegeOrUniversity"> 
6.   <span property="name">University of Cambridge</span> 
7.   <link property="sameAs" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/University_of_Cambridge"/> 
8.   </div> 
9.   <span property="startDate">1959</span> 
10. </div> 
Source:	Schema.org	(2017e)	
 
 
Figure	8.	RDFa	Markup	of	a	Government	Permit	
1.      <div vocab="http://schema.org/" typeof="GovernmentPermit"> 
2.   <span property="name">NYC Food Service Establishment Permit</span> 
3.   <div property="issuedBy" typeof="GovernmentOrganization"> 
4.   <span property="name">Department of Health and Mental Hygiene"</span> 
5.   </div> 
6.   <div property="issuedThrough" typeof="GovernmentService"> 
7.   <span property="name">NYC Food Service Establishment Permit Service</span> 
8.   </div> 
9.   <div property="validIn" typeof="AdministrativeArea"> 
10.   <span property="name">New York</span> 
11.   </div> 
12.   <time property="validFor" datetime="P1Y">1 year</time> 
13. </div> 
Source:	Schema.org	(2017d)	
	
Figure	7.	and	Figure	8.	show	two	examples	of	RDFa	markup.	Much	like	the	Microdata	
example	in	Figure	4.,	both	RDFa	examples	begin	by	specifying	the	context	from	which	each	
object	draws	its	information.	Note	that	in	both	figures	the	markup	draws	on	
“http://schema.org/”	for	this	context.	Figure	7.	describes	a	type	of	person	(Line	1)	named	“Delia	
Derbyshire”	(Line	2)	who	is	the	sameAs	the	person	referenced	in	the	Wikipedia	entry	at	the	
given	URL	(Line	3).	This	person	is	an	alumniOf,	which	is	defined	as	a	type	of	organizaitonRole	
(Line	4),	with	the	specific	designation	that	Delia	is	an	alumniOf	a	specific	form	of	organization	
“CollegeOrUniversity”	(Line	5)	that	has	the	specific	name	“University	of	Cambridge”	(Line	6)	
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which	is	the	sameAs	the	referenced	Wikipedia	entry	(Line	7).	And	finally,	it	specifies	that	Delia	
was	an	alumnus	of	Cambridge	in	1959	(Line	9).		
	
Figure	9.	RDFa	Markup	Using	Multiple	Ontologies	
 
1. <p vocab="http://schema.org/" prefix="ov: http://open.vocab.org/terms/" resource="#manu"    
typeof="Person"> 
2. My name is 
3. <span property="name">Manu Sporny</span> 
4. and you can give me a ring via 
5. <span property="telephone">1-800-555-0199</span>. 
6. <img property="image" src="http://manu.sporny.org/images/manu.png" /> 
7. My favorite animal is the <span property="ov:preferredAnimal">Liger</span>. 
8. </p> 
 
Source:	Sporny	(2015)	
	
Interpreting	this	markup	is	a	straight	forward	affair,	but	an	important	one	to	discuss	
because	of	the	underlying	difference	in	the	data	model	used	by	RDFa	and	Microdata.	Microdata	
creates	semantic	data	by	simply	structuring	information	through	attaching	specific	points	of	
relationships	via	reference	to	the	Schema.org	vocabulary.	It	does	not	use	the	RDF	data	model	to	
create	semantic	data.	RDFa,	on	the	other	hand,	is	a	specification	of	the	RDF	data	model	and	
thus	applies	the	full	subject	–	object	–	predicate	format	to	content.	In	doing	so,	RDFa	provides	a	
direct	format	for	linking	data	and	supplying	additional	context	in	the	form	of	referenceable	
subjects,	objects,	and	properties	all	with	attendant	relationship	sets	as	defined	by	the	
contextual	ontology.	In	Figure	7.,	semantic	data	is	created	by	supplying	not	only	the	set	of	
formal	relationship	as	determined	by	Schema.org,	but	also	by	linking	the	content	being	marked	
up	with	information	found	in	the	Wikipedia	entries	for	Delia	Derbyshire	and	the	University	of	
Cambridge,	each	with	a	unique	identifier.	Recall	that	each	component	of	the	RDF	data	model	
needs	to	be	uniquely	referenced	by	IRI	or	literal	values.	In	this	case	the	“name”,	“sameAs”,	
“organizationRole”,	etc.	predicates	and	objects	are	referenced	implicitly	by	their	associated	IRIs	
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within	Schema.org	–	“http://schema.org/name”	or	“http://schema.org/GovernmentPermit“	
(Figure	8.),	but	do	not	require	the	individual	specification	of	the	root	namespace	each	time,	as	
Microdata	does.	One	can	specify	context	at	the	onset,	and	all	of	the	following	code	will	draw	
from	that	specified	root	to	determine	context	and	set	the	boundaries	of	the	meaning	space.	
Figure	9.	makes	a	deviation	from	the	models	supposed	this	far	(Figure	7.	and	Figure	8.)	by	
integrating	a	second	ontology	(Line	1).	The	interpretation	is	the	same	as	the	one	from	Figures	7.	
and	8.,	but	for	the	added	caveat	that	predicates	and	objects	that	begin	with	the	prefix	“ov”	
reference	the	Open	Vocab	ontology	for	their	sets	of	relationships.	This	is	a	significant	departure	
from	the	Microdata	specification,	as	it	allows	the	RDFa	syntax,	and	the	Schema.org	ontology	to	
enter	into	connections	with	other	data	assemblages,	in	this	case	the	Open	Vocab	ontology.	
When	unspecified	by	a	prefix,	the	parser	reverts	back	to	Schema.org	in	this	case	since	it	is	pre-
defined	in	the	standard	itself.	In	practice,	this	can	become	very	complex	as	managing	
compatibility	and	working	across	ontologies	can	lead	to	the	issues	discussed	in	earlier	sections,	
where	types,	classes,	and	definitions	are	treated	or	understood	differently.		
While	compatible,	RDFa	is	not	built	into	the	HTML5	specification	as	is	Microdata.	It	
works	in	a	far	wider	variety	of	languages	and	situated	contexts,	but	it	relies	on	a	parser	being	
able	to	decode	the	RDF	data	model,	not	just	HTML5.	Additionally,	since	it	is	not	directly	
integrated	into	HTML,	one	of	the	most	widely	used	Web	standards,	one	can	reasonably	expect	
that	it	will	be	less	familiar	to	Web	developers,	as	they	would	need	some	additional	training	in	
building	semantic	Web	architecture.	Indeed,	the	data	seem	to	indicate	that	developers	are	
more	familiar	with	Microdata	than	RDFa.	However,	RDFa	does	not	suffer	from	the	same	
problem	with	modeling	reverse	relationships	and	so	does	not	constrain	ontology	development	
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and	use	in	the	same	way.	Similarly,	RDFa	can	support	multiple	types	for	a	single	object	and	so	
some	of	the	problems	of	semantic	hegemony	discussed	above	are	mitigated	with	regards	to	
markup	standards.		
	
5.3	JSON-LD	
Javascript	Object	Notation	(JSON)	is	a	lightweight	and	human	readable	syntax	for	
sending,	receiving,	and	storing	data	on	the	Web.	Since	data	transmission	between	servers	and	
browsers	is	limited	to	text	only,	JSON	provides	a	compact	means	for	transmission	between	
Javascript	objects	on	the	server	and	a	browser	which	can	then	be	embedded	into	HTML	and	
other	formats	and	languages	(W3C	2017).	JSON-LD	is	a	W3C	linked	data	specification	of	the	
JSON	syntax.	Being	JSON	based,	JSON-LD	can	be	parsed	by	any	agent	that	reads	the	JSON	
syntax,	not	strictly	those	that	read	HTML	such	as	Microdata,	or	those	that	can	parse	the	RDF	
data	model	such	as	RDFa.	Moreover,	JSON-LD	is	more	compact	and	easier	to	code	than	the	
other	two	syntaxes.	Rather	than	revising	the	HTML	markup	in	Web	content,	JSON-LD	markup	
can	be	embedded	into	HTML	or	application	environments	as	discrete	objects	making	it	easier	
for	content	developers	to	adopt	semantic	technologies	(Sporny	et	al.	2014).	JSON-LD	is	also	
developed	openly,	and	so	anyone	with	the	inclination	and	ability	to	contribute	to	its	
development	and	modification,	can.	However,	that	openness	can	result	in	its	own	set	of	
problems	and	complications.	Furthermore,	JSON-LD	is	a	good	mechanism	for	adding	semantic	
markup	to	content	when	the	information	environment	and	vocabulary	is	changing,	as	it	is	
relatively	easy	to	update.	However,	there	are	limitations	here	that	are	discussed	below.		
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Figure	10.	JSON-LD	Markup	of	a	Government	Permit	
1. <script type="application/ld+json"> 
2. { 
3.   "@context": "http://schema.org", 
4.   "@type": "GovernmentPermit", 
5.   "issuedBy": { 
6.     "@type": "GovernmentOrganization", 
7.     "name": "Department of Health and Mental Hygiene\"" 
8.   }, 
9.   "issuedThrough": { 
10.     "@type": "GovernmentService", 
11.     "name": "NYC Food Service Establishment Permit Service" 
12.   }, 
13.   "name": "NYC Food Service Establishment Permit", 
14.   "validFor": "", 
15.   "validIn": { 
16.     "@type": "AdministrativeArea", 
17.     "name": "New York" 
18.   } 
19. } 
20. </script> 
Source:	Schema.org	(2017d)	
	
Figure	10.	shows	the	same	original	markup	from	the	Microdata	example	(Figure	6.)	and	
the	RDFa	example	(Figure	8.),	only	in	JSON-LD.	Of	immediate	note	is	the	parsimony	in	the	actual	
markup.	This	snippet	of	code	would	be	embedded	in	a	standard	HTML	document	or	other	code	
script,	as	offset	by	the	specification	of	the	script	type	and	curled	brackets	(lines	1-2).	As	with	
the	other	markup	standards,	we	see	that	context	is	initially	supplied	by	Schema.org	(Line	3).	
Furthermore,	each	ensuing	part	of	the	initial	markup	example	is	clearly	and	cleanly	encoded	by	
the	appropriate	Schema.org	types,	classes,	and	properties.	In	JSON-LD	the	ampersand	indicates	
to	a	parser	to	deference	the	contextual	IRI	followed	by	the	specific	add-on	in	the	ensuing	
quotations.	These	code	forms	following	each	ampersand	are	digital	objects	that	enact	a	sort	of	
protocological	control	that	specifies	and	permits	only	certain	expected	values	(Galloway	2004,	
2006).	The	specified	IRI	is	then	used	to	establish	the	rest	of	the	semantic	string.	For	example,	
"@type":	"GovernmentOrganization",	indicates	that	the	agent	should	parse	
“http://schema.org/GovernmentOrganization”	to	establish	is	subject,	object,	predicate	relation	
set.	The	“GovernmentOrganizaiton”	subject,	has	the	expected	property,	or	predicate,	“name”	
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which	expects	a	literal	value,	in	this	case	“Department	of	Health	and	Mental	Hygiene”.	This	
simulates	the	general	RDF	data	model	used	in	the	semantic	web,	without	actually	being	the	
formal	RDF	model.	Of	note,	however,	is	that	one	could	add	an	additional	property	to	the	string	
by	adding	the	expected	property,	“URL”,	with	an	appropriate	value.	This	would	effectively	
create	an	RDF	triple	where	each	subject,	object,	and	predicate	was	uniquely	referenced	by	an	
IRI.	As	we	will	see	below,	however,	simply	adding	additional	properties	that	deference	IRIs,	can	
conflict	with	the	context	file	and	invalidate	markup.		
	
Figure	11.	JSON-LD	Markup	Using	Multiple	Ontologies	
 
1. [ 
2.   { 
3.     "@context": "http://example.org/contexts/person.jsonld", 
4.     "name": "Manu Sporny", 
5.     "homepage": "http://manu.sporny.org/", 
6.     "depiction": "http://twitter.com/account/profile_image/manusporny" 
7.   }, 
8.   { 
9.     "@context": "http://example.org/contexts/place.jsonld", 
10.     "name": "The Empire State Building", 
11.     "description": "The Empire State Building is a 102-story landmark in New York City.", 
12.     "geo": { 
13.       "latitude": "40.75", 
14.       "longitude": "73.98" 
15.     } 
16.   } 
17. ] 
 
Source:	Sporny	(2014)	
	
Like	RDFa,	JSON-LD	is	mobile	and	can	also	be	used	with	multiple	vocabularies.	Figure	11.	
shows	an	illustrative	example	where	the	context	for	“name”,	“homepage”,	and	“depiction”	are	
supplied	by	the	fictional	IRI	specified	in	the	initial	@context	declaration	(Lines	3-6).	It	shows	a	
second	context	used	to	supply	“name”,	“description”,	“geo”,	“latitude”,	and	“longitude”	from	
the	second	specified	@context	declaration	(lines	9-14).	This	would	likely	be	done	to	remedy	
gaps	in	semantic	coverage	from	the	first	contextual	ontology.	This	ontology	about	“persons”,	
would	be	unlikely	to	cover	locations,	their	descriptions,	or	their	geographic	coordinates.	
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Likewise,	the	second	contextual	vocabulary	about	place,	would	be	unlikely	to	cover	people	and	
their	descriptions.	Where	semantic	ontologies	are	very	limited	in	scope	this	can	be	useful	
strategy,	made	all	the	easier	with	JSON-LD,	as	it	allows	context	to	be	defined	local	to	the	syntax	
and	from	multiple	namespaces.	However,	in	this	example,	there	are	overlaps	between	the	
“name”	property.	While	in	this	fabricated	example	drawn	from	the	W3C	specification	
document,	“name”	would	not	likely	be	defined	in	drastically	different	ways	across	the	two	
ontologies,	it	sets	up	a	point	of	potential	conflict	in	the	markup	strategy.	For	instance,	“name”	
in	the	place	vocabulary,	may	specifically	indicate	that	it	is	looking	for	the	name	of	a	location	as	
defined	by	a	standards	organization	or	it	may	expect	an	IRI	or	set	of	G.P.S.	coordinates	as	a	
value,	not	a	simple	text	string.	Moreover,	recall	that	the	@syntax,	while	a	mechanism	for	
establishing	IRI	indication,	is	also	a	control	protocol	that	establishes	acceptable	conditions.	
These	protocols	must	be	in	alignment	with	the	expectations	of	each	ontology	separately	and	
each	ontology	combined	for	the	multiple	semantic	data	assemblages	to	successfully	connect.	
These	differences	can,	and	sometimes	do,	invalidate	markup	and	create	representations	that	
deviate	from	their	modeled	reality.	In	the	JSON-LD	specification,	when	item	overlap	occurs,	the	
parser	defaults	to	a	“last	in”	override.	In	this	case,	a	parser	would	not	use	the	context	file	from	
“person”	to	define	“name”	(Lines	3-4),	but	would	instead	use	the	context	file	from	“place”	(Line	
9)	to	define	both	“name”	specifications	(Lines	4	&	10).	This	means	that	a	developer	must	
account	for	the	full	coverage,	the	structural	relationships,	expected	values,	and	underlying	
semantics	of	any	ontology	that	they	include	in	their	markup.	This	complication	increases	in	its	
affect	as	ontologies	consolidate,	become	broader	based,	and	grow	larger.	Of	further	note,	this	
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context	specification	(Lines	3	&	9)	can	all	occur	on	the	same	initial	line,	i.e.	both	person	and	
place	context	files	could	appear	on	line	3.			
Of	course,	JSON-LD,	while	the	preferred	markup	standard	by	Schema.org,	contains	
additional	limitations	that	constrain	the	development	and	use	of	the	vocabulary.	Embedded	
JSON	objects	add	extra	file	size	for	each	page,	and	this	makes	parsing	it	more	computationally	
expensive.	This	added	expense	can	create	performance	problems	for	smaller	and	older	
processors,	or	internet	connections	with	lower	bandwidth.	This	added	expense	is	another	
factor	that	can	contribute	to	Schema.org’s	de	facto	status	as	the	standard	semantic	web	
ontology.	Not	only	is	it	easier	to	ensure	semantic	coherence	when	one	is	drawing	on	a	single	
vocabulary,	but	it	is	also	less	computationally	expensive	to	only	have	to	download	one	context	
file	each	time	a	webpage	is	parsed.		
	 	
5.4	Effects	on	Ontology	Development		
Schema.org’s	ontologists	must	continuously	grapple	with	the	affordances	and	
constraints	provided	by	the	three	markup	standards.	Moreover,	they	also	must	balance	these	
affordances	and	constraints	against	their	approach	to	ontology	development	and	their	specific	
data	model.	These	conflicts	and	limitations	most	often	rest	in	the	background	and	do	not	visibly	
affect	development	and	use.	However,	sometimes,	these	affordances	and	constraints	work	
against	their	modus	operendi,	their	applied	data	model,	their	ability	to	make	the	world	
machine-readable,	and	ultimately	their	ability	to	construct	a	world	of	semantic	data.	
Until	somewhat	recently,	Schema.org	over-determined	all	service	provision,	operation,	
production,	and	performance	in	explicitly	commercial	terms.	Their	way	of	representing	the	
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provision	of	services,	goods,	performances,	and	the	production	of	creative	works,	among	other	
things,	was	to	subsume	these	types	under	the	seller	property.	As	mentioned,	this	had	the	
unintended	effect	of	capturing	non-commercial	activities	under	a	commercial	rubric,	with	all	of	
the	attendant	assumptions	and	properties	that	the	seller	property	brings	to	those	semantics.	As	
a	solution,	one	of	the	steering	group	members	proposed	that	they	adapt	the	provider	property	
to	cover	non-commercial	relations,	notably,	for	this	example	was	coverage	for	library	holdings.	
Problematically,	this	change	would	alter	the	inheritance	paths	for	some	other	existing	
properties	and	markup,	as	well	as	increasing	the	complexity	of	adopting	the	markup	in	further	
use	cases.	Ultimately,	the	group	settled	on	another	steering	group	member’s	suggestion	that	
they	recycle	the	existing	property	makesOffer	as	a	property	type	between	the	types	person	
and/or	organization,	redefining	it	as	“a	pointer	to	products	or	services	offered	by	the	
organization	or	person.”			
There	are	three	substantial	issues	that	arise	from	this	change.	The	first	issue	relates	to	
the	application	of	the	Schema.org	data	model	and	increased	complexity,	while	the	second	issue	
is	a	complication	stemming	from	the	first.	Both	of	these	two	issues	will	be	discussed	in	the	next	
chapter.	The	issue	most	relevant	here,	however,	is	in	the	directionality	of	the	makesOffer	
property.	As	a	solution,	makesOffer	was	an	elegant	way	to	resolve	the	initial	problem,	as	the	
ontologists	only	needed	to	encourage	its	use	by	developers	and	to	modify	the	
recommendations	and	wording	on	the	property’s	page	to	fit	the	new	use	context.	However,	
makesOffer	is	unidirectional.	A	person	or	organization	can	make	an	offer	of	type	offer	of	any	
large	number	of	types,	products,	services,	etc.	each	with	their	own	modifying	terms	and	
properties.	An	agent	might	interpret	this	and	display	a	list	of	associated	services	and	functions	
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but	have	no	ability	to	see	the	inverse	relationship	unless	an	inverse	were	allowed	or	specifically	
specified.	This	means	that	if	an	agent	were	to	parse	the	thing	offered,	it	would	not	be	able	to	
traverse	the	relationship	graph	to	determine	that	it	was	an	offer	and	who	or	what	was	making	
the	offer.	Potential	use	cases	include	severing	the	link	between	outpatient	services	and	the	
hospital	that	offers	those	services,	as	well	as	searching	for	a	book	title	but	not	being	able	to	
connect	the	search	to	the	library	in	which	the	title	was	located,	among	many	others,	as	this	
property	has	between	10,000	and	50,000	use	domains.		
As	discussed	earlier,	RDFa	and	JSON-LD	both	natively	contain	the	ability	to	represent	
inverse	properties.	This	means	that	an	agent	can	parse	any	content	in	any	direction	when	that	
content	is	marked	up	with	either	one	of	the	two	standards,	providing	that	the	agent	can	parse	
those	syntaxes.	Microdata,	on	the	other	hand,	does	not	include	that	ability.	Microdata’s	
inability	to	encode	reverse	properties	comes	with	a	good	deal	of	consternation	among	the	
ontologists,	as	two	contributors	note,	“I'm	all	for	reverse	property	mechanisms	but	as	far	as	I'm	
aware	@itemprop-reverse	isn't	part	of	the	html5	specs…	[m]eaning	microdata	is	left	behind	
with	this	solution”	and	“well,	RDFa	defines	@rev	and	JSON-LD	defines	@reverse	so	it's	really	
only	microdata	hanging	out	there”.	While	some	contributors	echoed	familiar	refrains	about	
beginning	the	process	of	deprecating	Microdata	like,	“and	anyway,	JSON-LD	is	the	new	king	in	
town.	RDFa	will	retire	and	go	to	the	Guggenheim	Foundation	for	its	abstract	beauty	and	
Microdata	to	NASA's	Houston	Space	Center	for	its	practical	impact”,	others	make	note	of	its	
seemingly	unfortunate	continued	relevance	to	their	work,	despite	its	limitations.	Microdata	is	
the	most	frequently	used	of	the	markup	standards,	a	fact	that	some	contributors	point	to	as	a	
counter	to	deprecation	noting,	“[u]nfortunately,	no	matter	how	much	we	denigrate	other	
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serialization	approaches,	a	significant	proportion	of	the	adopters	of	Schema.org	are	wedded	to	
Microdata”	and	“I	should	check	with	[name]	or	[name]	before	claiming	Yandex	is	satisfied,	
given	the	relatively	high	amount	of	microdata	in	[R]unet”.		
Here,	we	can	see	the	frustration	that	ontologists	have	over	the	constraints	that	markup	
standards	place	on	their	work,	in	this	particular	case,	Microdata.	To	resolve	this	issue,	
ontologists	had	to	break	with	their	design	principles	and	data	model	to	create	an	additional	and	
separate	reverse	property,	offeredBy.	This	same	problem	pervades	much	vocabulary	
development	where	the	ontologists	are	trying	to	model	inverse	relationships.	Additionally,	by	
simplifying	the	markup	to	the	Organization	or	Person	->	makesOffer	->	Offer	->	itemOffered	->	
Product	pathway,	they	are	creating	added	markup	for	Web	developers	that	use	Microdata.	Not	
only	will	Web	developers	need	to	add	a	separate	property	to	model	the	inverse	relationship,	
they	will	also	need	to	specify	a	new	itemtype,	“href”,	and	their	associated	unique	IRIs	since	each	
offer	would	now	require	the	code	to	model	the	inverse	as	a	separate	feature	of	the	markup.	
The	impact	of	this	constraint	is	potentially	severe,	as	the	data	indicates	that	not	only	is	
Microdata	the	most	common	markup	standard,	but	it	also	generates	the	most	questions	from	
Web	developers.	In	each	case,	they	are	confronted	by	three	options.	They	can	create	an	
additional	property,	breaking	with	their	stated	desire	for	simplicity	and	parsimony.	They	can	
refer	Web	developers	to	alternate	markup	standards,	a	complication	discussed	later.	
Alternatively,	they	can	refer	users	to	the	experimental	@itemprop-reverse	syntax.	
This	last	option	deserves	additional	discussion.	Recently,	advice	has	been	to	use	the	
experimental	syntax,	rather	than	encoding	reverse	properties	in	the	ontology.	This	
experimental	syntax	is	not	a	part	of	the	official	specification	and	thus	sees	more	limited	use	
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across	the	Web.		Presented	with	the	continual	problem	of	encoding	reverse	relationships	in	
markup,	some	of	Schema.org’s	ontologists	worked	through	the	limitation	and	enacted	an	
unofficial	change	in	the	markup	standard	to	suit	the	designs	of	the	ontology.	If	and	when	this	
syntactical	change	occurs	at	the	official	level,	the	already	developed	reverse	properties	will	
eventually	be	deprecated,	invalidating	existing	markup.	While	this	change	would	be	in	the	best	
interests	of	both	users	and	ontologists	alike,	it	is	a	complication	for	enacting	machine	
readability.	It	also	makes	a	questionable	assumption	that	Web	developers	keep	up	with	the	
latest	Microdata	specifications.		
Another	major	issue	mentioned	to	earlier,	is	that	Microdata	does	not	allow	for	multiple	
types	for	a	single	object	where	that	object	exists	across	ontologies	or	when	property	use	is	not	
the	same	for	each	type	in	the	multiple	type	entity.	This	adds	a	major	constraint	to	both	
ontologists	and	Web	developers	alike,	ultimately	leading	to	both	ontological	over-
determination	and	ontic	occlusion.	For	example,	in	Schema.org,	many	classes	are	listed	as	
subclasses	of	product	–	any	class	that	could	be	viewed	as	a	product	to	be	offered,	sold,	
performed	–	even	though	they	may	also	be	represented	in	non-product	contexts.	This	limitation	
is	significant	because	the	inheritances,	expected	types,	properties,	and	values	of	the	product	
class	do	not	include	the	same	ones	relevant	to	other	classes	and	will	cause	validation	issues	
when	the	expected	classes,	which	are	not	applicable	or	available	in	a	non-product	context,	are	
not	satisfied.	That	is,	the	real-world	characteristics	of	non-products	are	not	necessarily	the	
same	as	those	of	products,	and	cannot	legitimately	be	coerced	to	be	so	in	the	markup.	In	one	
broadly	applicable	and	often	cited	issue	relating	to	the	problem	of	commercial	over-
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determination	and	multiple	types,	the	Schema.org	ontologists	indicated	the	following	needed	
changes	to	completely	address	the	issue:	
• We	must	establish	it	as	a	standard	that	products	are	multi-typed	entities	in	
examples	etc.	
• All	major	consumers	of	schema.org	markup	can	process	multi-typed	entities.	
• Move	all	subtypes	of	Product	up	to	Thing	or	a	branch	thereof.	
• Move	up	all	properties	of	Product	that	are	not	tied	to	the	Product	role	up	to	that	
subtype(s)	of	Thing	(e.g.	weight).	
• Update	descriptions	and	examples.	
	
This	solution	requires	that	the	ontologists	move	all	of	the	subtypes	and	properties	of	Product	to	
the	level	of	Thing.	This	seemingly	simple	solution	is	actually	a	fundamental	reorganization	of	
the	way	that	the	ontology	is	ordered.	The	Thing	class	is	the	root	level	of	the	ontology,	it	is	the	
most	basic	class	with	the	most	basic	set	of	types	and	properties.	All	artifacts	in	the	ontology	
inherit	the	types	and	properties	of	the	Thing	class.	Moving	these	product	subtypes	to	this	level	
would	not	only	invalidate	a	large	amount	of	existing	markup,	but	it	would	also	either	over-
determine	content	as	a	product	and	in	the	Microdata	contexts,	occlude	all	other	possible	types,	
or	require	that	all	subtypes	contain	the	same	set	of	product	related	properties,	even	in	non-
product	contexts.	Unsurprisingly	this	potential	solution	to	the	multiple	types	problem	was	met	
with	resistance	and	lament	for	Microdata’s	continuous	effect	on	development,	with	some	
finding	“it	very	unfortunate	that	we	seem	to	keep	struggling	with	limitations	of	Microdata.”	In	
this	example,	markup	standards	are	directly	inhibiting	the	ability	to	semantically	encode	
information.	Using	the	Microdata	standard,	one	is	left	with	the	options	of	over-determining	
content	as	a	product,	thus	occluding	other	more	accurate	data	or	not	creating	semantic	
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content,	and	where	all	search	is	now	semantic	search,	this	creates	an	entirely	new	set	of	
problems	for	a	Web	developer.		
There	are	times	where	seemingly	small	constraints	imposed	by	markup	standards	have	
major	reverberations	throughout	ontology	development.	In	one	issue,	a	steering	group	
member	noted	a	general	guidance	problem	with	respect	to	encoding	languages	in	markup.	The	
problem	is	that,	in	some	cases,	guidance	directed	users	to	use	the	formal	language	and	in	
others	informal	abbreviations,	a	problem	complicated	by	the	diverse	understanding	of	language	
that	Schema.org	needs	to	attend	to	(addressed	in	the	next	chapter).	Another	steering	group	
member	made	the	following	proposal:	
To	be	frank,	I	think	the	handling	of	language	information	was	much	better	in	the	strict	
RDF	worlds	where	any	plain	literal	could	have	a	language	tag,	so	it	was	straight	forward	
to	represent	alternative	texts	for	the	same	property	depending	on	the	language.	Of	all	
relevant	syntaxes	for	schema.org,	only	Microdata	lacks	this	feature	AFAIK.	Why	don't	we	
simply	recommend	RDFa	or	JSON-LD	for	use-cases	that	require	language	meta-data?	
That	seems	much	better	to	me	that	introducing	a	mechanism	at	the	level	of	the	
vocabulary.	
	
Here,	this	member	notes	the	limitations	of	the	Microdata	standard	in	adding	meta	tags	to	tell	
the	parser	what	language	a	given	set	of	content	is	in.	Rather	than	hard	coding	complexity	and,	
perhaps	more	importantly,	constraints	into	the	ontology,	this	member	proposes	that	the	
ontologists	shift	the	responsibility	for	language	tagging	to	the	users.	For	this	particular	
suggestion,	that	responsibility	shift	is	substantial.	The	data	indicates	that	using	semantic	
markup	is	challenging	and	fraught	with	confusion.	While	selection	bias	and	other	issues	of	
representation	in	the	data	do	not	allow	me	to	generalize,	certain	standards	seem	to	be	more	
confusing	than	others.	The	challenges	of	markup,	and	drawing	on	semantic	ontologies	in	
general,	are	often	noted	in	the	data	for	reasons	of	understanding	the	underlying	application	of	
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the	RDF	data	model,	the	depth	of	class-type-property	hierarchies,	differences	in	expected	
values,	and	the	affordances	and	constraints	imposed	by	markup	standards.	So,	a	suggestion	for	
a	shift	in	responsibility	to	the	user	is	an	uncommon	occurrence,	one	that	actually	goes	against	
Schema.org’s	collective	development	philosophy	of	making	the	ontology	as	simple	as	possible	
for	Web	developers.	Moreover,	suggesting	that	in	particular	use	cases,	users	work	around	the	
problem	and	adopt	different	markup	standards	in	different	use	cases	is	problematic.		
Technically	speaking,	there	is	nothing	the	prohibits	a	developer	from	using	all	of	the	
syntaxes	on	the	same	page	or	even	to	describe	the	same	thing.	However,	differences	and	the	
cross-compatibility	issues	described	earlier,	mean	that	there	will	likely	be	information	loss	or	
confusion	on	the	part	of	whatever	parser	is	looking	at	the	markup.	This	is	particularly	the	case	if	
one	were	to	use	multiple	syntaxes	to	mark	a	single	piece	of	content.	In	fact,	both	Google	and	
Microsoft’s	documentation	for	building	semantic	data	into	a	webpage	is	very	clear	about	this	
(Bing	2017;	Google	2017).	Moreover,	the	added	time,	knowledge	requirements,	and	complexity	
means	that	the	likelihood	of	error	is	increased	and	the	ability	of	a	given	computational	agent	to	
parse	the	content	is	reduced.	So,	assuming	that	one	needs	to	mark	their	content,	in	this	
example	the	constraints	imposed	by	Microdata	make	it	so	that	one	either	shifts	their	usage	
patterns,	which	is	difficult	and	time-consuming	or	adopt	a	second	standard,	which	can	create	
compatibility	issues	and	information	loss.	Alternatively,	the	ontologists	can	restructure	the	
ontology	around	the	combined	affordances	of	the	standards	or	operate	with	those	known	
restrictions.	I	find	that	the	ontologists	most	often	either	try	to	negotiate	with	those	restrictions	
by	either	developing	around	the	constraints	and	allowing	generalized	and	bricolage	type	
approaches	to	markup,	or	by	allowing	the	issue	to	persist	pending	further	work.		
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In	this	particular	case,	the	constrains	imposed	by	Microdata	opened	up	further	issues	
relating	to	the	encoding	languages.	As	one	steering	group	member	notes,	
	
[Y]ou're	missing	the	leading	use	case	for	the	Language	type:	the	many	other	contexts	in	
which	it	is	useful	to	mention	and	name	languages,	beyond	annotation	of	sections	of	
textual	markup.	For	examples	see	the	incoming	properties	section	at	bottom	
of	http://schema.org/Language:	
• http://schema.org/availableLanguage	(of	a	ServiceChannel,	ContactPoint)	
• http://schema.org/inLanguage	(of	a	CreativeWork,	Event,	etc.)	
• http://schema.org/programmingLanguage	(on	SoftwareSourceCode)	
• http://schema.org/subtitleLanguage	(Movie,	ScreeningEvent,	TVEpisode)	
In	all	these	cases	we	might	have	an	informal	name	for	a	language,	or	(for	human	
languages)	a	code	from	https://tools.ietf.org/html/bcp47	or	perhaps	a	Wikipedia	
link.	
	
While	using	different	markup	standards	to	encode	language	metadata	will	solve	the	original	
issue,	this	member	is	noting	that	the	suggestion	to	simply	advise	users	to	use	alternate	markup	
standards	does	not	fully	solve	the	problems	of	language.	They	point	to	the	leading	use	case	of	
language	markup	as	being	relevant	to	a	wide	subset	of	different	usage	domains,	not	simply	
marking	the	natural	human	language	of	a	given	set	of	content.	Here,	it	is	evident	that	language	
markup	can	refer	to	that	language	used	on	a	webpage,	that	language	a	service	or	content	is	
available	in,	the	language	used	in	a	creative	work	or	event,	the	computer	language	used	in	a	
piece	of	software,	or	the	language	used	or	available	for	subtitles,	among	other	language	uses	
that	are	in	development.	
While	many	of	these	differences	can	be	resolved	by	specifying	best	practices	and	
clarifying	guidance,	some	cannot.	One	member	summarizes	the	issue	thusly,		
Regarding	programmingLanguage,	which	has	as	its	expected	type	Language,	I	believe	
this	is	an	awkward	conflation	of	"language"	in	the	conventional	sense	of	"conventional	
human	languages"	with	computer	programming	"language",	"a	system	of	signs	for	
encoding	and	decoding	information".	They're	clearly	quite	different	things,	which	is	why	
one	won't	find	C++	in	BCP	47…	IMO	the	expected	type	for	programmingLanguage	
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should	not	be	Language,	but	Text.	(Absent,	say,	an	enumerated	value	or	code	for	
programmingLanguage	-	but	the	former	is	unwieldy	and	has	extensibility	issues,	and	for	
the	latter	no	standard,	AFAIK,	exists.	This	is	not	the	case	for	human	languages,	which	are	
unlikely	to	be	extended	and	are	supported	by	standards	like	BCP	47).	
	
This	member	is	drawing	attention	to	the	fact	that	programmingLanguage	expects	a	language	
type	as	allowed	by	the	adopted	standard,	which	is	a	problem	where	the	ontology	expects	a	link	
to	the	Internet	Engineering	Task	Force	(IETF)	BCP	47	standard	in	order	to	be	compliant.	As	the	
community	member	notes,	C++	and	other	computer	languages	are	not	included	in	natural	
language	standards	like	IETF	BCP	47.	Relatedly	encoding	programming	language	either	
overcodes	differences	in	things	like	HTML	which	are	not	really	considered	programming	
languages,	but	rather	a	representational	script,	or	omits	them	from	the	ontology	altogether.	At	
the	moment	those	pseudo-computer	languages	are	omitted	from	markup	coverage	due	to	the	
complexity	of	modeling	the	distinguishing	between	representational	script	and	programming	
languages.	Here	such	differences	are	occluded.		
The	problems	ontologists	and	Web	developers	encounter	are	not	limited	to	Microdata,	
as	another	limitation	to	resolving	this	issue	is	that	JSON-LD	does	not	permit	language	to	be	
declared	by	an	IRI,	as	would	be	common	practice	in	semantic	web	markup.	Instead,	JSON-LD’s	
@language	specification	expects	text	only.	This	means	that	the	@language	type	could	not	be	
meaningfully	used	for	something	like	computer	language	or	programming	language	as	declared	
in	the	Schema.org	ontology,	as	those	are	links	to	both	ontology	contexts,	and	to	specific	use	
cases.	This	also	means	that	language	for	JSON-LD	has	limited	machine	understanding	since	a	
parser	cannot	use	JSON-LD	markup	to	point	to	a	relevant	or	equivalent	case	as	defined	by	an	
IRI.	In	the	Schema.org	context,	the	@language	feature	of	the	JSON-LD	specification	prohibits	
	121	
translating	the	variety	of	languages	in	a	way	that	is	machine-readable	if	one	is	trying	to	declare	
a	language	specification.	
To	negotiate	these	limitations,	ontologists	created	a	new	language	type	called	
computerLanguage,	updated	the	language	term	in	the	ontology	to	note	that	former	uses	may	
have	included	programmingLanguage	(in	effect	requiring	old	markup	to	be	corrected),	updated	
the	programmingLanguage	to	expect	both	the	new	computerLanguage	link	and	text	strings	(to	
account	for	JSON-LD’s	limitations),	and	added	the	IETF	BCP	47	standard	to	the	expected	natural	
language	types	with	the	added	property	value	alternateName	to	include	deviations	from	the	
IETF	BCP	47	standard.	This	works	around	the	limitation	by	creating	a	new	type	to	avoid	the	
association	of	parsed	language	in	use,	indicated	by	@language,	and	language	used	by	marked	
content.	Some	of	these	changes	are	significant	in	that	using	markup	to	indicate	text	strings	is	
not	creating	semantic	data.	It	merely	creates	a	structured	presentation	mechanism	for	a	parser.	
The	computational	agent	has	no	understanding	or	reference	for	that	content.		
While	many	semantic	web	standards	allow	for	the	bricolage	of	different	vocabularies,	
they	have	trouble	when	terms	overlap.	As	mentioned	earlier,	in	JSON-LD	you	can	supply	
multiple	namespaces	for	vocabulary	context.	However,	it	uses	a	“last	in,	first	out”	method	of	
handing	cases	of	term	overlap.	This	means	that	if	a	publisher	were	to	mark	content	with	the	
specific	semantics	of	the	first	namespace	and	other	content	with	the	second	if	that	second	
namespace	contained	the	type	or	property	used	to	mark	the	instance	from	the	first	namespace,	
it	would	overwrite	the	markup	that	was	originally	declared	using	the	first	namespace.	This	
would	happen	regardless	of	the	semantic	differences	between	uses	in	the	two	vocabularies.	
While	in	some	instances,	this	is	a	non-issue,	in	other	cases	this	might	result	in	more	serious	
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problems.	In	either	case,	however,	the	standard	puts	the	interoperability	between	ontologies	at	
risk,	and	thus	endangers	a	major	feature	of	the	semantic	web.	It	also	risks	reducing	the	
semantic	coherence	between	a	user’s	intent	and	computational	agent’s	interpretation.	The	risk	
is	furthered	where	deep	understandings	of	JSON-LD	are	missing,	and/or	sophisticated	
knowledge	of	the	various	ontologies	is	lacking.	While	the	data	is	likely	to	have	some	bias	
towards	misunderstanding,	given	that	those	who	understand	are	less	likely	to	ask	questions,	
queries	about	markup	standards	and	ontology	details	are	commonplace,	and	the	ontologists	
frequently	discuss	the	problems	that	the	complexity	of	ontologies	and	markup	standards	bring	
to	their	proper	use.	Data	also	indicates	that	in	many	cases,	even	sophisticated	core	community	
members	have	trouble	understanding	proper	class	type	usage	and	inheritance	paths.		
While	the	standards	implicated	here,	particularly	RDFa	and	JSON-LD,	are	linked	data	
standards,	their	specific	implementations	and	promotions	through	Schema.org	obscure	that	
ability.	My	investigation	revealed	almost	no	mention	of	linking	to	other	ontologies,	no	examples	
of	best	practices	for	interlinking,	or	in	the	advice	to	that	effect	on	the	community	board.	The	
main	exceptions	were	when	linking	to	directly	associated	extensions.	This	includes	the	various	
internally	developed	and	hosted	extensions,	the	externally	hosted,	but	compatible	GS1	
extension,	which	was	developed	with	input	from	the	Schema.org	community.	The	other	
exception	was	when	linking	to	the	Wikidata	database,	which	is	externally	hosted	and	developed	
but	is	in	the	process	of	being	mapped	for	cross	compatibility	with	Schema.org.		
It	is	important	to	note	at	point	that	this	is	not	attributing	any	form	of	intent	on	the	part	
of	the	ontologists	or	their	associated	organizations,	but	that	certain	unintended	consequences	
can	emerge	from	the	limitations	these	markup	standards	contain	especially	when	those	
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standards	are	used	across	large	scale	ontologies	that	are	likely	to	have	a	large	amount	of	
overlapping	coverage.	One	consequence	for	users	is	that	one	can	either	stay	strictly	within	the	
approved	Schema.org	universe	or	manage	the	potential	complexity	and	incompatibility	of	
multiple	vocabularies.	This	also	means	that	ontologists	looking	to	extend	or	map	their	existing	
vocabularies	to	Schema.org	need	to	do	so	nearly	exactly.	Furthermore,	any	of	these	
compatibility	mappings	need	to	harmonize	across	external	extensions,	internal	extensions,	and	
the	core	vocabulary.	This	all	makes	creating	and	using	ontologies	very	difficult	and	in	many	
ways,	counter	to	the	original	aims	of	the	semantic	web	(Berners-Lee	at	al.	2001).	
Recall	that	markup	standards	either	directly	deference	an	IRI	for	each	individual	subject,	
object,	and	predicate,	or	set	an	initial	context(s)	through	which	they	establish	the	definition	of	
terms,	properties,	and	relationships.	Particularly	for	JSON-LD,	that	means	that	all	context	needs	
to	be	supplied	in	each	case,	or	available	from	a	publicly	hosted	server	requiring	that	any	
ontology	have	the	ability	to	host	a	file	in	a	way	that	can	sustain	potentially	significant	levels	of	
Web	traffic,	as	each	time	a	piece	of	markup	was	parsed,	the	computational	agent	would	
request	the	hosting	page.	Indeed,	this	was	an	early	concern	among	some	of	the	Schema.org	
developers	while	JSON-LD	was	being	created.		As	it	stands	now,	Schema.org	does	host	a	context	
document.	This	context	file	also	includes	the	entire	range	of	other	vocabularies	that	have	
compatibility	with	Schema.org.	This	effectively	gives	Web	developers	two	choices:	provide	IRIs	
for	each	context	file,	dealing	with	the	added	complexity	and	room	for	error	that	such	an	
approach	entails,	or	use	Schema.org’s	context	file	and	associated	vocabularies.	This	can	have	
the	unintended	effect	of	implicitly	forcing	the	semantic	web	community	of	users	to	abandon	
the	more	complicated,	but	potentially	more	expressive,	and	diverse	set	of	ontologies	in	favor	of	
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a	smaller	set	that	have	become	a	de	facto	standard.	This	also	has	the	effect	of	forcing	
ontologists	to	contribute	to	Schema.org’s	set	of	ontologies,	develop	their	own	in	accordance	
with	Schema.org’s	extension	guidelines,	or	risk	disuse	and	conflict	with	one	of	the	most	widely	
used	and	supported	platforms.	As	the	de	facto	semantic	web	standard,	their	choices	become	
everyone’s	choices	providing	that	a	Web	or	application	developer	wants	search	engine	
exposure	or	the	ability	to	parse	the	largest	set	of	semantic	data.	As	one	community	member	
put	it	“for	me	and	my	coworkers,	Schema.org	is	the	semantic	web.”		
Ontologists	and	developers	alike	use	validation	tools	to	ensure	that	their	markup	
conforms	to	the	dictates	of	the	relevant	standards	and	will	be	legible	to	content	consumers.	
Problematically,	however,	these	validation	tools	can	come	to	disagreements	in	how	they	parse	
content.	This	issue	is	most	relevant	to	JSON-LD	markup.	The	underlying	problem	is	not	
specifically	a	problem	of	the	standard,	the	parser,	or	the	ontology,	but	emerges	from	the	
interaction	of	the	three.	The	parser	downloads	and	interprets	the	relevant	context	file	at	the	
first	stage	of	the	JSON-LD	syntax.	From	there	it	uses	the	context	file	to	interpret	the	terms,	
objects,	and	values	given	by	the	JSON-LD	markup.	These	items	are	the	ones	in	the	syntax	with	
ampersands	preceding	them.	They	indicate	to	the	parser	what	to	expect	as	an	input	based	on	
the	dictates	of	both	the	context	file,	which	dereferences	the	ontology,	and	the	syntax	rules	of	
JSON-LD.	A	steering	group	member	explains	one	problem	as	such,		
Currently	the	context	file…	has	this:	"namedPosition":	{	"@type":	"@id"	}	...	because	an	
URL	is	a	possible	value.	However,	text	is	also	a	possible	value,	and	currently	more	likely.	
The	problem	is	that	the	JSON-LD	context	forces	the	property	value	to	be	interpreted	as	
a	(possible	relative)	URI	reference,	hence	in	http://json-ld.org/playground/	the	value	
shows	up	relative	to	the	site	the	data's	on:	We	could	over-ride	this,	e.g.	using:	
"namedPosition":	{	"@value":	"Quarterback"	}	Or	we	could	change	the	context	for	this	
property	(and	others?),	so	that	literal	values	are	the	default.	But	then	we'd	need	to	use	
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(something	like)	this	notation	for	controlled	values:	"namedPosition":	{	"@id":	
"http://sport-vocabs.example.org/Quarterback"	}	
	
This	steering	group	member	is	explaining	that	in	the	context	file	for	the	given	property	(there	
are	many	more	affected	than	indicated	in	this	excerpt),	the	@type	tag	is	expecting	an	IRI	
preceded	by	the	@id	tag.	In	JSON-LD,	the	@id	in	@type	objects	must	always	be	an	IRI	or	a	term	
from	the	ontology	that	is	implicitly	expanded	to	an	IRI	via	the	function	of	the	ampersand	in	
JSON-LD	syntax.	However,	to	create	maximal	coverage,	Schema.org	allows	many	properties	to	
expect	both	IRIs	and	text.	Problematically,	neither	the	context	file	nor	the	@id	tag	permits	text	
strings	for	these	properties.	As	this	member	mentions,	the	group	could	change	the	context	file	
so	that	the	default	expectation	is	@value	rather	than	@id	so	as	to	indicate	that	a	parser	should	
expect	a	text	string	as	opposed	to	an	IRI.	However,	to	keep	the	value	as	semantic	data,	users	
would	have	to	add	additional	separate	notation	to	point	to	a	specific	IRI.	Currently,	this	issue	is	
still	unresolved	because	the	two	solutions	presented	above	create	different	additional	
complications.	First,	overriding	the	context	file	is	both	unintuitive	and	creates	complicated	
added	markup	for	developers.	Second,	these	specific	overrides	fail	validation	on	two	of	the	
three	primary	validation	tools,	notably	the	widely	used	Google	Structured	Data	Testing	Tool	
(SDTT).	This	means	that	not	only	will	Web	developers	be	unable	to	see	if	their	markup	actually	
works,	but	also	they	will	be	told	by	the	SDTT	that	it	is	not	compliant	for	Google’s	parsers.	Third,	
by	changing	the	context	file,	ontologists	potentially	invalidate	markup	that	already	uses	IRIs	
instead	of	text	strings.	This	data	would	then	be	lost	until	Web	developers	recoded	their	
content.	At	present,	the	current	guidance	is	to	override	the	context	file	by	being	specific	about	
both	@value	and	@id	where	applicable.		
	126	
This	issue	is	significant	because	it	shows	how	markup	standards	interact	with	other	
components	of	the	data	assemblage	to	enact	data	in	specific	ways.	Ontologists	develop	
ontologies	in	specific	ways	that	categorize	and	classify	the	world	and	its	relationships	to	create	
semantic	data.	This	involves	complex	negotiations	with	how	and	why	to	represent	things.	These	
decisions	are	bound	by	the	affordances	and	constraints	of	the	markup	standards	adopted.	
These	standards	impose	constraints	on	the	ways	the	data	assemblage	can	be	enacted,	but	they	
do	not	do	so	absolutely.	The	ontologists	and	Web	developers	negotiate	these	affordances	and	
constraints	to	both	work	around,	through,	and	with	the	markup	standards.	Problematically,	
these	negotiations	occur	within	other	contexts,	levels	of	expertise,	and	means	for	validation	
that	bear	upon	data	creation.						
	
5.7	Conclusion	
This	chapter	detailed	the	general	ways	that	markup	standards	shape	the	development	
and	use	of	the	semantic	web	and	the	specific	ways	that	they	condition	Schema.org	and	its	use.	
Enacting	semantic	translations	is	not	just	a	matter	of	classification.	Classification	work	tells	us	
that	representation	necessarily	leads	to	forms	of	over-determination	and	occlusion	
complexities	are	blunted	and	marginal	cases	are	made	to	fit	into	the	classification	schema	at	
hand.	Schema.org	and	semantic	ontologies	are	no	exception	here.	The	process	of	translation	
from	human	to	machine	is	also	one	of	translating	through	code	standards.	At	times	markup	
standards	block	these	translations	as	they	prohibit	certain	directionality,	plurality,	and	
representational	forms	among	other	things.	The	Web	content	to	be	encoded	may	be	of	a	
certain	static	type,	but	ultimately,	the	particular	markup	standard	that	one	deploys	is	actually	
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what	calls	the	semantic	data	into	existence,	and	it	does	so	in	potentially	different	ways	as	it	
translates	between	the	work	of	ontologists,	Web	developers,	and	computational	agents.	At	
times	the	standards	force	ontologists	to	cater	to	their	constraints,	while	in	other	times	
ontologists	and	users	both,	create	work	arounds	where	they	avoid	direct	engagement	with	the	
standard	and	those	constraints.	Sometimes	this	means	that	they	deploy	a	different	standard	to	
account	for	one’s	limiting	features.	In	others,	they	adjust	their	approach	to	modeling	and	
encoding	content	to	better	match	the	dictates	of	the	standard.	However,	these	actors	also	work	
with	and	through	these	markup	standards,	engaging	directly	with	the	standard	itself.	They	work	
with	the	standard	by	accepting	its	limitations	and	making	subtler	modifications	to	their	practice	
to	enable	other	parts	of	the	markup	standard	to	function	in	ways	other	than	the	standard’s	and	
ontology’s	original	intent.	Here	there	the	negotiation	with	standards	is	one	of	strategic	
compromise	where	the	affordances	and	constraints	of	practices	and	standards	shift	to	enact	
the	translation.	However,	at	times	practitioners	work	through	the	standards,	changing	the	
standard	to	fit	the	needs	of	practice,	even	if	in	unofficial,	or	not	yet	sanctioned	ways.	
	The	resulting	situated	markup	for	a	given	part	of	the	environment	will	potentially	differ	
in	both	form	and	function	for	different	markup	standards	depending	on	the	content	to	be	
encoded	and	the	way	affordances	and	constraints	are	handled.	This	has	an	effect	such	that	the	
specific	ways	that	ontologies	and	standards	are	adapted	to	fit	their	respective	allowances	and	
prohibitions	can	result	in	the	differential	enactment	of	semantic	web	assemblages	and	the	
semantic	data	the	enable.	This	is	especially	the	case	as	ontologies	grow	in	scope	and	size	and	
themselves	take	on	the	role	of	a	standard	(Waller	2016).			
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In	addition	to	affirming	past	work	attesting	to	standards’	jussive	power,	this	chapter	
begins	to	address	the	lacuna	in	the	literature	on	standards	by	showing	the	ways	that	these	
standards	sometimes	work	against	the	very	stability	and	interoperability	that	they	are	
supposed	to	enable.	Furthermore,	I	situated	the	standards	in	the	communities	of	practice	that	
negotiate	those	restrictions,	showing	that	contrary	to	the	divergent	claims	of	prior	work,	
practitioners	work	around,	with,	and	through	standards	to	negotiate	their	failings	(Halpin	2016;	
Whooley	2010,	2014;	Whooley	and	Horwitz	2013).	However,	I	conclude	that	most	often	
practitioners	worked	with	and	through	the	markup	standards.	Here	that	took	the	form	of	
adapting	the	ontology	to	better	accommodate	the	strategic	use	of	the	standard,	overriding	
context	files,	or	deploying	markup	in	ways	that	over-determines	contextual	content.	These	
practitioners	negotiate	the	limitations	of	different	standards	differently	depending	on	the	
standard	implicated,	the	possibility	of	affecting	large	amounts	of	markup,	the	complexity	of	the	
solution	for	the	ontology,	and	the	added	complication	of	a	fix	for	users.	Lastly,	I	detailed	some	
of	the	unintended	consequences	of	those	negotiations	and	how	they	can	serve	to	over-
determine	and	occlude	certain	understandings	of	the	world.	
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6.	Practices,	Rationalities,	and	Communities	
As	noted	earlier,	the	shapes	that	data	assemblages	take	are	dependent	on	the	
interactions	between	the	assemblage’s	components.	Thus,	the	study	of	semantic	data	must	
necessarily	engage	with	the	questions	relating	to	processes	of	creation	and	the	interactions	
between	the	various	components.	Here	I	am	concerned	with	the	specific	apparatuses	that	
include,	systems	of	thought,	practices,	and	communities	that	work	together	to	enact	the	
ontology	(Kitchin	2014b;	Lynch	2013;	Woolgar	and	Lezuan	2013,	2015;	Sismondo	2015).	Within	
these	apparatuses	are	the	conceptual	models,	rationalities,	techniques,	conventions,	and	the	
communities	involved	in	applying	those	systems	of	thinking	and	forms	of	practice	to	the	
process	of	human-machine	translation	(Kitchin	2014b:25).	As	such,	this	chapter	examines	the	
interactions	between	those	various	elements	of	the	Schema.org	data	assemblage.	In	this	
section	I	concentrate	on	the	two	main	communities	of	practice	relevant	to	Schema.org	and	the	
design	philosophies,	habits	of	logic,	and	rationales	they	deploy.	These	two	groups	are	the	
ontologists	charged	with	the	vocabulary’s	creation	and	maintenance,	and	the	Web	developers	
who	deploy	the	vocabulary	to	convert	their	content	into	semantic	data.	This	examination	will	
reveal	the	ways	that	Schema.org	ontologists	adapt	the	RDF	data	model	to	their	specific	needs,	
their	underlying	philosophical	approach	to	modeling	semantic	data,	the	problems	they	
encounter	in	doing	so,	and	the	consequences	of	the	ways	in	which	they	negotiate	those	
problems.	Additionally,	it	will	show	how	interactions	with	the	user	base	affect	those	issues	and	
negotiations.	
This	chapter	contributes	to	gaps	that	exist	in	our	understanding	of	AI	systems.	I	fill	the	
gap	left	by	past	work	that	ignores	translations	between	humans	and	machines	in	its	focus	on	
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the	translation	between	different	experts,	and	the	interpretations	of	machine	output	by	users	
(Agre	1995;	Collins	1990;	Forsythe	1993;	Ribes	and	Bowker	2009;	Suchman	1987).	Rather	than	
seeing	knowledge	as	something	easily	extracted	or	converted	to	machine	understanding,	the	
Schema.org	ontologists	recognize	the	difficulty	their	task.	While	the	knowledge	engineers	in	
past	work	see	the	problem	as	simply	one	of	managing	human	description	errors	and	extracting	
the	“correct”	knowledge,	these	ontologists	see	the	problem	as	a	matter	of	pragmatics.	They	
understand	that	they	are	choosing	the	terms	and	relations,	and	understand	that	a	trade-off	
between	precision	and	practicality	is	usually	inevitable.	Thus	their	approach	to	development	
reflects	their	interpretations	of	the	state	of	users,	consumers,	the	state	of	the	Web,	and	the	
current	state	of	the	ontology.		
In	line	with	past	work	in	assemblage	theory	(Delanda	2006;	Deleuze	and	Guattari	1987;	
Galloway	2012;	McCarthy	2017),	I	find	that	as	attempts	to	capture	meaning	are	increased	and	
their	complexities	more	accurately	mapped,	those	attempts	only	ever	create	more	complexity.	
Thus,	development	and	use	of	Schema.org	occurs	at	high	levels	of	granularity,	making	those	
additional	complexities	largely	invisible.	I	will	argue	that	their	pragmatic,	generalized,	and	
a/contextual	approach	to	development	can	lead	to	problems	of	path	dependence	and	
indeterminacy.	While,	these	approaches	are	not	empirically	distinct,	their	analytic	distinction	
helps	to	show	the	way	each	contributes	to	the	problems	listed.	Furthermore,	I	argue	that	the	
specific	ways	the	ontologists	and	users	navigate	these	problems	can	have	unintended	
consequences	that	stem	from	issues	of	complexity	and	imprecision.	Lastly,	I	argue,	that	this	
tension	between	precision	and	practical	deployment	is	largely	unresolvable,	as	it	either	over-
determines	a	domain	area	or	offers	little	in	the	way	of	coverage.	
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6.1	The	Community		
	 The	Schema.org	project	is	overwhelmingly	dominated	by	a	limited	number	of	
individuals,	companies,	and	other	organizations.	However,	Schema.org	is	openly	available	to	
anyone	able	and	willing	to	contribute	or	that	has	cause	to	use	its	markup	in	creating	semantic	
data.	It	is	also	worth	noting	that	despite	this	central	dominating	cluster,	modifications	to	the	
ontology	have	originated	and	continue	to	originate	from	marginal	collaborators,	and	that	
Schema.org’s	explicit	operating	principle	is	to	make	contributions,	changes,	and	extensions	as	
simple	and	as	free	as	possible.	While	the	evidence	is	in	line	with	other	work	that	suggests	
perceived	prestige	and	meritocracy	serve	as	the	differentiators	of	soft	organizational	power,	
contributions	by	competent	and	able	community	members	are	welcomed	(Coleman	2004;	
Halupka	and	Star	2011).	Steering	group	members	often	encourage	users	and	members	with	
proposals	to	establish	working	groups	to	expand	the	ontology’s	reach	and	scope.	While,	the	
project	is	shepherded	by	the	steering	group,	which	ultimately	decides	courses	of	action,	their	
communications	and	directions	are	largely	transparent.	Additionally,	it	is	the	general	practice	of	
steering	group	members	to	establish	rough	community	consensus	on	additions,	changes,	and	
other	courses	of	action20.	Furthermore,	while	debate	and	disagreement	are	common,	
particularly	on	complicated	issues,	the	general	timbre	of	discussion	is	professional	and	collegial.	
Moreover,	despite	the	large	differences	in	understanding	and	mastery	of	both	the	semantic	
web	and	Schema.org,	those	community	members	who	are	more	knowledgeable	and	
experienced	are	polite	and	helpful	to	those	who	are	less	well	informed.		
																																																						
20	Rough	consensus	here	means	that	they	informally	poll	the	people	involved	or	working	on	a	
specific	issue.	Involvement	can	range	from	two	to	fifteen	participants	and	agreement	is	
denoted	by	a	+1	or	a	“thumbs	up”	emoji.		
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6.2	Pragmatism	
The	Schema.org	ontologists	take	a	pragmatic	approach	to	development	and	they	
encourage	a	pragmatic	approach	to	use.	Developers	and	users	alike	opt	for	what	works	over	
what	could	work	best.	For	the	ontologists,	this	means	grounding	their	development	in	existing	
use	cases	and	empirical	evaluation	of	their	environment	–	the	Web.	For	users,	this	means	
mimicking	examples	found	on	Schema.org’s	main	website,	Stack	Overflow21,	and	examples	of	
other	similar	from	the	community	message	boards,	despite	perhaps	not	being	perfectly	
accurate	semantics.	There	are	many	moments	in	the	development	process	where	a	community	
member,	or	a	potential	user	initiates	a	proposal	to	cover	a	domain,	specify	an	existing	one,	or	
clarify	an	area	with	vague	or	ambiguous	semantics,	only	to	face	a	question	from	steering	group	
members,	or	other	central	contributors,	regarding	potential	or	already	existing	use	cases.		This	
is	not	in	and	of	itself	surprising	since,	as	a	commercial	product,	it	makes	sense	to	have	work	
flow	decisions	be	guided	by	such	practical	considerations.	However,	the	value	of	practicality	
and	the	benefits	that	pragmatism	in	decision	making	have	are	not	necessarily	evenly	distributed	
among	the	potential	actors	involved	or	affected	by	those	decisions,	as	smaller	proposals	backed	
by	the	sponsor	companies	are	adopted	with	little	disagreement.		
A	somewhat	recent	example	is	with	the	claimsReview	addition.	Recently,	Google,	as	well	
as	a	small	collection	of	fact	checking	sites,	wanted	to	add	a	way	for	their	checked	content	to	
automatically	appear	in	Google’s	news	aggregator	next	to	relevant	articles.	To	do	so,	it	had	
																																																						
21	Stack	Overflow	is	a	question	and	answer	forum	for	programmers	to	ask	for	and	give	coding	
advice.		
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Schema.org	ontologists	create	the	claimsReview	class	with	which	a	fact	checking	site,	or	other	
content	provider,	can	use	to	encode	their	content	to	say	that	they	are	reviewing	a	given	a	
claim,	by	a	given	article	or	outlet,	all	with	the	attendant	semantic	markup	for	Google	news	to	
interpret.	Google	has	its	own	undisclosed	mechanisms	for	determining	the	improper	use	of	the	
claimsReview	markup,	but	its	existence	feasibly	opens	up	complications	that	come	along	with	
automatically	presenting	anything	claiming	to	be	a	fact	check	and	the	publicly	uncertain	means	
to	verify	and	police	improper	use.	This	addition	to	the	ontology	was	included	for	release	despite	
having	fewer	than	ten	use	domains,	and	without	any	real	discussion.	However,	it	was	
introduced	to	the	community	in	the	same	way	as	all	issues	are	entered	into	the	project.	With	
Google’s	support	for	the	proposal	It	is	not	surprising	that	the	there	was	little	push	back.	I	see	
that	as	relatively	unproblematic,	but	it	does	mean	that	things	of	alternate	interest	and	long	tail	
domains	don’t	receive	the	attention	that	they	could,	or	perhaps	should.	There	is	a	limited	
number	of	people	involved	with	the	actual	work	in	Schema.org,	and	a	smaller	number	still	with	
the	sophistication	to	complete	the	growing	workload.	When	those	people	are	overburdened	as	
they	currently	attest	to	being,	they	are	not	likely	to	have	the	time,	energy,	or	inclination	to	do	
extra	work	to	cover	domains	that	may	have	only	small	numbers	of	actual	uses.		
In	most	cases	the	concerns	of	covering	use	cases	weighs	heavily	on	decision	making.	The	
data	are	rife	with	examples	and	instances	where	core	community	members	question	requests	
for	coverage	and/or	new	proposals.	One	member	asks,	“are	you	aware	of	publishers	who	are	
putting	relevant	structured	information	into	HTML	sites	already	that	would	be	candidates	for	
adoption?	Or	that	are	doing	other	kinds	of	Web-based	data	sharing?”	and	in	a	separate	case,	
“are	there	tools	looking	for	religious	events	specifically	to	justify	this	addition?”	In	each	excerpt,	
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this	core	member	is	inquiring	about	the	potential	demand	for	two	different	vocabulary	addition	
issues.	These	particular	cases	were	formal	proposals	made	on	GitHub.	However,	the	most	
common	place	where	use	is	questioned	is	on	the	W3C	message	boards,	where	proposals	are	
most	often	less	well	developed	than	they	tend	to	be	on	GitHub.	Members	have	similar	
questions	in	this	forum,	such	as,	“I	know	of	a	lot	of	useful	things	we	could	do	with	the	
information.	The	question	is	whether	there	is	someone	who	is	going	to	do	something,	because	
until	that	point	I	am	reluctant	to	support	adding	the	terms”	and	“But	before	we	get	too	far,	
what	is	the	actual	use	case	for	this	data?	Who	is	going	to	process	it	and	present	it?”	In	many	
cases	these	fledgling	proposals	are	just	simple	requests	for	coverage	and	are	informally	vetted	
before	reaching	the	GitHub	stage.	This	vetting	process	is	not	required	to	introduce	a	proposal	
to	GitHub,	but	is	instead	a	less	visible	means	for	participating.	To	paraphrase	a	conversation	I	
had	with	a	steering	group	member,	the	GitHub	repository	is	akin	to	the	main	stage	and	many	
community	members	have	expressed	anxiety	about	participating	at	that	level	of	visibility.	
Use	case	driven	pragmatism	does	not	just	concern	new	creation.	Schema.org	is	a	form	
of	living	document,	as	term	definitions	and	expected	values	change	overtime	as	novel	
applications	of	the	existing	vocabulary	are	introduced	by	the	community	of	users	or	uncovered	
by	the	ontologists.	Many	frequent	changes	are	of	the	following	nature,		
A	common	change	is	for	a	property	to	be	marked	as	applicable	to	some	previously	
unrelated	type,	or	to	expect	to	take	values	of	a	new	type.	When	this	happens	the	textual	
definitions	are	often	adjusted	slightly	too.	This	is	either	by	listing	the	new	types	
explicitly,	or	through	the	use	of	a	more	general	term	like	"item",	"entity"	or	"thing".	
	
Schema.org’s	ontologists	reflect	on	usage	and	adjust	the	ontology	in	a	way	the	seeks	to	avoid	
adding	constraints.	The	steering	group,	as	representative	of	the	project	itself,	does	not	want	to	
“define	or	dictate…	and	notion	of	‘mandatory’	property”.	The	ontologists	expect	that	users	will	
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have	different	amounts	of	available	information	to	encode	and	that	those	amounts	or	types	
cannot	be	determined	a	priori.	They	also	know	that	the	needs	and	abilities	of	consuming	
services	vary.	This	means	that	they	attempt	to	satisfy	the	broadest	possible	set	of	users	and	
consumers,	as	their	driving	goal	is	creating	coverage.	The	practical	implications	are	that	when	
they	see	or	hear	of	a	use	driven	result	that	they	were	initially	unaware	of,	they	implement	it	if	it	
is	easy,	compatible,	and	does	not	invalidate	markup.	Also,	it	means	that	they	operate	under	the	
assumption	that	some	markup	is	better	than	no	markup.	Regarding	this	last	point,	the	
ontologists	reflexively	adapt	guidance	on	the	vocabulary	to	be	more	inclusive	in	order	to	
accommodate	less	detailed	or	less	sophisticated	usage.	This	was	particularly	evident	in	the	
ability	of	the	listItem	and	recipe	types	to	both	include	any	things	that	have	steps	and	any	things	
that	have	both	ingredients	(broadly	construed)	and	steps,	respectively.	While	the	property	
values	of	these	types	would	coerce	a	“how	to”,	or	instructional,	guide’s	semantics,	particularly	
in	a	non-culinary	context,	simply	omitting	property	markup	would	allow	the	steps	to	be	
displayed,	only	absent	the	rich	descriptive	detail	enabled	by	properties	that	allow	for	formally	
correct	semantics	and	cross	instance	mapping.		
This	use	driven	approach	often	even	supersedes	precision	in	content	markup.	In	one	
example,	discussed	in	greater	detail	below,	the	community	debated	the	most	appropriate	way	
to	code	recurrence	into	the	vocabulary.	One	of	the	steering	group	members,	who	is	often	
reluctant	to	add	precision	for	precision’s	sake,	makes	the	following	argument,		
I	agree	that	we	might	need	to	improve	the	wording	for	schema:Event,	but	I	hesitate	to	
add	a	new	type	for	this.	I	would	not	fight	against	EventSeries,	but	I	do	not	see	any	actual	
benefit	for	neither	publishers	nor	consumers	of	data.	In	the	end,	what	matters	is	not	
whether	you	can	disambiguate	a	concept	by	a	philosophical	analysis	but	whether	the	
distinction	brings	any	benefits	for	automated	data	processing.	
	
	136	
The	basic	argument,	which	is	often	repeated	in	cases	where	the	drives	for	complexity,	
precision,	and	practicality	conflict,	is	that	if	an	instance	can	be	modeled	by	drawing	on	other	
parts	of	the	existing	vocabulary,	in	this	case	date	specification,	then	a	computational	agent	
does	not	need	to	understand	that	the	instance	is	of	a	certain	different	type.	This	is	especially	
the	case,	where	the	agent	is	only	required	to	represent	the	instance	according	to	generalized	
context.	Here,	that	means	showing	an	event	series	as	an	event	that	occurs	at	different	times.	
However,	as	I	discuss	below,	that	over-determines	a	Web	developer	or	consumer’s	intent,	and	
the	underlying	state	of	the	instance.		
The	data	indicate	that	the	drive	for	semantic	precision	most	often	prevails	when	
simplicity	and	practicality	agree	with	it.	This	agreement	in	most	commonly	found	where	
proposals	are	small,	clear,	less	detailed,	and	introduce	novel	and/or	superficial	coverage	to	the	
vocabulary.	A	noted	example	was	when	the	community	added	Exhibition	to	the	vocabulary	and	
then	further	marked	the	distinction	between	exhibition	as	creativeWork	and	exhibition	as	
event.	In	this	example	there	was	consensus	about	ease	of	use,	ease	of	implementation,	and	
semantic	accuracy.	Thus,	there	was	alignment	between	the	forces	that	push	increased	
precision,	coverage,	and	ease	of	use	(McCarthy	2017).	Though	this	is	not	exclusively	the	case,	as	
major	semantic	gaps	prompt	majority	agreement	for	the	need	to	modify	or	complicate	the	
ontology,	especially	where	modification	is	use	driven.	However,	as	with	the	recurring	events	
case	above,	those	issues	that	are	subject	to	significant	levels	of	debate	are	often	longer	term	
problems	and	remain	complicated	and	unresolved	as	the	community	weighs	the	impact	across	
other	sections	of	the	vocabulary.		
	137	
Breakdown	in	semantic	accuracy	occurs	when	specifications	are	made	to	existing	
domains	or	when	new	domain	proposals	involve	a	high	degree	of	semantic	complexity.	As	one	
member	remarks	about	a	proposal	for	integrating	legal	decisions	and	terminology,		
The	problem	is	that	internationally	there	are	SO	many	different	vocabularies—I'm	not	
just	talking	about	language	differences,	I'm	talking	about	the	way	legal	concepts	are	
referred	to	and	thought	of	in	different	jurisdictions.	Not	to	mention	at	all	levels	from	
international…	to	national	to	regional	(state,	province)	to	municipal	and	other	local	
levels.	So	trying	to	include	all	those	existing	vocabularies	is	not	only	monumental	but	
probably	unworkable.	In	a	situation	like	this	it	is	actually	more	helpful	to…	come	up	with	
high	level	generic	terms	to	which	individual	vocabularies	can	be	mapped.			
	
In	this	example,	semantic	complexity	is	simply	too	great	to	manage,	let	alone	integrate	in	a	way	
that	developers	could	easily	use.	The	trade-off	in	this	case	was	a	proposal	to	use	generic	legal	
terms,	but	even	those	terms	ran	into	semantic	difficulties	because	they	were	based	on	the	U.S.	
legal	system	and	were	not	sensitive	to	the	differences	in	other	local	regional,	and	global	legal	
systems.	This	follows	the	pragmatic	approach	described	in	one	member’s	explanation	as	to	why	
Schema.org	does	not	code	detailed	data	provenance	information	into	its	vocabulary,	“the	world	
is	too	rich,	complex	and	interesting	for	a	single	schema	to	describe	fully	on	its	own.	With	
schema.org	we	aim	to	find	a	balance,	by	providing	a	core	schema	that	covers	lots	of	situations,	
alongside	extension	mechanisms	for	extra	detail.”		
Thus,	my	data	suggests	the	opposite	of	the	work	by	Agre	(1995),	Collins	(1990),	and	
Forsythe	(1993).	Rather	than	seeing	knowledge	as	something	easily	extracted	or	converted	to	
machine	understanding,	the	Schema.org	ontologists	recognize	the	difficulty	of	such	a	task.	
While	social	scientists	see	the	problem	as	intractable,	and	knowledge	engineers	see	the	
problem	as	simply	one	of	managing	human	description	errors,	these	ontologists	see	the	
problem	as	a	matter	of	pragmatism.	They	understand	that	they	are	choosing	the	terms	and	
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relations,	and	understand	that	there	is	a	measure	of	“semantic	violence”	that	occurs	(Agre	
1995).	However,	they	are	tasked	with	implementing	the	semantic	web,	and	so	they	prefer	to	
approach	modeling	in	a	way	that	is	based	on	empirical	use	and	compatibility,	unlike	Forsythe’s	
(1993)	knowledge	engineers.	If	a	declared	term	or	relationship	causes	little	disturbance	and	
resonates	with	the	existing	set	of	terms	and	relationships,	they	tend	to	accept	that	it	is	a	good	
declaration.	They	do	not,	however,	see	themselves	as	building	worlds,	but	rather	representing	
them.	They	resolutely	believe	that	they	can	approach	an	adequate	representation	of	the	world	
though	discussion	and	consensus.	As	one	steering	group	member	put	it,		
The	problem	that	any	knowledge	representation	system	has	is	fully	describing	its	system	
so	that	all	users	across	all	cultures	and	languages	will	understand	it	and	have	the	
capacity	to	expand	upon	that	system	while	maintaining	agreement	across	all	cultures	
and	languages.	'Negotiating	the	limits'	often	times	just	means	that	folks	have	to	simply	
"talk	it	out",	in	email,	GitHub	issues,	or	meetups,	until	a	consensus	is	formed.	
	
	
6.3	Generalizability	
Related	to	their	pragmatic	approach	the	Schema.org	ontologists	prefer	to	adopt	a	
generalized	application	of	the	RDF	model.	This	is	in	some	ways	inseparable	from	the	use	case	
driven	approach	and	is	arguably	an	improvement	over	the	patchwork	open	approach	of	the	pre	
Schema.org	semantic	web,	at	least	in	terms	of	operating	at	Web	scale.	Simply	put,	if	the	
ontology	is	too	complex,	either	no	one	will	use	it	or	they	will	use	it	incorrectly.	A	survey	from	
one	of	the	pioneering	members	of	Schema.org,	and	the	semantic	web	more	generally,	found	
that	nearly	60%	of	all	semantic	markup	on	the	Web	was	incorrect	(Guha	2014).	This	leads	
Schema.org’s	ontologists	to	advocate	for	restraint	when	it	comes	to	adding	to	the	existing	
vocabulary.	Among	many	other	places,	this	approach	is	evident	in	the	long	standing	debates	
surrounding	recurrence.	In	these	debates,	the	fundamental	issue	for	data	modeling	is	whether	
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to	materialize	facts	individually	or	encode	decision	rules	into	the	vocabulary.	This	dilemma	
reflects	two	opposing	positions	within	the	Schema.org	community.	The	debate	revolves	around	
forcing	users	to	mark	their	content	for	each	possible	occurrence	in	each	possible	place,	or	allow	
for	a	recurrence	rule	that	defines	a	repeating	pattern	of	events,	times,	or	definitions.		
	 This	debate	exposed	two	different	but	related	debates	about	recurrence.	The	first	has	to	
do	with	repeating	dates,	while	the	second	has	to	do	with	recurring	events.		Adding	markup	for	
repeating	dates	would	be	broadly	applicable	across	Schema.org.	One	steering	group	member	
notes,		
Recurring	dates	will	be	relevant	for	many	branches	of	schema.org,	namely	for	opening	
hours,	but	also	offer	validity	and	prices	specifications,	so	I	prefer	a	generic	solution.	
Once	we	have	this,	there	is	IMO	no	need	for	a	specific	mechanism	for	recurring	events,	
because	we	can	simply	use	the	recurring	dates	mechanism	to	specify	the	dates	of	the	
event	
	
The	member	is	arguing	for	a	generalized	approach	to	recurrence	so	that	the	underlying	
grammar	of	the	ontology	can	model	across	contexts.	At	issue	is	that	Schema.org	has	no	ability	
to	model	change.	While	mutable,	the	world	that	Schema.org	creates	is	not	dynamic.	That	is,	
pursuant	to	the	materialization	approach,	a	user	would	need	to	encode	all	parts	of	a	process	in	
which	change	or	differing	states	occurred	individually	as	discrete	artifacts.	Working	from	the	
preceding	excerpt,	hours	would	need	to	be	specified	for	each	individual	day	with	each	
exception	marked	at	every	instance.	For	offer	and	price	validity,	all	fluctuations	and	price	
differences	would	likewise	need	to	be	changed	manually	at	each	instance	depending	on	the	
markup	syntax	in	use.	Since	prices	are	often	generated	algorithmically	on	many	of	the	major	e-
commerce	sites	that	use	Schema.org	markup,	this	materialization	approach	can	create	a	
mismatch	between	how	price	is	modeled	and	how	pricing	occurs	in	actuality.		
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	 In	a	rule	based	approach,	recurrence	is	modeled	and	the	exceptions	to	the	recurrence	
rules	are	materialized	ad	hoc.	Adopting	a	decision	rule	approach	is	more	complicated,	but	
allows	for	the	easier	coverage	of	change	so	long	as	that	change	is	predictable.	Such	an	
approach	would	require	that	the	rule	system	be	simple	to	adopt,	specific	enough	to	be	of	
practical	benefit	to	users,	and	also	be	general	enough	for	use	across	contexts.	However,	as	one	
member	notes,		
The	problem	with	recurrence	rules	is	that	no-one	ever	thinks	to	put	an	end-date	on	
them	(even	if	only	a	tentative	one	that	can	be	extended	later),	so	you	end	up	with	
meetings/events	with	rules	like	"10-11am	every	Tuesday"	and	then	look	at	your	
calendar	a	few	years	into	the	future	and	see	it	full	of	events	that	will	almost	certainly	
never	happen.	
	
Here,	a	member	highlights	one	pragmatic	problem	associated	with	the	specific	proposal	to	
integrate	a	recurrence	rule	into	the	ontology.	The	dilemma	is	that	ontologists	can	either	model	
change,	thereby	increasing	the	applicability	of	the	ontology	and	reducing	the	potential	error	of	
users	having	to	add	markup	for	each	and	every	possible	point	of	change	in	an	ad	hoc	basis,	or	
run	the	risk	of	implementing	a	complex	rule	that	produces	user	error	and/or	negligence.				
	 There	is	a	similar	tension	evident	in	the	proposal	to	add	compositional	data	modeling	to	
the	ontology.	Compositional	data	modeling	is	an	approach	that	algorithmically	combines	pre-
existing	parts	of	the	ontology	to	model	more	complex	concepts.	One	steering	group	member	
puts	it	thusly,		
We	often	have	the	same	underlying	concepts	appear	in	several	places	in	the	hierarchy,	
as	part	of	more	complex	concepts.	So	for	example	we	might	have	GolfCourse	(which	
combines	the	idea	of	a	place	where	you	do	a	sport	i.e.	a	SportsActivityLocation	with	
some	specific	sport,	Golf).	But	we	might	also	have	a	(something	like...)	GolfSportsMatch,	
which	combines	that	same	sport	-	Golf	-	with	a	different	concept	-	the	idea	of	being	a	
kind	of	SportsEvent	devoted	to	a	particular	sport.	
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As	schema.org	grows,	we	get	more	and	more	of	these	situations.	It	becomes	a	burden	
to	keep	track	of	the	different	ways	in	which	we've	built	terms	that	combine	simpler	
underlying	ideas	(like	specific	sports).	We	don't	want	to	clutter	schema.org	with	every	
possible	sensible	combination	of	these	ideas	e.g.	a	GolfingTutorial	or	a	
CricketSportsEvent	or	a	CyclingCompetition	or	a	CricketTutorial	or	a	GolfingSportsEvent	
or	a	GolfingCompetition	or	a	CyclingTutorial.	The	combinations	soon	become	
unmanageable.	
In	keeping	with	their	approach	to	not	add	highly	granular	subtypes	into	the	ontology,	a	steering	
group	member	made	a	proposal	to	replace	the	input	of	a	name-value	pair	linked	to	a	specific	
Schema.org	IRI	with	a	function	set	that	mimics	an	IRI	with	a	series	of	arguments	that	reference	
type,	property,	and	class	variables	in	the	ontology.	In	JSON-LD	this	turns	an	@id	string	from	
something	like,	“@id:	http://schema.org/about”	to	the	much	more	complex	string,	“@id:	
http://schema.org/<Function>arg1name=arg1value&arg2name=arg2value".	Ostensibly,	this	will	
make	the	ontology	much	more	expressive	with	little	added	complication	to	the	ontology	itself.	
It	adds	an	intra-ontological	reference	system	whereby	the	vocabulary	can	be	broadened	and	
types	can	be	added	as	acceptable	values	where	they	may	not	be	predefined	or	otherwise	
allowed.	Problematically,	this	proposal	adds	substantial	complexity	to	an	already	complex	set	of	
technologies,	unsurprisingly	leading	to	a	number	of	the	core	community	members	to	question	
the	applicability	of	the	compositional	model.	They	state,	
Yes,	the	approach	is	structured	but	the	implementation	pattern	would	be	so	unlike	the	
rest	of	Schema.org	the	result	would	be	as	unnatural	as	a	shotgun	marriage	between	
SOAP	and	REST.	Both	pushing	the	same	direction	but	a	union	incomprehensible	to	the	
outside	world	
	
trying	to	understand	it	makes	my	brain	hurt	because	of	the	-	for	me	-	too	abstract	
description,	thus	making	me	skeptical	about	the	practicality	of	the	proposal	for	everyday	
webmasters…	About	that,	first	off,	I've	literally	lost	count	of	the	amount	of	times	I've	
seen	theme	developers	utterly	destroy	graphs	because	they	don't	really	understand	
how	Drupal	(and/or	markup)	works	(and/or	aren't	aware	that	structured	data	is	part	of	
its	core).	Often	leading	to	developers	either	letting	broken	markup	get	published	or	
disabling	those	parts	of	Drupal	that	add	structured	data	to	a	page.	So	unless	[name]	gets	
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involved	in	the	gazillion	custom	templates	out	there	I	wouldn't	get	your	hopes	up	about	
seeing	a	lot	of	proper	implementations.	
	
These	critical	voices	are	not	only	experts	in	semantic	web	technologies,	but	are	also	experts	in,	
and	founding	community	members	of,	Schema.org.	Furthermore,	this	proposal	brings	up	
important	questions	for	the	markup	standards	as	there	is	some	uncertainty	about	if	and	how	
they	can	encode	such	functional	strings.	Ultimately,	the	proposal	is	on	hold	and	not	attached	to	
a	major	version	update	target	as	concerns	about	the	proposal’s	usability	and	empirical	value	
remain.			
That	tension	between	usability,	generalizability,	and	specificity	is	a	frequent	issue	for	
ontologists,	who	often	argue	that,	“we	need	to	find	a	sweet	spot	that	covers	80	-	90	%	of	the	
cases.	A	formally	proven	perfect	solution	for	the	underlying	problems	is	IMO	beyond	what	
Schema.org	can	achieve.”	Thus,	their	approach	to	data	modeling	is	one	where	simplicity	and	
generalizability	prevail	over	complexity	and	specificity.	Ontologists	often	shy	away	from	adding	
types	and	properties	to	existing	parts	of	the	ontology,	preferring	instead	to	allow	markup	to	be	
used	in	the	broadest	possible	ways	working	with	markup	standards	to	strategically	leverage	the	
flexibilities	that	they	offer.	This	often	occurs	despite	potential	problems	with	semantic	accuracy	
and	the	unintended	consequences	of	ontic	occlusion	and	over-determination	that	can	result.			
	 The	potential	for	over-determination	is	evident	in	this	generalized	approach.	
Surrounding	these	attempts	to	model	change,	is	a	large	and	diverse	series	of	issues	attempting	
to	model	things	in	series.	In	one	example	the	community	was	trying	to	add	conceptual	
clarification	to	events	that	have	separate	and	distinct,	or	specific,	events	within	them.		
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By	way	of	example,	they	were	discussing	both	the	Salzburg	Festival	and	the	Olympics	for	use	
cases	where	there	is	a	super	event	with	many	sub	events	that	occur	within	it.	The	semantic	
problem	that	occurs,	particularly	if	a	simple	recurring	dates	model	is	applied	to	the	event	
designation,	is	captured	in	the	following	two	descriptions	of	the	problem	by	two	steering	group	
members,		
An	EventSeries	is	a	collection	of	events	that	share	some	unifying	characteristic.	For	
example,	"The	Olympic	Games"	is	a	series,	which	is	repeated	regularly.	The	"2012	
London	Olympics"	can	be	presented	both	as	an	Event	in	the	series	"Olympic	Games",	
and	as	an	EventSeries	that	included	a	number	of	sporting	competitions	as	Events	
(member	1).	
"The	Ashes"	(cricket	contest	between	Australia	and	England)	is	repeated	frequently,	but	
not	according	to	any	long-term	stable	schedule.	The	course	"Beowulf:	the	manuscript	
and	the	man"	can	be	an	EventSeries	consisting	of	individual	seminars	with	the	same	
participants,	and	an	EventSeries	of	the	course	being	held	repeatedly	over	a	decade	
(member	1).	
For	example	consider	if	there	is	a	2016	seminar	series	(e.g.	each	of	6	x	1h	sessions	on	
successive	weeks),	and	then	later	the	course	is	re-run	as	a	2017	series	with	the	same	
structure	and	topic,	but	different	people.	This	also	relates	to	whether	we	want	to	say	
that	EventSeries	is	a	subtype	of	Event	(or	at	least	carries	Event-like	properties).	
[member	1]	outlines	two	views.	One	is	to	see	the	6	sessions	in	2016	as	an	EventSeries	
i.e.	'2016	Beowulf	course',	the	other	is	to	see	the	sequence	of	annual	runs	of	the	course	
-	i.e.	'Beowulf:	the	manuscript	and	the	man'	-	as	an	EventSeries.	Either	way,	superEvent	
would	point	up	the	hierarchy,	from	e.g.	'2017	session	3'	(an	Event)	to	'2017	Beowulf	
course'	(an	Event	or	an	EventSeries)	and	from	there	to	the	top	level	'Beowulf:	the	
manuscript	and	the	man'	which	is	presumably	an	EventSeries	but	not	an	Event	since	it	
represents	just	the	high	level	notion	of	the	series	rather	than	something	that	you	can	
say	is	happening	at	a	particular	place	and	time.	
The	mid-level	is	the	most	awkward.	Intuition	pulls	it	towards	being	both	Event	("An	
event	happening	at	a	certain	time	and	location"	e.g.	summer	2016,	Madrid)	and	also	an	
EventSeries	(approximately	"a	collection	of	events	that	share	some	unifying	
characteristic	e.g.	relationship")	(member	2).	
Here,	the	problem	is	as	follows.	A	given	instance	is	ontologically	indeterminate,	meaning	that	it	
can	legitimately	and	empirically	occupy	two	or	more	ontological	states	simultaneously.	As	
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member	1	notes,	the	2012	London	Olympics	can	be	both	an	event	in	a	series	and	an	event	
series.	Likewise,	the	Beowulf	course	can	be	two	different	types	of	event	series,	depending	on	
perspective,	or	an	event	in	a	series	of	events	relating	to	an	organization’s	course	offerings.	So,	
depending	on	the	particular	context	under	consideration,	event	and	eventSeries	could	both	be	
considered	super	types	and	subtypes.	This	means	that	marking	the	order	of	relationships	and	
inheritances	will	necessarily	over-determine	the	semantics	of	both	event	and	eventSeries	while	
occluding	the	alternate	meaning.		
By	way	of	example,	omitting	such	a	distinction	would	mean	the	difference	between	
marking	the	something	like	the	World	Trade	Organization	meetings	(WTO)	as	an	event	with	the	
relevant	description	and	associated	semantic	properties	that	surround	it,	and	modeling	the	
WTO	as	an	event	series,	with	the	1999	Seattle	WTO	as	a	specific	event	in	that	series.	One	
completely	occludes	the	possibility	of	representing	specific	and	important	information	relating	
to	an	event,	the	other	enables	a	specific	case	to	be	represented	and	allows	for	the	possibility	of	
supplementary	information	to	be	included	and	linked	to	both	the	overarching	super-event	and	
the	subject	of	that	event,	in	this	example	the	famed	protests	of	the	1999	WTO	meeting.	
Marking	such	distinctions	is	beneficial	and	relevant	to	consumers	of	information	whose	
interpretations	and	intentions	cannot	be	specified	a	priori.	This	issue	also	bears	upon	issues	of	
reversibility	and	the	constraints	of	standards	discussed	in	the	previous	chapter,	as	well	as,	
potential	cross	compatibility	problems	with	other	ontologies.	This	problem	of	precision,	
complexity,	and	usability	is	not	fully	resolvable.		
	 	This	general	approach	to	organization	can	also	lead	to	problems	of	path	dependency	
within	the	vocabulary.	Consider	the	following	example,		
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In	the	previous	medical/health	additions	we	made	the	mistake	of	including	terms	whose	
name	was	implicitly	contextualized	to	medical/health	scenarios.	So	we	“used	up”	the	
word	“action”	on	a	property	that	we	now	call…	muscleAction	and	so	on…	every	change	
needs	to	make	sense	[a]cross	domain,	since	schema.org	is	a	cross	domain	vocabulary.	
	
In	this	situation,	prior	to	the	development	of	the	hosted	medical	extension,	ontologists	created	
a	general	set	of	terms	to	cover	a	nascent	medial	domain,	the	problem	was	that	this	general	
term,	along	with	its	very	large	set	of	inheritances,	was	then	used	in	a	large	number	of	use	cases.		
Here	a	member	points	out	that	a	previous	vocabulary	specification	came	into	conflict	with	the	
development	of	an	ontology	extension	because	when	the	ontologists	added	specificity	to	a	type	
of	action	they	precluded	its	use	for	the	extension	to	which	it	was	eventually	most	relevant.	This	
forced	them	to	encode	additional	complexities	into	the	extension	that	have	caused	misuse	and	
conceptual	confusion	in	modeling.	Thus,	we	see	their	general	affinity	for	broad	or	generic	types	
and	properties.	This	affinity	however	created	problems	as	the	ontology	grows.	Another	
member	notes,	“As	Schema.org	grows,	generic	names	for	types	and	properties	leads	to	
unfortunate	collisions.”	Here,	one	of	the	steering	group	members	brings	up	a	long	list	of	
general	terms	and	properties	that	at	the	time	constrained	the	possible	ranges	of	use	and	
interpretation.	For	example,	season	was	artificially	limited	to	references	to	seasons	of	TV	
shows,	precluding	mention	of	any	other	interpretations.	Likewise,	code	referenced	software	
code	omitting	other	potentially	serious	code	types,	like	medical	or	legal	codes	which	are	both	
immediately	relevant	to	Schema.org’s	internally	hosted	extensions.		
Adding	new	subtypes	and	filling	in	additional	context	specific	details	would	seem	like	
the	easy	solution,	but	doing	so	forces	the	inheritance	of	an	entire	range	of	additional	subtypes	
and	properties,	many	of	which	might	be	inappropriate	to	the	newly	specified	types.	
Alternatively,	depending	on	how	the	developers	code	the	new	specification,	it	could	mean	the	
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displacement	of	properties	and	subtypes	already	deployed	in	a	given	publisher’s	markup.	There	
are	no	one	size	fits	all	approaches	to	deal	with	the	problem	of	path	dependence.	The	
ontologists,	especially	the	steering	group	members,	carefully	weigh	the	consequences	of	
updates.	In	some	rare	cases	they	deprecate	the	original	term	or	relocate	property	inheritances	
under	the	new	subtypes,	but	both	solution	occur	at	the	expense	of	existing	use	cases.	In	most	
other	cases	the	developers	broaden	the	expected	set	of	inputs	and	make	use	of	flexibilities	
within	the	markup	standards,	though	at	the	cost	of	further	dulling	semantic	precision	and	
reducing	domain	specific	context.	
	
6.4	a/Contextuality		
	 Context	in	Schema.org,	and	in	the	semantic	web	more	generally,	is	complicated.	As	
noted	in	an	earlier	chapter,	semantic	web	ontologies	are	constructed	acontexually	(Waller	
2016).	Purportedly,	this	allows	them	to	be	applied	across	contexts,	but	as	Ginsberg’s	(2008)	
research	shows,	this	can	lead	to	serious	complications	including	ontological	over-determination	
and	occlusion,	as	the	context	where	markup	is	applied	defines	the	socio-cultural	range	of	
interpretations	(Agre	1995;	Collins	1990;	Knobel	2010).	However,	past	work	on	meaning	and	
context	shows	that	the	actual	deployment	of,	and	meanings	surrounding,	technologies	never	
occurs	outside	of	a	specified	context.	Much	of	this	past	work	shows	that	the	definitions	of	
concepts	and	their	attachments	to	properties	always	necessarily	rely	on	social	context	for	their	
provision.	That	is,	all	claims	are	inextricably	embedded	in	specific	contexts	(Bakhtin	1981;	
Heidegger	1973;	Lakoff	1987;	Waller	2016).	For	the	semantic	web,	context	is	stripped	from	
factors	of	its	creation	and	then	imputed	to	the	individual	instance.	This	resonates	with	Seaver’s	
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(2015)	claim	that	context	is	everywhere	and	at	all	times	a	matter	of	making	decisions	and	
statements	about	the	state	of	the	world.	However,	this	re-imputed	context	is	determined	
entirely	by	the	boundaries	set	in	the	ontology	and	it	unavailable	to	consumers	in	the	way	that	
past	work	stipulates	(Agre	1995,	2003;	Collins	1990;	Ford	and	Graham	2016;	Waller	2016).	
While	my	investigation	does	not	reveal	that	ontologists	assume	a	single	correct	
definition	or	context	for	every	concept,	as	does	other	work	(Forsythe	1993;	Ginsberg	2008;	
Ribes	and	Bowker	2009;	Waller	2016),	ontologists	have	no	method	to	address	intentionality	
regarding	use	context	and	so	are	constrained	in	their	ability	to	model	context.	I	attribute	this	as	
one	of	significant	reasons	for	adopting	a	pragmatic	and	generalized	approach	to	modeling.	
Since	by	allowing	term	reuse,	you	obviate	the	need	to	account	for	context.	Further,	this	
superficially	appears	to	eliminate	the	problem	of	imputing	contexts	to	instances.	However,	I	
argue	that	while	imputing	context	seems	to	be	avoided	at	the	local	level	of	the	instance,	
context	is	entirely	determined	at	the	level	of	the	ontology.	So	far	as	semantic	data	is	concerned,	
the	ontology	entirely	determines	an	instance’s	ontological	state,	as	it	sets	the	boundaries	of	
what	can	and	cannot	be.		
The	approach	to	modeling	data	inherent	to	ontologies	necessarily	over-determines	
relationships	and	their	inheritance	paths	as	they	are	defined	within	a	specific	domain	that	
cannot	be	context	agnostic.	The	alleged	agnosticism	is	evident	in	the	approach	detailed	earlier.	
Recall	the	previous	discussion	on	how	Schema.org	over-determines	service	provision	or	agency	
by	organizations	in	commercial	contexts.	The	decisions	to	model	types	and	properties	relating	
to	services	as	a	commercial	offer	of	a	product	was	a	pragmatic	decision	to	cover	an	assumed	
significant	majority	of	their	use	cases,	but	it	has	the	problem	of	imputing	commercial	contexts	
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to	things	like	volunteering,	aid,	pro-bono	work,	and	other	similar	actions	by	organizations	and	
individuals.	Waller	(2016:8)	notes	similar	patterns	with	the	actions	afforded	to	the	vocabulary	
type	Person,	where	whether	“‘alive,	dead,	undead	or	fictional’,	are	focused	on	involvement	in	
movies,	videogames,	TV	series,	radio	and	sport	and	buying	and	selling.”.	This	problem	of	
context	is	not	necessarily	a	fault	of	ontologists,	but	the	fault	of	ontologies	in	particular,	and	the	
modeling	of	the	world	in	simple	terms	of	objects	and	their	relations,	in	general.	In	this	system	
of	thinking,	context	is	not	locally	determined	by	the	characteristics	and	peculiarities	of	
situations,	but	rather	determined	globally	by	the	declaration	of	a	canonical	reference	point,	in	
this	case,	a	context	file	or	ontology.		
	 In	terms	of	context,	Schema.org’s	enactment	of	data	is	captured	well	by	one	steering	
group	member,		
We	very	often	have	the	following	workflow:	
someone	suggests	a	new	property	+	textual	definition	
someone	else	says,	"hey	what	about	re-using	property	such-and-so?"	
they	agree	to	re-use	an	existing	property,	perhaps	tweaking	its	definition	to	mention	or	
permit	this	new	usecase.	
result:	the	original	more	contextualized	definition	gets	lost.	
	
and	a	Web	developer	who	notes	that,	“Schema.org	does	seem	to	encourage	reuse	of	terms	
that	have	the	same	semantics	in	different	contexts.”	Ontologists	call	this	boundary	traversal	
“scope	creep”.	However,	these	understandings	of	context	display	an	understanding	of	context	
that	fits	within	the	paradigm	noted	in	earlier	work	on	AI,	namely	a	context	that	ignores	some	
level	of	constructivism	implied	in	ontology	development.	While	these	community	members	are	
correct	in	that	Schema.org	encourages	the	pragmatic	and	generalized	application	of	terms	
across	contexts,	as	discussed	above,	this	implies	that	context	is	somehow	erased,	rather	than	
displaced	and	enacted	in	every	instance.	Much	as	Seaver	(2015)	argues	that	rather	than	the	
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analysis	of	big	data	stripping	context	from	data	points,	it	instead	recreates	it,	the	cross	
contextual	application	of	Schema.org	enacts	contexts	in	the	process	of	selecting	the	markup	
syntax,	type	and	property	usage,	and	underlying	content	to	be	created	as	data.	Here,	context	is	
precisely	the	thing	in	question.		
	 Moreover,	this	application	obscures	the	way	that	context	informs	a	vocabulary’s	
creation.	In	every	instance,	vocabulary	proposals	are	made	with	a	specific	single	or	set	of	use	
cases	in	mind.	The	proposer	may	be	a	Web	developer,	community	member,	steering	group	
member,	industry	group,	or	sponsor	company.	While	each	different	group	comes	to	the	
community	with	different	levels	of	sophistication	and	knowledge	of	the	domain,	the	ensuring	
process	is	relatively	similar.	First,	a	proposal	is	made.	As	discussed	previously,	this	includes	the	
range	of	potential	use	domains,	clarification	of	why	it	is	needed,	and	what	additions	or	
modifications	might	be	required,	among	other	details	that	fit	the	particular	proposal.	Second,	
the	community	evaluates	the	need	for	the	proposal	and	the	potential	for	use	in	related	
contexts.	This	measurement	of	scope	creep	is	the	first	stage	in	the	abstraction	of	context	from	
the	initial	proposal.		Third,	the	best	approach	to	model	that	use	context	is	debated	and	
measured	for	its	fit	into	the	existing	ontology	and	its	ability	to	be	modeled	appropriately	with	
the	three	markup	syntaxes.	This	is	a	next	step	in	deconstructing	context,	as	the	community	
evaluates	the	amount	and	extent	to	which	the	proposed	extension	or	addition	can	be	satisfied	
with	existing	terminology.	This	has	the	effect	of	removing	context	specificity	from	a	domain.	
Interestingly,	this	new	domain	proposal	only	happens	because	a	user	determines	that	the	
existing	ontology	does	not	fit	the	domain	specific	context	required.	The	last	stages	are	where	
the	ontologists,	often	with	the	domain	expertise	of	the	users,	set	implementation	details	and	
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timelines	to	integrate	the	proposal	into	the	core	vocabulary	or	as	an	extension	of	it.	The	
cumulative	process	of	moving	from	the	proposal	stage	to	the	implementation	stage	is	one	
where	small	and	compatible	additions	and	modifications	are	stripped	of	their	particular	context	
to	fit	into	the	core	vocabulary	and	hosted	extensions	in	way	that	minimizes	the	impact	to	the	
existing	ontology.	As	noted,	this	means	reusing	or	adapting	existing	terminology	wherever	
possible,	abstracting	meaning	from	its	origin	and	set	up	as	a	standing	reserve	from	which	new	
contexts	and	new	meanings	can	be	imputed.	The	new	terms	are	then	put	to	use	in	markup	
recreating	and	imputing	a	new	set	of	contexts,	that	may	or	may	not	be	aligned	with	the	ones	
contributing	to	their	genesis.		
	 To	sum	up,	context	informs	creation,	context	is	then	removed	as	the	new	creation	is	
integrated	with	the	older	set	of	decontextualized	relationships,	and	then	context	is	newly	
introduced	at	both	local	and	global	levels	as	the	ontology	is	deployed	by	users.	While	this	may	
result	in	little	actual	change	to	the	initial	context,	that	matter	depends	on	the	potential	impact	
to	the	existing	ontology,	as	well	as	the	level	of	overall	and	the	perceived	value	of	the	addition	
as	negotiated	by	the	proposer	and	the	steering	group	members.	In	some	instances,	context	
bears	some	resemblance	to	the	one	initially	supplied,	but	its	use	occurs	in	a	diluted	form,	as	
with	proposed	mapping	of	the	pre-existing	European	Legislation	Identifier	Ontology	(ELI)	
ontology.	In	this	case,	integrating	this	vocabulary	with	Schema.org	would	alter	the	semantic	
context	of	the	original	vocabulary,	as	Schema.org’s	validFrom	does	not	equal	the	ELI’s	
dateInForce	and	applicableDate,	and	Schema.org’s	basedOn	is	not	the	same	as	the	ELI’s	
madePossibleBy	in	legal	contexts.	These	examples	among	others	in	this	proposal	highlight	the	
inadequacy	of	existing	acontextualized	Schema.org	terms	to	encode	nuanced	understanding	of	
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how	the	legislative	process	works.	This	is	something	further	complicated	by	property	
directionality	and	its	availability	to	be	specifically	modeled.		
	 This	case	is	additionally	complicated	by	the	fact	that	there	is	no	single	legislative	process	
to	be	modeled,	but	rather	many	different	processes.	Returning	to	the	excerpt	from	page	137,			
The	problem	is	that	internationally	there	are	SO	many	different	vocabularies—I'm	not	
just	talking	about	language	differences,	I'm	talking	about	the	way	legal	concepts	are	
referred	to	and	thought	of	in	different	jurisdictions.	Not	to	mention	at	all	levels	from	
international…	to	national	to	regional	(state,	province)	to	municipal	and	other	local	
levels.	So	trying	to	include	all	those	existing	vocabularies	is	not	only	monumental	but	
probably	unworkable.	In	a	situation	like	this	it	is	actually	more	helpful	to…	come	up	with	
high	level	generic	terms.	
	
We	see	that	this	user	is	responding	to	a	proposal	to	add	markup	coverage	for	legal	decisions	
discussed	earlier	in	the	chapter.	He	correctly	highlights	the	complete	inadequacy	of	trying	to	
model	variation	in	legal	terminology	across	a	wide	feature	set,	as	there	is	significant	variation	in	
legal	structure,	terminology,	publication,	and	process	across	all	levels	of	jurisdiction.	This	
particular	part	of	the	problem	is	well	discussed	in	the	data,	and	can	be	seen	as	a	unifying	point	
connecting	frequent	proposals	to	add	legal	and	legislative	proposals	that	cover	a	wide	variety	of	
case	types	and	jurisdictions.	Currently,	efforts	to	integrate	the	two	largest	and	most	detailed	
legal	proposals	(E.U.	and	U.S.	based)	into	a	hosted	legislation	extension	are	ongoing.	Users	and	
community	members	in	this	and	related	discussions,	debated	the	differences	in	the	European	
and	U.S.	legal	systems	establishing	the	intractability	of	the	problem	they	faced.	While	
establishing	“high	level	generic	terms”	may	be	the	best	of	a	number	of	poor	solutions,	it	is	
actually	only	the	best	where	those	high	level	terms	draw	out	the	correct	legal	contexts.	As	one	
user	makes	note,		
My	only	concern	is	that	some	legal	issues	aren’t	about	the	government-to-citizen	
relationship	(like	civics	would	imply),	but	about	family	matters	(divorce,	child	custody,	
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child	support,	domestic	violence	—	these	are	some	of	the	most	common-searched	legal	
help	topics),	corporate	matters,	contracts,	property,	etc.	
	
Presently	such	concerns	are	not	included	in	the	pending	extension.	While	these	concerns	have	
been	noted	by	users	and	emphasized	by	steering	group	members,	making	additions	likely,	they	
will	require	careful	consideration	and	preservation	of	existing	real	world	context	to	have	
meaning	in	this	domain.	Additionally,	as	this	proposal	remains	underdevelopment,	new	interest	
groups	are	advocating	for	coverage	of	other	legal	domains,	structures,	and	jurisdictions,	further	
complicating	the	addition.	In	meaning	spaces	where	precision	is	paramount,	system-level	over-
determination	of	legal	concepts,	options,	and	advice	may	have	severe	consequences	for	
information	seekers.		
	
6.5	Conclusion	
Schema.org	ontologists	adopt	a	pragmatic,	generalized,	and	a/contextual	approach	to	
development.	This	empirically	driven	approach	contrasts	with	the	approaches	detailed	in	earlier	
work	on	knowledge	engineering	(Agre	1995;	Forsythe	1993a,	1993b;	Star	1995).	Furthermore,	
the	ontologists	and	users	recognize	the	semantic	problems	of	their	respective	tasks	and	do	not	
believe	that	they	are	simply	representing	a	stable	worldview,	but	rather,	take	the	pragmatic	
view	that	if	consensus	based	decision	making	can	come	to	a	developed	representation	that	
aligns	with	the	existing	set	of	them,	they	can	construct	a	more	or	less	true	vision	of	the	world.	
That	is,	they	are	acutely	aware	of	the	fact	that	they	might	be	embedding	certain	cultural	
understandings	in	their	work.	Again,	this	runs	counter	to	existing	work	(Forsythe	1993a,	1993b).	
Their	pragmatic	approach	allows	them	to	navigate	between	an	entirely	constructivist	or	realist	
path	to	development.	By	basing	their	development	decisions	on	actual	use	on	the	Web,	the	
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ontologists	and	Web	developers	can	enact	an	ontology	that	while	constructed,	resonates	with	
the	existing	and	agreed	upon	interpretations	of	their	information	environment.	The	assemblage	
based	approach	allows	us	to	uncover	the	ways	that	those	states	are	exposed	by	attending	to	
the	situated	interactions	of	components.	In	this	chapter,	those	components	are	the	rationales,	
strategies,	modeling	techniques,	and	communities	of	practice.		
Problematically	for	this	pragmatic	approach	is	the	tension	between	precision	and	
applicability.	Following	from	their	use-driven	approach,	ontologists	and	Web	developers	alike,	
opt	for	applicability	over	precision,	as	that	tension	is	not	often	able	to	be	resolved.	Relatedly,	
ontologists	and	users	try	to	make	the	ontology	as	generalizable	as	possible.	This	has	the	effect	
of	making	it	easier	to	use	and	more	adaptable	across	domains.	However,	in	addition	to	
suffering	the	similar	consequences	of	pragmatism,	generalizability	tends	to	lead	to	both	over	
determining	meaning,	as	it	applies	classes	and	types	broadly	across	content	domains,	and	to	
creating	a	path	dependency	problem.	Path	dependency	creates	a	problem	where	the	ontology	
faces	two	undesirable	outcomes,	invalidating	existing	markup	or	adding	new	coverage	into	the	
ontology	with	the	potential	to	create	semantic	problems	relating	to	class	and	property	
inheritance.		
Finally,	the	ontology,	far	from	being	acontextual,	determines	contexts	in	two	different	
ways.	First,	it	serves	to	impute	a	specific	context	to	a	particular	application	at	the	local	level.	
This	removes	markup	from	its	original	contextualized	development	and	embeds	it	into	a	new	
domain.	As	the	ontology	is	developed	to	generalize,	this	acontextual	mapping	creates	a	degree	
of	indeterminacy,	as	both	domains	can	make	equal	claims	to	legitimacy	with	the	markup.	This	
has	the	effect	of	losing	the	ability	to	specify	semantics	in	any	precise	manner	at	that	micro,	or	
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local,	level.	Second,	the	ontology	determines	context	in	ontological	terms	by	constructing	a	
delimited	state	of	semantic	meaning	at	the	that	larger	global	level.	Here,	existence	is	
determined	entirely	through	the	specific	construction	of	the	ontology,	in	this	case,	Schema.org.		
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7.	Conclusion	
	 In	this	concluding	chapter	it	will	be	helpful	to	revisit	my	motiving	questions	and	to	
briefly	return	to	the	chapters	where	they	were	investigated	both	in	order	to	explain	how	I	came	
to	answer	them,	and	to	show	how	those	answers	address	the	literature	that	informed	them.	
Motivated	by	calls	in	the	emerging	field	of	data	studies,	I	initially	sought	to	understand	how	
data	assemblages	came	to	be.	These	calls	stem	from	a	lack	of	large	scale	studies	about	how	
data	assemblages	come	together	to	produce	data.	This	question	can	only	ever	be	answered	in	
part,	as	the	semantic	web	is	composed	of	many	different	assemblages,	which	themselves	
include	various	components.	It	would	be	impossible	to	completely	cover	the	scope	and	scale	
that	this	question	implies.	Nonetheless,	my	investigation	does	explain	how	one	major	semantic	
web	assemblage	is	enacted.	Answering	this	question	required	engaging	with	literatures	
surround	the	various	components	of	a	given	data	assemblage.	Major	components	addressed	
here	included	standards,	developers,	users,	design	philosophies,	and	habits	of	logic	(Kitchin	
2014b).		
	 Answering	this	question	required	that	I	first	answer	two	other	major	questions.	First	
among	them	examined	the	way	that	ontological	states	are	declared	in	the	processes	of	
developing	and	using	semantic	web	ontologies.	At	the	onset	of	this	study	I	wrote	that	this	
question	was	primarily	theoretical	in	that	it	attended	to	the	particular	delimiting	of	meaning	
space.	While	I	maintain	that	the	question	is	primarily	a	theoretical	one	that	deals	with	the	
processes	of	ontological	over-determination	and	occlusion	that	occur	any	time	data	
assemblages	take	shape,	it	is	also	an	empirical	question.	Empirically,	the	question	shifts	to	my	
second	subsidiary	question	which	demanded	that	I	understand	how	humans	represent	an	
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indeterminate	world	to	a	deterministic	machine.	It	was	important	in	this	particular	case	to	
move	past	the	long	standing	and	intractable	problem	of	accuracy	in	representation,	to	
acknowledge	that	representations	are	happening	and	to	understand	how.	Approaching	these	
questions	of	ontology	in	terms	of	assemblage	theory	meant	that	I	needed	to	understand	how	
components	are	implicated	in	the	assemblage	and	how	they	interact	to	express	it.	This	required	
drawing	on	recent	work	in	STS	on	empirical	ontology	and	practice	to	remedy	gaps	in	literatures	
surrounding	standards,	expert	systems	and	AI,	as	well	as	emerging	work	on	the	semantic	web.		
	 Chapter	five	detailed	the	ways	that	markup	standards	shape	the	semantic	web	in	
general	and	Schema.org	in	particular.	These	markup	standards	translate	the	work	of	ontologists	
and	the	work	of	Web	developers	in	ways	that	alter	the	both	sets	of	practices.	Not	only	do	the	
standards	force	ontologists	to	cater	to	the	dictates	of	the	standards,	but	also	the	resulting	
situated	markup	may	differ	in	both	form	and	function	for	different	markup	standards	as	they	
offer	different	affordances	and	constraints	on	how	semantics	can	be	expressed	and	what	forms	
of	markup	are	allowed.	This	section	showed	how	Microdata	forced	ontologists	to	modify	the	
ontology	to	enable	reverse	properties	and	to	allow	for	more	permissive,	though	semantically	
less	accurate,	markup	rules	to	account	for	Microdata’s	lack	of	reverse	properties	and	multiple	
types	across	contexts.	These	modifications	result	in	over-determining	semantic	states	and	
ambiguous	semantics.	However,	it	also	showed	the	ways	that	ontologists	creatively	work	with	
standards	to	enact	compromise	and/or	modifications	to	the	standards.	
This	chapter	also	showed	the	ways	the	markup	standards	create	and	exacerbate	
problems	with	drawing	on	multiple	ontologies.	Using	markup	standards	to	encoded	semantic	
content	is	a	complicated	activity.	This	is	made	all	the	more	complicated	as	Web	developers	
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need	to	have	a	deep	understanding	of	the	definitional	and	structural	relationships	between	
ontologies	if	they	are	to	interlink	them.	Absent	those	deeper	understandings,	the	problems	of	
term	override,	namely	ontological	over-determination	and	occlusion,	lead	to	problems	where	
the	human	intent	does	not	translate	to	machine	interpretation.	Furthermore,	where	Web	
developers	lack	an	ability	or	motivation	to	draw	on	multiple	ontologies,	the	space	for	semantics	
is	constrained.	Ultimately,	the	ways	that	ontologies	are	adapted	to	fit	the	constraints	and	
affordances	of	markup	standards	can	result	in	the	differential	enactment	of	the	semantic	web	
as	the	ontologies	are	developed	both	through	seeking	to	accurately	model	an	environment	and	
through	negotiations	with	the	limits	set	forth	by	markup	standards.	The	potential	for	
differential	enactments	of	semantic	data	is	especially	significant	as	ontologies	grow	in	scope	
and	size	where	they	themselves	take	on	the	role	of	a	standard.		
	 My	investigation	into	the	interactions	between	communities	of	practice	and	markup	
standards	leads	to	the	following	conclusions.	In	line	with	past	work	on	standards,	the	various	
actors	involved	with	Schema.org	have	a	tenuous	relationship	with	the	markup	standards	used	
to	enact	semantic	data	(Bowker	and	Star	1999;	Epstein	2007,	2010;	Heimer	2001;	Whooley	
2010,	2014;	Whooley	and	Horwitz	2013).	In	part,	I	agree	with	this	research,	finding	that	while	
standards	do	enable	interoperability	in	many	ways,	they	require	users	to	work	around	their	
limitations.	Here	this	takes	the	form	of	deploying	a	different	standard	to	circumvent	an	
imposed	constraint.	While	workarounds	exist,	they	were	not	the	most	common	negotiation	in	
my	data,	particularly	as	development	progresses.	Ontologists	do	not	like	to	advocate	for	using	
multiple	standards,	and	they	prefer	not	to	modify	the	ontology	unless	absolutely	necessary.	
Instead,	I	side	with	Halpin	(2016)	finding	that	rather	than	working	around	the	limitations	
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imposed	by	standards,	actors	usually	act	creatively	to	work	with	and	through	them.	This	
happens	in	a	few	main	ways.	I	show	that	standards	force	ontologists	to	compromise	by	
modifying	types	and	properties	to	fit	into	syntax	rules	that	might	otherwise	not	have	been	
appropriate	to	use	in	such	circumstances,	mitigating	the	standards’	limiting	influence.		I	also	
show	that	ontologists	have	some	measure	of	control	over	the	standards	themselves,	modifying	
them	to	fit	the	ontology.	Additionally,	I	show	that	users	deploy	the	ontology	in	ways	that	while	
semantically	over-determine	their	content,	provides	some	level	of	semantics.	These	
practitioners	negotiate	the	limitations	of	different	standards	differently	depending	on	the	
standard	implicated,	the	possibility	of	affecting	large	amounts	of	markup,	the	complexity	of	the	
solution	for	the	ontology,	and	the	added	complication	of	a	fix	for	users.	This	affirms	much	of	
the	extant	literature,	attesting	to	standards’	jussive	power.	Additionally,	it	contributes	to	the	
recent	debate	on	how	practitioners	negotiate	the	limitations	imposed	by	standards.		
	 Furthermore,	there	is	evidence	to	suggest	that	the	various	markup	standards	work	to	
create	multiple	ontological	states,	as	the	unique	affordances	and	constraints	of	each	contribute	
to	the	differential	enactment	of	semantics.	In	the	limited	example	in	this	study,	we	can	see	such	
an	effect	with	the	differential	abilities	of	Microdata,	RDFa,	and	JSON-LD,	particularly	as	they	
pertain	to	allowing	for	multiple	context	files	and	property	types	for	a	single	instance.	Certain	
markup	standards	are	simply	more	expressive	than	others	for	a	given	ontology.	While	I	have	
not	done	additional	empirical	research	on	this	matter,	I	would	expect	new	work	to	support	that	
suspicion	since	there	are	many	other	markup	standards	that	are	not	supported	by	Schema.org	
and	are	used	for	other	semantic	web	ontologies.	Each	with	their	own	set	of	affordances	and	
constraints.		
	159	
	 Chapter	six	discusses	the	underlying	processes	of	development.	It	does	so	in	two	main	
ways.	First,	it	outlines	the	underlying	design	philosophies	and	systems	of	thought	that	
ontologists	use	to	craft	Schema.org.	Second,	it	investigates	the	development	and	deployment	
of	the	ontology	in	terms	of	the	interactions	between	ontologists	and	users.	I	find	that	the	
ontologists	and	users	alike,	adopt	a	pragmatic	view	of	ontologies	and	their	work.	By	basing	
many	of	their	development	decisions	on	actual	usage	on	the	Web,	they	opt	for	an	empirically	
grounded	approach	to	model	world	relations	in	a	way	that	they	believe	best	resonates	with	
their	understanding	of	it.	Furthermore,	they	do	not	assume	that	they	have	a	necessarily	correct	
world	image	in	the	way	that	past	work	has	portrayed	knowledge	engineers	and	ontologists	
(Forsythe	1993,	2001;	Ribes	and	Bowker	2009;	Waller	2016).	Instead,	Schema.org’s	ontologists	
debate	both	the	existing	state	of	the	world	and	the	best	way	to	represent	it.	They	attempt	to	
arrive	at	consensus	for	both	the	world	image	and	the	way	to	best	model	that	image.	Central	to	
this	view	is	that	they	recognize	the	problem	inherent	to	their	task.	As	a	means	to	navigate	the	
tension	between	precision	and	applicability	ontologists	and	users	try	to	make	the	ontology	as	
generalizable	as	possible.	This	helps	to	make	the	ontology	easier	to	use	and	more	adaptable	
across	domains,	as	ontologists	develop	in	a	way	that	permits	broad	interpretation	and	users	
deploy	markup	in	creative	ways,	something	particularly	useful	for	navigating	the	limitations	
discussed	in	chapter	five.	
By	adopting	this	approach	ontologists	and	users	create	a	complication	of	context.	While	
ontologists	use	such	design	models	to	allow	their	ontologies	to	be	deployed	independent	of	
particular	domain	contexts,	they	actually	determine	context	in	both	local	and	global	ways.	
Locally,	contexts	are	removed	from	their	initial	development	and	the	reasserted	as	terms	and	
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properties	are	used	across	domains.	It	serves	to	impute	a	specific	context	to	a	particular	
application	at	that	local	level,	despite	the	sometimes	problematic	imputation.	Simultaneously,	
the	ontology	determines	global	context	by	constructing	a	bounded	meaning	space.	This	
confirms	the	concern	raised	in	recent	work	that	an	ontology	constructs	a	world	taken	as	a	
whole	(Ford	and	Graham	2016;	Halford	et	al.	2013;	McCarthy	2017;	Waller	2016).	Ontological	
states	are	circumscribed	at	both	levels	of	granularity.	At	each	level,	what	can	and	cannot	be	
said	or	interpreted	is	dictated	by	the	ontology.	At	the	local	level,	what	can	be	said	in	a	domain	is	
limited	to	what	domain	specific	knowledge	is	encoded	in	the	ontology,	or	what	is	generalizable	
from	others.	At	the	global	level,	what	can	be	said	in	total,	as	well	as	where	the	localities	sit	in	
relation	to	others,	is	defined	and	exposed	by	its	existence	in	the	ontology,	or	occluded	by	its	
omission	(Knobel	2010).		
	 This	contributes	to,	and	extends	recent	work	on	practice	in	STS.	Following	this	“turn	to	
ontology”	(Lynch	2013;	Woolgar	and	Lezuan	2013,	2015;	Sismondo	2015).	I	do	not	make	the	
assumption	that	there	is	a	picture	of	the	world	that	ontologists	are	getting	right	or	wrong.	
Instead	I	add	to	this	turn,	by	exploring	how	ontologists	and	users	are	engaged	in	negotiating	
with	the	various	situated	components	of	the	data	assemblage.	These	engagements	enact	a	
particular	understanding	of	the	world	for	machines,	but	are	dependent	on	the	ontology	used,	
the	standards	deployed,	the	way	markup	is	performed,	and	the	content	that	is	encoded.	Thus,	
ontology	in	this	respect	can	be	said	to	be	multiple,	particularly	as	contexts	are	continually	re-
determined	(Mol	2002;	Sismondo	2015).	However,	while	STS	work	on	multiple	ontologies	
eventually	converge	to	enact	the	thing	in	question,	for	the	semantic	web,	ontologies	remain	
multiple.	That	is,	their	states	do	not	converge	to	create	a	unified	thing.	Additionally,	I	add	to	
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this	work	by	showing	precisely	how	“being”	is	premediated	by	the	technological	systems	
(Aneesh	2017).		
	 This	also	contributes	to	gaps	that	exist	in	our	understanding	of	AI.	In	this	study,	I	
attempt	to	reinvigorate	long	dormant	work	on	AI	and	expert	systems	from	the	slumbers	of	the	
AI	winter22.	Present	day	ontologists,	and	the	knowledge	engineers	of	early	AI	systems	have	
different	views	of	what	they	are	doing.	My	data	suggests	the	opposite	of	the	work	by	Agre	
(1995),	Collins	(1987,	1990),	Forsythe	(1993a,	1993b),	and	Star	(1995).	Rather	than	seeing	
knowledge	as	something	easily	extracted	or	converted	for	machine	understanding,	the	
Schema.org	ontologists	recognize	the	difficulty	of	making	these	translations.	While	the	
knowledge	engineers	in	that	work	see	the	problem	as	simply	one	of	managing	human	
description	errors,	these	ontologists	see	the	problem	as	a	matter	of	pragmatic	consensus	
building.	Where	consensus	is	agreement	amongst	user,	experts,	ontologists,	and	the	ontological	
orderings	of	Schema.org.	They	understand	that	they	are	choosing	the	terms	and	relations,	and	
understand	that	a	trade-off	between	precision	and	practicality	is	usually	inevitable.	Thus	their	
approach	to	development	reflects	their	interpretations	of	the	state	of	users,	consumers,	the	
state	of	the	Web,	and	the	current	state	of	the	ontology.	Furthermore,	I	fill	the	gap	left	by	past	
work	that	ignores	translations	between	humans	and	machines	(Agre	1995;	Collins	1990;	
Forsythe	1993a,	1993b;	Ribes	and	Bowker	2009)	through	their	specific	focus	on	the	translation	
between	different	experts	and	cultural	communities.		
																																																						
22	This	term	reflects	the	temporary	abandonment	of	AI	across	governments,	academics,	popular	
press,	tech	companies,	and	venture	capital	as	computing	power	and	actual	applications	could	
not	live	up	to	the	promises	of	artificial	intelligence.	See	Wikipedia	(2017)	for	further	details.		
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Where	the	space	for	expressing	semantics	is	constrained	by	ontological	consolidation	
and	frictions	between	human	and	machine	translations,	Web	consumers	are	provided	with	
limited	understandings	of	the	world.	Of	course	while	humans	have	the	capacity	to	exercise	their	
socio-cultural	knowledge	(Collins	1990)	to	interrogate	and	develop	meaning	from	information,	
they	are	limited	where	the	provenance,	methodology,	and	contexts	of	that	information	is	
hidden.	Overall,	these	questions	contribute	broadly	to	sociological	concerns	of	information	
asymmetries	and	access.	As	the	AI	winter	thaws,	and	Web	environments	continually	shift	in	
ways	that	make	that	contextual	information	less	visible	and	answers	more	ready	to	hand,	
understanding	how	systems	like	AI	and	semantic	search	are	developed	becomes	more	
important.	While	the	semantic	web	and	AI	mediated	search	offer	many	promises	for	efficiency	
and	knowledge	acquisition,	a	critical	analytic	eye	must	remain	on	their	implementations.		
	 This	study	is	not	without	its	limitations.	I	can	identity	at	least	two.	First,	this	study	only	
examines	one	semantic	web	ontology.	Ideally,	a	study	that	attempts	to	understand	the	multiple	
ways	that	ontological	states	are	determined	for	AI	and	other	computational	agents	would	be	
able	to	examine	the	multiple	ways	that	they	are	developed	across	ontologies.	As	I	argue	
throughout	this	work,	the	given	state	is	a	function	of	the	complex	interactions	between	
assemblage	components.	Thus	a	comparative	study	would	have	been	illustrative	on	this	front.	
Problematically,	I	know	of	no	such	comparative	site	for	research.	There	are	relatively	few	
ontologies	that	are	actively	developed,	and	fewer	still	that	are	developed	as	openly	and	with	as	
much	supporting	evidence	as	Schema.org.	Wikidata	does	offer	some	window	into	its	
construction,	but	it	is	not	as	rich	or	comprehensive	as	Schema.org.	Additionally,	it	does	not	
have	the	same	type	of	community	involvement,	so	there	is	not	a	similar	level	of	exposure	to	the	
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ontology’s	user	base.	Despite	this	limitation,	my	research	convincingly	shows	the	ways	that	the	
interactions	between	components	produce	a	specific	ontological	state.	I	think	that	my	work,	
and	the	limited	work	on	other	ontologies,	allows	for	the	logical	assumption	that	the	specific	
interactions	in	other	ontological	assemblages	might	produce	other	states.		
	 A	second	limitation,	noted	in	the	methods	chapter,	is	that	I	was	not	able	to	conduct	in-
depth	interviews	with	community	members.	While	the	data	used	contain	all	of	the	public	
discussion	on	how	to	best	alter	and	apply	the	ontology,	it	does	not	contain	any	backchannel	
communications.	My	research	indicated	that	backchannel	communications	happened	regularly	
between	steering	group	members.	Most	of	the	time	those	discussions	are	disclosed	to	the	
group	with	a	summary	of	the	results,	but	the	actual	content	of	some	of	those	discussions	is	lost.	
This	may	be	fine	for	continued	work	on	the	project	from	the	perspective	of	a	developer,	but	
from	an	analytic	perspective,	there	could	be	information	important	to	my	findings,	for	or	
against.	Additionally,	since	the	data	are	entirely	textual	and	interviews	were	not	performed	for	
this	study,	there	is	no	possibility	for	follow	up	or	clarification	questions	that	are	not	covered	or	
alluded	to	in	the	two	main	research	sites.	However,	the	vast	majority	of	decisions	and	
rationales,	as	well	as	all	modifications	and	development	were	public	and	so	these	limitations	
seem	negligible.		
	 One	final	aspect	of	this	research	that	is	missing,	but	perhaps	not	a	limitation	per	se,	is	
that	there	was	no	practicable	way	to	investigate	the	actual	displayed	and	final	form	of	user’s	
markup.	Markup	is	available	in	source	code,	but	the	sheer	volume	of	markup	applied	is	beyond	
the	scope	of	even	a	team	of	researchers.	However,	a	systematic	survey	of	semantic	markup	in	
use	could	allow	for	a	discursive	analysis	similar	to	the	type	used	by	Ford	and	Graham	(2016).	
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While	one	could	certainly	interrogate	sematic	markup,	problematically,	its	provenance	is	lost.	
This	is	not	a	limitation	of	this	study,	as	it	is	outside	of	the	scope	and	scale	here.	Additionally,	
because	these	systems	are	deterministic,	one	can	fully	comprehend	the	range	of	possibility	by	
understanding	the	standards	and	ontology	coverage	at	a	given	time.	However,	it	poses	
interesting	empirical	questions	about	in	situ	deployment	of	Schema.org	markup.		
This	study	closes	some	questions,	but	doing	so,	opens	others.	Recent	work	in	data	and	
code	studies	has	been	largely	oriented	towards	critique.	While	my	research	certainly	took	a	
critical	eye	towards	the	limitations	of	Schema.org	and	the	semantic	web	more	generally,	
critique	in	a	more	critical	theoretic	tradition	was	not	my	aim.	However,	following	from	that	
tradition	an	analysis	of	the	power	relationship	that	exist	within	and	through	the	semantic	web’s	
development	would	be	productive.	Work	in	this	area	would	do	well	to	take	critical	feminist	and	
postcolonial	approaches	to	the	ways	that	the	semantic	web	builds	worlds	to	foreclose	on	
certain	knowledges	while	expanding	on	others,	such	as	the	decidedly	Western	and	commercial	
orientation	Schema.org	has.	Such	analyses	might	adopt	critical	discourse	analyses	of	the	
coverage	of	ontologies	by	mapping	out	what	different	domains	are	covered	by	major	
ontologies,	what	sort	of	equivalencies	they	establish,	and	how	they	reflect	and	reinforce	
dominant	power	relationships	that	exist	at	large.	
Additional	work	might	look	at	other	forms	of	bias	that	enter	into	technical	systems.	Such	
critical	approaches	might	also	investigate	the	ways	in	which	peer	production	creates	its	own	set	
of	biases	on	technical	systems.	Conventionally,	peer	production	would	seem	like	a	way	to	
mitigate	the	existence	of	bias	in	code	based	systems,	but	as	other	work	has	shown,	biases	that	
exist	at	larger	levels	of	social	organization	often	manifest	themselves	in	technical	systems	
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(Barocas	and	Selbst	2016;	Friedman	and	Nissenbaum	1996;	Noble	2013;	Sweeny	2013).	This	is	
particularly	the	case	with	AI	systems	that	rely	on	deep	neural	networks	which	are	unavailable	
for	even	machine	learning	experts	to	scrutinize.		
	 Currently,	semantic	technologies	are	developed	manually	by	individual	or	teams	of	
ontologists.	They	debate	the	ways	to	define	terms,	relationships,	and	their	domain	contexts	all	
for	users	to	apply	to	their	content.	The	processes	outlined	by	various	scholars	all	involve	the	
situated	practical	activity	of	individuals	to	translate	expertise	and	organize	knowledge	in	a	way	
that	is	amenable	to	computer	scientists	(Collins	1990;	Forsythe	1993;	Khazaree	and	Khoo	2011;	
McCarthy	2017;	Millerand	&	Bowker	2009,	Ribes	and	Bowker	2009,	Ribes	and	Finholt	2009).	In	
this	way,	the	process	of	constructing	ontologies	is	still	available	for	scrutiny.	However,	recent	
advances	in	natural	language	processing	and	state	of	the	art	machine	learning	algorithms	like	
Word2vec	promise	to	automate	these	processes.	At	the	moment	these	famously	black	boxed	
neural	network	algorithms	are	too	computationally	expensive	to	run	at	Web	scale,	but	as	
processing	units	become	more	powerful,	smaller,	and	more	efficient,	we	may	soon	see	
Pandora’s	box	close	for	good.		
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Appendix:	
Glossary	of	Terms	
	
Commits:		 These	are	the	specific	changes	to	a	repository.	
Enumerations:	 A	set	of	available	categories	and	the	set	of	values	that	rest	within	those	
categories	
Fork:		 This	is	the	process	of	marking	a	separate	version	of	the	master	repository.	
When	one	wants	to	make	a	change	to	the	master	repository,	one	creates	a	fork	
from	the	master,	makes	a	specific	set	of	changes,	and	then	uploads	those	
changes	for	approval.	
Issues:		 These	are	the	main	tasks	that	are	created	for	specific	work.	On	GitHub,	they	
take	a	threaded	form,	each	with	a	hyperlinked	number.	Issues	are	varied	and	
can	be	for	specific	coding	tasks,	simple	documentary	changes,	goal	setting,	etc.	
They	are	linked	to	pull	requests	and	commits	when	action	is	taken	on	them.	
Issues	can	either	be	merged	with	other	issues	when	substantially	similar,	
closed	when	completed,	deemed	irrelevant,	unimportant,	or	open	when	still	
actively	being	worked	on.	
Literals:	 Specific	string	values	that	indicate	a	value	precisely	without	IRIs	
Pull	Requests:		 Pull	requests	are	notifications	sent	to	the	working	group	indicating	that	a	
developer	has	made	changes	on	a	project	that	are	awaiting	review.		
	
Repository:		 These	are	the	stores	of	all	versions,	code,	and	metadata	for	a	project.		
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